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THE APHORISMS OF 8’A’NDILYA = COMMENTARY OF SWAPNES’WARA.
J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL. D.
van 2 CALCUTTA:
PRINTED BY C. B. LEWIS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. 1861.
Ind L 212, 35 `
v7
+,
8 त cae
VALS WAP .. "4 Woods 1935
ADVERTISEMENT.
THE following work was more than half printed, when Dr. Ballantyne left this country for his new post in London, and the remaining sheets were car- ried through the press by Professor Griffith, his suc- cessor in the Benares Sanskrit College.
We extract from the preface to the editor’s prize essay on “Christianity contrasted with Hindu phi- losophy,”’ the following remarks on the work itself.
‘‘There are some Sanskrit books yet untranslated, which the writer must study before deciding upon his theological terminology for India. Among these works is the Aphorisms of S'dndilya. S‘andilya rejects the Hinda (gnostic) theory that knowledge is the one thing needful, and contends that knowledge is only the handmaid of faith.”’
Hence, besides its intrinsic value as illustrating a peculiar phase of the Vedanta philosophy, S’andilya’s work has an additional value as bearing on the ques- tion of the proper Sanskrit phraseology for theological controversy.
Dr. Ballantyne hopes to publish hereafter a trans- lation of the Aphorisms, if his present engagements allow him leisure to complete it.
ए. 3. C. Secretary, B. A. $,
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शद्धिपचम्।
खश्दम् । तद्पेच्चायां "्ागब्रद्यणा तच्नलानिति भगवते दत्त नेवे- दयनिमाल्यादिकं तया
कर णासम्बन्पस्य
पदम् । तदपेच्तया
TATA AT तच्जलानीति
i भगवते cw नेवेद्यमाल्यादिकः
तया करणस MAY
चुटिपचम्।
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Re ८ ्टसिं्पु° | pony | BloRR
ar द सिंहपु° | Hoc | Bo २१
४९ १५ AIMS To To | पद | THR
प्ार्डिल्यश्तखचीयं भाष्यम् । टक्के
परमे खस जयति |
प्रपद्य परमं देवं श्रीखभ्रेश्चरदरिणा।
शाण्डिस्यश्रतद्धौयं भाव्यमाभाव्यतेऽधृना ॥ ९॥
गोाविन्दचरणद्न्दमधुने मदद हुतम् |
यत्पायिनो न मुद्यन्ति wai यद्पायिनः॥२॥
Marat ब्रह्मभावापत्तिमुक्तिरिति वच्यते are ब्रह्म
रोाऽत्यन्तमभिक्ला इति तेषां संसारस्तिगृणात्मकान्तःकरणा- पाधिकता न सादजिकः स्फरि कस्येव जपादिसज्निधिरतं Sif त्यादिकं ख दपाधिकलादेव न ज्ञानेन निवत्तनोयः faa पाध्युपधेययोरन्यतरहानेम तत्छम्बन्धष्टानेन वा नहि निपणतर्- दभ्ननाण्युपाधियोगे स्फरिकलोादित्यभ्रमनिटत्तिरस्ि तथे न॒ सवेसन्तास्फुरणात्मना हानिः सम्भवति नवा सम्बन्धख तस्य तदुभयसखदूपानतिरकात् परिग्रषादुपाधिहानादेव भ्रम- निद्तिनात्मज्ञामात् उपाभिदाने च कारणान्तरमन्बेष्टयये त्र भक्तिरोवाला किकला छरतिरूतिसिद्ध | तया (Are | अ०९४ | BToa) । `
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a4 we निमललत्वात् प्रकाश्कमनामयम।
सुखसङ्गेन aurfa ज्ञानषङ्न चानघ ।॥९॥
रजा रागात्मकं विद्धि टष्णासङ्गसमुद्धवम्,
तज्निवैप्नाति aria कमेसङ्गेन Sera te i
तमस्न्ञानजं विद्धि मादनं सर्व॑देडिमाम।
मादालस्यनिद्राभिस्तन्िवघ्राति भारत ie i TAIRA | | 4 मां च योऽव्यभिचारेण भक्तियोगेन सेवते। स गुणान् समतीत्यैतान् ब्रह्मण्याय कल्यते ॥ इल्युपसंहरन् भगवानेवात्ममक्रेस्तिगृणात्मकान्तःकरण-
ल यपुवकन्रह्यानन्दावात्तिलच्षणमुक्तिदेततामाद | मचात्मन्ना- AAU अरश्रद्धामलक्तालनेन भक्तावुपये गात् नलपरोकच्ता- न्तःकरणरूपा पाधिधमोध्यासनिराससम्थै ज्ञानम् श्रत एव (Hora store) whey परं वेत्ति agrd साऽधि- गच्छतीति (Tre at Bl सो g ९) waafseqdnafaayi- दावथमथः zl एव नचाज्ञानष्टतः संसारो येन ज्ानान्नि- Pacha aa शक्या प्रमाणाभावात् रजतावयवारैः कार- ` शच्याभावाद श्रातश्युकतित उत्पत्यसमवाच् | श्रपिच (ere | ०३०२) HIE खल् ered स्छादखतः सञ्जायतेति रतिः का्यंसत्तया कारणसन्चां बाधयन्तो संसारस्य सत्यलमेवाड | fatty (ङकान्दा०।पु० Roy) सद्यसकल्त्य इत्यादिना पर- मेश्वरखगंस्य। नापि भगवान् बादरायणः कचिद्पि खत
[चअ०१।च्वा०] शाण्डिल्यशतखचोयं भाष्यम् । OR
संसारस्याज्ञान्नकल्ितलमक्तवान प्रत्यत खश्रशटष्िनिराकरणेन | STUGe: खत्यलम् । नच..दृष्टान्तायं तत् मानाभावात्। सुखादिधमाणां त atefaan नोापपद्यते सुखादयो न साचादराद्मविकारा श्रद्मनि प्रतीोयमानलाद्भारतल्ादिवत। सुखाद्यपलसिः सकरणिका क्रियालादिव्यव खाचवात सम वायेनेव कर णजन्यत्वं युज्यते रा जजन्यलमिव अब्दस्य सुखा- दयः करप्खम्बेताः waeifxaarwavaa weafefa परमते | ` उभंयमते स्यर्भन्येद्दियग्राद्यगणवात्। अत्मधि- faq स्वसन्ताप्रकाश्रकतयेति। सवंमेतद्भितीये तोये स्फुरो- : भवि्यति। aaa पुरुषार्थरेत॒लाद्ध्म्धेव weafaterata- ;' wat खचम्। | | अथात भक्तिजिन्नासा ॥ Vi श्रयेव्यधिकारायथा array: | श्रानन्तयं हिन खाध्य-
aware श्रानिन्द्ययेन्यधिरतेवच्यममणत्वात्। नापि शमा- दि षन्पत्यथः ममनच्तामाजख मक्यधिकारतात्। यथया मन्वणः ंता०। ए०२६९) |
या ware विदधाति ya
यावै acty ufettia aa
तं इ Kanraaiguara
Hass शरणमहं प्रपथे ॥ दति ।
नच मङ्गलाथीाऽपि तद्च्चारणमाचस् मङ्गललात्। तथाच
wager भक्तिविचारः क्त्य cau fawrear विचार 8 2
[ee श्राणिल्यश्तदधवीयं भाष्यम्। OL oe
आकि्यते। यद्यपि परमेश्वरानुरङष्पाया wit waa छतिसाध्यतं न वा ब्रह्मवजनश्ेयलं तयापि तस्याः खकारणएपवंसु- छृतेडिकनाणभकह्यादि सन्पन्नाया श्रपि नेयं मक्तिः नेयं जिःओेय- साया नयमन्तमविषयेव्यादि कुतककबेलनेन निदटत्तिरपि भवति यथा पत्थो पल्याः। तन्निरासमखेनव तन्मोमांसाया भक्रावपयाग इति श्रतःश्ब्देनाच्यते। यतः कुतकनिरासाऽपेचणीयः wa- स्तव्जिन्नाखेति। श्रत एव, (विष्ण ०।अंगे ९।अ०२०।ा०९६)। माय योनिसदखेषु येषु येषु व्रजाम्यहम् | तेषु तेष्वचला भक्रिरच्यतास्तु सदा लयोति॥ तद विच्यतिप्रायथनमपेचितलादिति। wa एव च फलव- द्ध क्ङ्गमपि विचारः फलवानेवेति ॥९॥ अय तस्या लाकिकाकारतामन्तरेण बद्यानारोाडहान्न वि- चार विषयत्वमतस्तन्नचण मच्यते | ke सा TCH WR aa सा परेति wafage: | शेषं लच्णम्। परेति गाणीं व्यावन्तंयति । श्र दूति प्रषठताभिप्रायम् | श्राराध्य- विषयकरागत्वमेव सा। इष तु परमेश्वरंविषयकान्तःकरण- ठत्तिविशेष एव भक्तिस्तदश्य्यं च लाकिकानुरागादौा सुय- म् । यथोक्तं परभक्रिमता weet (fare ९। अ०२०।न्ञा ०९७) | या प्रीतिरविवेकानां विषयेव्वनपायिनौ। त्वामनस्मरतः सा मे इदयान्मापसपतु॥
[अ०९।खा०१] शण्डिल्यशणतदधच्रौयं भावष्यम्। ` ५
q of
शच प्रीतिपदेन qufaaat राग एव afaa: अनन्यया प्रीतेः सुखदरूपाया निविषयत्वेन विषयसप्रमीन स्यात तद्या सुखस्लानखूपलेऽपि तज्न्नानस्य सुखविषयलत्ाददिषयविषयलास-
मावात। तस्मादनरक्रिरोव खविषयिणी लकिता। नच विषय- ^: जन्यप्रीतिर्थः WATT श्रनननुशासनात्। किञ्च श्रद्य- ". तास्त सदा amaa भक्तेरीश्ररविषयतासिद्का प्रीतिषदेनापि <
तदेकवाक्यतया arya wt प्रतिजन भक्तिप्रायेनमिह विषयरागदृष्टान्तेन तस्या एव सवयथा्परिदार्यलप्रार्यन- fafa fava: | विषयजन्यप्रौीतिरपि रागं विना न सम्भवतीति
+~ 4
रागावश्चकत्वम्। तथाच पातञ्ञलद्धचम्। (APRs) |
सुखानश्यी राग. tf तस्येव वच्यमाणएलिङ्षु व्यापना- छाघवाख भक्तित्वम्। नतु क्रचित् सरणस्य। कवित कोत- नारेः अ्रनन्गमात्। नच तज्ज्ञानस्य ad द्वेषादिमत्छपि तत्रसङ्ात्। नापया राध्यलेन ज्ञानं खा पजानमसकाराद्यारा- धनास्ननगमात्। अपिच बला्धयाद्रा नमस्कार्यवादिजन्ञान- त्यपि भक्ताऽयमनुरक्राऽयमिति व्यवहारापत्तेः ्रनुरागादि- सहिताराध्यलज्ञाममिति चेत् श्रनुराग एवास्ह श्रत एव (Aol श्र०९०।द्ा*९)।
मित्ता मद्रतप्राण बेधयन्तः परस्परम्।
कथयन्तश्च मां नित्यं तन्ति च cata ae il
तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रोतिपुवेकम् |
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्तिते॥ ९॥
¢ | WfSALIGN भावष्यम्। [ अ०९।च्धा ०१]
दत्यादै तद्तचिन्तप्राणादौनां भजनमुक्तं नाराध्यतेन श्ञानवतामेव। अत एव च छष्यास्य कमनौोयाङतिर शनेनानुर- कानां गेोपतरुणीनामपि भक्तिफलं मुक्तिः खयते। weg नृ छच्चणान्लगतः faa भगवन्महिमादिज्ञानादनु पञ्चान्ना- यमानलादनुरक्तिरिद्युक्तम्। नम् प्रिजादिगेाचरानुरागस्छापि ` श्रङछतभक्िल्ं प्रसज्येत जगत एव परमेश्वरा्मलवात्। श्रय विकाराविशिष्ट एव तथालं बां तथापि गेपौप्रशतीनां भआादुभोवावच्छननेश्वरभक्तावव्यापकम्। उच्यते जीवो प्राध्यनव- च्छिन्नचेतनविषयिएो शरनुरक्रिरेव सेति। एवच्च प्रादुभोवाव- च्छिन्ने परिपृणं च रक्तः खग्टहीता भवति॥२॥
तव्दखस्याग्डतत्वोपट्शात् ॥ ३॥
तस्िन्नीश्वरे संस्था भक्तिर्यस्य ख तथोक्तः तस्याग्डतलं फलमुपदि श्यते (का०।४०१२७) ब्रह्मसंसाऽम्टतलमेतीति । तस्मान्निष्फलतलगेणफलतलनिबन्भना तद जिज्ञासा प्रिता भवतोति) ३॥
ज्ञानमिति चेन्न दिषताऽपि ज्ञानस्य तद संस्थितेः॥ ४॥
ननु बह्यसंस्थाशन्देन नद्ध ्नानमेवेाच्यते मत॒ तद्धक्तिः। तथाचाग्डतलफ़रलं तदेवेति Wee नेष दोषः । सस्या भक्ति रेव न ज्ञानं दिषतस्तन्त्नानवताऽपि तत्संसखव्रव्यवदडारा- भावात्। राजाद्यनुरक्ताः खल्वमात्यमिचादयस्तत्छंस्था इति
[orate | शाख्डिल्यशतदधबीयं WTAE | ©
व्यपदिश्छन्ते न पुनः प्रतिपक्तमुषालाः। शन्डा्थनिणया fe लाकवद्टेव वेरेऽपीति। wa एव वचिरकालिकापाख्याने | विग्टश्यते न कालेन पल्लीसं स्थाव्यतिक्रमः। शाऽब्रवौख शं त्ता दुःखेनाश्रुणि वतंयन् ॥ दत्यमेन पतिभक्यतिक्रम उक्रः। तस्मात् संखा भक्ति- रिति। एवश्च (ब्रह्मद ०। अ०१।प ०७) तज्निष्टस्य माशपदेशा- दिति बादरायणोयद्धनस्या्यमेवार्थाऽध्यवसेय इति॥४॥ तंयेपिक्तया् ॥५॥ तया भ्या मुक्तिं प्रति ज्ञानमुपच्चौणं यस्माखचकार TH- युक्रिमृच्धयायेः (गो ०।अर ० ७। सो ०१३) | “देवान् देवयजो यान्ति मद्धक्रा यान्ति मामपि | cafe तया म्रह्वादं प्रति भगवेद्धाक्यम्। (fares चशे LW Ro BTR A) | अथा ते निश्चलं सेना भवि भक्िखमन्वितम् | तथा लं amas निवाणएमपि यास्यसि i दति fara नम् (शे०।ष०द२७) तमेव विदिलातिष्ठ- afta नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनायेत्यच वेदनफलं मुक्तिः श्रता तदिरोधेन खतीनामन्यार्थलं स्यादिति चेन्न श्रजापि तयेवाप- चयात् । तथाहि श्रतिग्टल्युपदं न मुक्ता रूढं किन्तु यसां सत्यां ग्टह्योरतिक्रम tra तदपेच्ायां यता भक्तर्डंत्य्वतिक्रम दति व्युत्पाद्य भक्रिमेवातिग्डल्युपदे नाभिधत्ताम् उपपद विभक्य- WIA कार कविभश्ययंसख बलवच्वात् । (गी ० wo RIS)!
< शाण्डिल्यश्तदखचोयं भाव्यम्। [चख १०१]
तेषामहं TAKA ग्ट्युसंसारखागरात् | भवामि म चिरात् पाथं मय्यावेशितचेतसाम् ॥ दत्यादिना भक्ता गत्यवतिक्रमप्राप्नेः। aay भवति (तैत्तिरौयमन्भागे ) sar यजामहे सुगन्धिं ufsagaa | Sasa बन्धनाक्रत्योमुक्तीय माद्हतादिति। wa यजनं भक्रिः तथेव तत्कल्पव्याख्यानात्। नचास्यां wat भक्तरसन्निधानं मृक्तावपि ठल्यलात्। तस्मादनपायिश्ुत्या ज्ानस्यापच्य एव प्रतौयत दति uy ti |
ननु तथापि भक्रेरागरूपत्वे किं कारणएमित्यपेच्चायामाइ | दषप्रतिपक्षभावाद्रसणश्ब्दाच्च रागः ॥ ई ॥ .
भक्तिः खल् राग एव भवितुमदति ga: इषविरोधि- ara लाकं fe gard भक्राऽयमिति मिथो विरद्धघमेवति व्यवद्धियते aa द्ेषविरोाधी च राग एव म्रसिद्धान ज्ञाना- दिः। एवञ्च वैष्णवे भगवति शिष्डुपालस्य देषानुबन्धमभि- धाय wa fe भगवान् कोल्तितः संरूतञख देषानुबन्धेनापि अखिलखरासुरदुलंभं फलं प्रयच्छति किमत सम्यग्भकिमता- भिदयुक्म्। तथाचाजिक्छता। विद्धषादपि गेविन्दं दमघोषात्मजः ATA faugarer गतः खमे किं पनस्त्परायणः॥ इति । aarfa देषविरोधिलेन भक्रेरभिघानात्। तथाच arg (गो ° श्र ०९६।स्ञा०१८) |
(aoyretee] शाण्डिल्यश्वदङचीयं भाव्यम् ! हट
मामात्मपरदेदेषु प्रदिंषन्ताऽभ्यङयकाः |
तामं दिषतः array संसारेषु नराधमान् ॥
चिपाम्यजसखमब्रभानासुरोव्येव योनिषु |
wet? योनिमापन्ना मूढा जन्मनि जक्नि॥
मामप्राप्यैव कने तते या्यधमां गतिम्। इति।
तद्िरोधिनीच भक्रिरीश्वरविष॑येवानुरक्रिरिति gaat
fag (aforgece) रसं Yard लब्घानन्दीभवतीति were ब्रह्मानन्द्ाविभोावम्क्तेब्रह्यगोचरस्य Tau aara- HA TTY रागः (गो०।अ०२। Bowe) |
THIS रसोऽप्यस्य परं get भिवरस॑ते। |
द्धारो प्रसिद्धः wa रसा विषयरागः। wa wa चख
रामलश्मणदीनां खलाकारोदणमक्ता येऽपि तेषु भगवदं- नेष्वनु रागिणः कोश्लणनगरनानपदास्तेऽपि वन्मनससत्ला- कतामापरिति साल्लादेव भक्रावनुरागशब्द्ः vam that तस्मादपि न ज्ञानं किन््मुरागरूपेव भक्तिभिः ख्रेयसफलेति । ननु देषविरोधिलवं न tine लिङ्गम् उद्ासोनलेनानेकाग्या- दिति Gai उच्यते tena निटृत्तिस्दिरोधिनी wefa- रिति। भवति च भक्तानां भजनोयानुवन्तनादोा प्रटत्ति- सदधिरोधिनां तदनवन्तनादे fash) एवञ्च कार्यमुखेन विरोघधमभिप्रेत्य देषविपरकषेतयुक्म्। तथाच प्रयोक्तव्यं भक्ति- भजनोयगेचररागरूपा तदनुवन्तनादि हे तुडितसाधनताधी- भिन्लाक्विग्रेषगुणएलाद् wad ad यथा देषः । tired
9
६ साखिल्यग्रतद्धजीयं भाव्यम्) were)
तदमवन्लतना दयुत्कषंस्य दृष्टवा) किञ्च ये afer भक्तस्तक तस्यदासीन्या भावेऽवगते भक्तिसादृशरानुवसंना चनुकूलरेषवि- रोाधिगृणरूपा श्नुवत्तंनदेला्मविगरेषग्णवाद्धितसाघनताधौ- वदिति हदितसाघनताधीलबाधषण्दकारेण परि शेषाद्रागत्- िद्धिः। किमुत भक्रिमताभि्येतत्कीम्तिकन्याये विरोधिन्येव LBB) (मीर।श०८। Ble sR) | |
ai fe पाथं वपाञ्चित्य येऽपि स्वः पापयानयः।
किं gaair@ut: ger इत्यादौ च। एवं (गी०।तअर०९६। Bloyc) मामात्मपरदेरेष्ित्यनेन द्वेषस्य संसारहेतलात् तद्विरोधिगणा जोवेापाधिपरिष्ारोण परात्मगाचरो राग एव भक्रिरूपः संसारनाणश्डेतुः। एतदेवोक्तं मामप्राथेवेति। watt पुलकादिरागलिङ्गेनापि casa प्रसिद्धं fe यृलकाश्चितेन कथयति मब्यनुरागं कपेखेनेत्यादो । भक्रे- यणएान्तरत्वे तु एयग्लिङ्गताकल्षने भेरवात्। सच रागः कषांचिदिषटसाघननतान्ञानजन्पाऽपि यागादिव्दिच्छारूप एव) waa तु ्रीणग्यनुरज्यामि नेच्छामोत्यादिप्रतीतेरागः एय- गेव देषवत्। इच्छाया श्रसिद्धमाचविषयलाद्रष्गख बिद्धा- सिद्ध विषयलःख । प्रत्युत तस्येच्छालादिव्यायलकल्यनागेारवा- खेति faq तस्मान तल्लखणारिङ्रिति॥ ६॥
ननु भक्तिः क्रियात्मिका साचनिःखेयसाय न aaa (afar ava) fears ऋक् २९) न कर्णा न प्रजया धनेन ल्याभे- नेकंऽम्डतलमानष्रित्यादिश्रुतिग्य इत्याश परिदरब्राइ,।.
[source] «- wifeanmaaste area | श
न क्रिया कछ्त्यनपेक्षणाज्न्नानवत् ॥ 9 सा भक्रिनं क्रियात्मिका भवितुमरति प्रयल्नानुविधामा- भावात् | यन्न प्रयन्नानुविधायि तन्न क्रियात्मक यया ज्ञानम्। तद्धि प्रमाणएसम्पत्यधोनं म पुरुषेण खेच्छया करत्तुमकर््तमन्यथा aa शक्यते। तथा भक्तिरपि । महि रागिणां प्रमदापुजा- दि विषयिणो पूंव्यापारेण तथा तथा भवति भक्तिः किन पूवेखुरुतगाणभल्यादिसखाधनाधीनेति ॥ ७ ॥ |
i अतएव फलानन्त्यम्॥ ८ ॥ चतः सान क्रियाल्िका अतएव तत्फलस्य निःओेयसद्या- AMAA | अन्यथा (कां °। ४०५२८) तद्ये कर्मजिता लोकः Waa एवमेवामु पु्णिता शलाकः Waa दत्यने- माग्टतत्स्यापि efad प्रसज्येतेति ॥ ८ ॥
तदतः प्रपत्तिशब्दाञ्च न ज्चानमितरगप्रपन्तिवः ॥ < ॥ भवति fe भगवद्ाक्यं (गी०। ्०७। Bove) | बह्भनां जद्मनामन्ते ज्नानवान् मां प्रपद्यते। वासुदेवः स्वमिति ष मदात्मा gees: इति। ज्ामवतः अप्तिरुक्षा | भक्रज्ानरेतुले नेदमृपपद्चते दतर- भ्रपन्तिवदिति। aur तदनन्तरं (tol Wo Ol Broke) | का्मसस्ेहंतज्ञानाः प्रपद्यन्तेऽन्यदेवताः। इत्यनेन देवतान्तरप्पत्तिनिन्दामुखेनेव प्रपत्तिः सयते ।
तच देवताभक्तेरोव प्रपन्तिग्रब्देन कथनं न ATS | तखा ०४
BR खिल्यशवरूजोय भाय्यम्। [ख०१।च्ा०६]
एव प्रप्तेदभयन प्रत्यभिश्चानात् एति । चकाराज्त्ञानान- माव्यंश्रवणमपि ज्ञानलाभावे निदानम् । यथा (गी०।अ०९१। Weve) | at मामेवमसंमढा जानाति पुरषेान्नमम्। स सवंविद्धजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत।॥ इति। तथा (Food 1 Ble Va) | भजन्यनन्यमनसा War दूतादिमवययम्। — दति मला भजन्तेमां बधा भावसमन्विताः ॥ ईति च। aaa marfaart) यद्यपि रागलेनेव ज्ञान मेदः सिद्धूस्तथापि भक्रिशब्दा ब्रह्मज्ञाने जाण दति wer नि राखार्थमेतत् | द्दन्त चिक्ये भगवद्गोतावाक्यानि न शब्दविधया वेदवत् प्रमाणएम्। किन्त भारते रूतिलेन 1 तथाच ay शब्दादिति faru: | अवरैकेऽनुमितन्दादिति व्या चक्षते | श्रचोच्यते श्रदृष्टार्थकमभगवदाक्यत्मेव as ae गीताखप्यविश्िष्टम् । wa एव भगवद्गीताद्धपनिषत्छिति दृश्यते, कवं त एव War व्यासेन निबद्धाः। aura यराणान्तरम् | | गीता gitar awa किमन्यः wrafsge: | या खयं पद्मनाभस्य मृुखपद्मादिनिःखता ॥ मच शद्राणामन्रवणप्रसङ्गः भारतश्रक्णाभ्यन्क्ञानेनेव तद्- we: प्रणवादि स्ठल्यादि वत् तदिदायेति चेन्न लचताऽपरि- एर्तैः । तथाचेोक्तमाचार्थः।
[ख०९।अा ०९] «= - erfaeeaae भाष्यम् | RR
तानेव वेदिकान् wear भारतादिनिवे्ितान्। खाथ्यायनियमं हिला Gregg were ॥ दति ॥< ॥ ष्त्याचाय्येखभ्रेश्रविद्दरविर चिते शाण्डिखन्रतद्नोयभाये प्रथमाध्यायद्य प्रथममाङ्किकम्॥ ९॥ then
एवमग्टतलं प्रत्यनन्यथासिद्धायां wat ललितायां ज्ान- यागभक्रीनामङ्गप्रधानभावविवेकाय दितीयाह्िकस्यारम्भः |
सा मुख्येतरापे्तितत्वात्॥ १०॥ †
आद्किकसमात्तावक्रसखय पनः सरणाय सेति मिदेः, at परा भक्तिर्मस्या प्रधानम् दतरोरात्मन्ञानयोगादिभिः खोाप- कादतथापेकितलादिव्य्यंः। कान्दाम्ये (ए०५९६) यो 2 wat तक्छखमित्याञुपक्रम्बाख्रायते | आआ्मीवेदं स्वमिति खवा एव एवं पश्यं मन्वान wa विजानन्नात्मरतिरात्मकोड श्रात्ममिद्यन आत्मानन्दः स ATE भवतीति तच्ातक्रति- ख्पायाः परभक्ेः wafafa दज्रनमप्रियलादिभरमनिरास- मुखेनाङ्गं भवति। यथा दण्डी प्रेषम्वाड प्राचोमावोतो राषयति अभिजागम् gif धनवान् संखवाजित्धादोा Toray तथा दशंनमपि caty मममविन्ञानयारक्त- प्रदजनार्थतया न्यायप्राप्रयारनवादः। एवमातमक्रोडारेरति- मेयल्याद्थंप्रापतोऽमुवाद् एव अन्यथा रद्युदेभेन द गरनादि- विधौ दञनाधुदृशेन वा रत्यादिविष वाक्धानि भिद्येरन् \
१.8 शाखल्यश्तदनीयं भाष्यम्। [ख०श।या०२]
तस्मात् ( पुवंमो्मांसाचाम्। अण््।पा०र। wee) शेषः पराथंत्वादितिन्यायादश्रनमङ्गमिति। अत एव भगवान् मन्- रपि (AVTATTO | शाज्ति०। We L281 FTe ७१९९ OAR) | Vaal wed कमं नित्यमाद्मरतिमुनिः । सवग्डता्मण्डताक्मा TSA परतमा गतिः ॥ दत्यनेनात्मरतेः प्राधान्यमारेति॥९०॥
प्रकरणाच्च ॥१९॥
प्रकरणं Tata फलवत्वात् तख्यास्तप्मकरणस्यं द शंनमङ्ग भवितु महतीति ॥ ९९ ॥
दशंनफलमिति चेन्न तेन व्यवधानात् ॥९९॥
अय Tite फलं खाराज्यलक्षणमम्टतत्वं तथाच ae प्रकरणमिति वैपरोत्यमिति चेल तेन तच्छब्देन व्यवधामात्। (च्छं °। ए ०५ ९६-९७) ख खराड भवतीत्यच तच्छब्देन सनि छाद्मरतिमानेवापस्याप्यते न विप्र्णष्टः पश्यन्निति व्यवहिता- परिता कारणाभावात् । प्रकरणमेव कारणमिति चेक अन्यान्याञ्जयात् ॥ ९२॥
THATS ॥ Ve Il
we fe aa सेन्दयादिश्चानस्य तरुष्यास्तरणे रति- Saas नतु रतेश्चानहेतुत्मिति इृष्टोपकारतादणङ्गलवमव- सोयते। दृष्टं च प्रङतेनिष्करुणला खपमहिमलाप्रिवलादि भनार मगेामालिन्यकारणं WAY करुणाबडलाव्याइतेखयातिश्रयित-
[०१।अआग्र्] साख्िर्वगतङोयं wert शथे
रूपाय श्रात्मेति ज्ञानान्मालिन्यनिटत्तिस्ततः परा भक्ति रिति। wa एव गीयते (rote MIB eS) | तद्ुद्ध बस्तदात्मानस्तन्निष्ठा खत्यराचणाः ! गच्छन्त्यपनराटत्तिं ज्ञानि द्धं तकस््षाः ॥ इति । तथा आयुर्वेदेऽपि (रष्टाङ्गश्दये | We Ll Beka) | धीर्धैयात्मादि विज्ञानं मनोदेषषधं परम्। Th Ae A
अत एव तदभावादल्नवोनाम् ॥ ९४॥
चत एव wit इष्टापकारकमङ्मत एव इ्टापकारं निरस्य मनामालिन्यादिबाधात् प्रधानभगवदनरागमानचे वल्लवीनां मुक्तिः स्मर्यते । यथा (विष्णुपुराणे | WT ५।अ०९३। द्या ०९४।९५) । तचन्ता विपुलाद्धाद रीणपष्छचया सती । तदप्राक्चिमडादुःखविलोनाशेषपातका ॥ चिन्तयन्ती जगत्सुतिं पर ब्रह्मखरूपिणम् | निरुच्छासतया afm गतान्या गापकन्यका॥ दति) अच सुखदुःखलिङ्गेनानुरागाऽनुमीयते म मुक्तिरिति ATR: | दारबाधादनवदतदछछष्णलेनापि कमणा फलसिद्धि- रिव तारां रागाग्मुङिस्तदष्यवगम्यते ज्ञानमङ्गमेव प्रधानलेतु तदभावे फलं नस्यात् दिन्ताचनब्रद्मात्मेक्यज्नानं तत्कारणए- श्रवणमननाद्यसम्भवात् | किन्लनुरागनियतानुरतिरेव। न- चायमथेवादः श्रपुवायलात् सन्नि विष्यभावाच्धेति॥ ९४॥
५ $ शाणठिव्यणतङजीयं भाष्यम्। [ख०्९।अआ०्२]
भत्वा जानामीति चेन्नाभिन्राष्या सादात् ॥ ९५॥ इदानीं श्रतिविरोधेन प्रकरणस्थानलणिङ्गबाधमा्तिय खमाधोयते। यया Ba (गो०।श्र०९८स्ञा०५५)। wet मामभिजानाति यावान् यख्चास्मि तत्वतः | ततो at तत्ता ज्ञाता विशते तदनन्तरम् ॥ दति। ` तच ( तेत्तिरीयसं ° | We limon अनुवाक) रेन्य्ा गा रपत्यमुपतिष्ठते दतिवत् कारकच्रुत्या बलीयखा wee श्व गडेतुतमवसोयते। यद्यपि दृष्टलादित्यनेन दृष्टापकारे Taya न खतेरवकाशः तथापि नह्यविषयिष्छा रते- ब्रह्यविषयज्ञानोापकार्यलं न प्रत्यक्तगम्यम् । faa aqure रतौ तथा दश्रनेम ब्रह्मगेाचरायामष्यनुमातव्यम् | तथाच लिङ्गवे पय॑वसानादिति चेन्न दोषः। तथाहि यदि केवलं जानातीति वदेन्न aay | किन्वभिजानातीति। afer पुव ज्ञातज्ञानमुच्यते। तथा. भतुपकारिपुवैश्ानं तत्फलदूपभक्ति- परवर्तकम। Wat यावत् acral भद्येवाभिन्ञत्िभावेनाये- च्यते ब्रीद्यवहननेनावचातवदिति। कार्यषादहाया्यमुक्तं तता ज्ञानद्वयेन भक्तिदा््छै सति fawa दति। तस्मान्नेयं श्रुतिः किन्तु न्यायप्राप्नानुवाद् दूति । एतमेवाथं स्फुटौकरोति॥ ९५ ॥
प्रागुक्तं च ॥ १६९॥
wet मामित्यस् पूवे wea कल्पत दत्यभिधाय (गी ०।अ्र०९८्।दा०१५४)।
[अ०र।अा०२] जाख्डिष्यन्नतस चीयं Are | te
We: प्रसलाद्मा म चति म arya | समः सर्वेषु way agi waa पराम् ॥ TEMA AS त न्ञानब्रहमशा ज्ञानप्रयाजनामावाद् युक्रमनुवाद लमिति ॥ ९६॥ |
एतेन विकल्पोऽपि RATA VOU एतेन ्नानस्याङ्गलनिषयेन ज्ञानभल्यार ज विकल्पपक्ताऽपि
wa: निरात इति मन्तव्यम्। न इङ्ग क्रिनोारेकच विकश्पो भवतोति | श्रपिश्रब्दात् खमृषयाऽपोति॥९७॥
देवभक्तिरितरस्मिन् सादच्थोत् ॥ EI
` Bleed Baa (शेताश्च ००३७४) । `
ae देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा रेवे तथा ATT ।
aaa कथिता Wer: प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः॥ इति।
wa द वभक्रिरौश्वरोतरस्िन् देवे मन्तव्या कुतः गरुभक्ति-
साहचयात् । weve fe नाम्टतफलायां भक्ती घरते। द्न्द्रादिरेवतास्वाराधिताः ग्रदुभषज्ज्ानफलाय भवन्तीति at- हचय्यमपि निणायकम्। साहचया दुलृक शब्द वदुक्रयुक्ररुप- एम्भकमेतत् ॥ ९८ ॥ |
TUATHA TAT प्रयाजवत् ॥ १९९ ॥
योगः ord wei च भवति। कमाडहितमनस्क-
बाया रमाभ्यामपेचणत् । Ty (पृ्वेमोर्मांसायाम्। अनद् D
c< ग्राख्िव्वश्तद्जीय भाव्यम्। [ख०२।यअा०् |
UU BFR) गणानां च परार्थेलादसन्बन्धः समलात् स्यादितिन्यायात् प्रधानाङ्गं योगः कथमङ्गाङ्गमित्यत श्रा ग्रथाजवदिति यथा प्रयाजे वाजपेधाद्यङ्ग तदीयदीचणोयाद- Cay तदत् । तदङ्गताबाधकप्रमाणाविशेषात् | केवलं श्नानार्े यागानष्टानप्रसङ्धेन भक्रिमृपकरो तोति । एवं विषयवेराग्यमपि उभयाय मन्तव्यम् ॥ ९९ ॥
| गमु (योगे । पा०९। ०२३) ईश्वरप्रणिधानादिति पत- आअखिखारणं दुरपड्वं तज परणिधानाभिधेयस्य wags समारिसिद्धर्थवमिति कथं we: प्राधान्यमित्यत आआह। `
` गेष्या तु समाधिसिद्धिः ॥ २०॥
तच प्रणिधानं जोणभक्तिरेव न प्रधानं तया समाधिसि- द्धिरिति न रङतिविरोाधाऽपीति, भवति च वाक्यश्ेषस्तचेव (ATH । पा ०९। ख ०२७।२८) तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः AAI खद येभावगमिति ॥ २०॥
` शया रागत्वादिति चेन्नात्तमास्पद्त्वात् AHA II २९॥
यागथाल्लमरखावादिदं waa ये गभास्ताक्तरागलाविभ्े- वाद्धक्तिरपि aqgur यैव । तथाच इनं (यो०।पा०२। Boa) रागदेषाभिनिवेशाः Har इति। एवश्चेदु च्यते। नेवं वश्यम् उन्मास्पदलाद्धक्रः परमेश्चरविषचलादिति चावत्। afe रागत्मातरेण रेयलं किन्तु संखारानुबन्धिरागलेनेव।
[setae] शाण्डिल्यश्तद्ौयं भाव्यम् । शे
यथा सङ्गवमाचेण न त्याच्यता fay असत्सङ्कलेन तदत् । तथाचेश्चरभक्िया रागलादित्यज संसारानुबन्षिलं माक्ता- wanes चोपाधिः। werent सा (Wot wero @icog) यजन्ते सालिका देवानित्यादिना साल्तिकल्कोन्त- atfefa i २९॥
तदेव कर्मिन्नानियोगिभ्य आधिक्यशन्दात् ॥ २९॥
तदेव भजनं BS तस्या भक्तेवौ मुख्यलम् । एतत् Twa fafad यस्मादेवं अन्द्यते (गीर।च०६।ज्ञा०४६।४७))
तपखिग्याऽधिको यागो ज्ञानिभ्योऽपि मताऽधिकः।
कर्मिंभ्यख्चाधिका योगी तस्रादयागी भवाजंन ie i
योगिनामपि स्वेषां मद्तेनान्तरात्मना।
श्रद्धावान् AHA Bt at खमे युक्रतमेा मतः॥२॥ इति,
अत्र विध्रेषणानां तपश्रादीनामाधिक्यनिबन्धनं विश्रेव्या- णामाधिक्यं क्रमादिति मन्तव्यम्) ग खल्वङ्गस्य मुस्यादा- धिक्यमपपद्यते तस््ाद्धक्तिः प्रधानमिति॥ ९२॥
श्ुत्य्थैनापि तदुत्पत्तिपरि हाराय पठति।
रञ्ननिरपणग्यामाधिक्यसिदरः ॥ RR ॥
अच शत्ाऽपि इाद्श्राध्याय STTET TA (गी०।अ०९९। GT ° १-७) ॥ ` | |
एवं चततयुक्रा ये भक्ास्लां पुपाव | D2
Re Wisenargt माच्यन्। [ख०्र।य्ाग्ड्]
चे चाणलरमवष्य्कं तषां कं योामविच्छमाः॥९॥ दति प्रश्नः aura मनो ये मां नित्ययुक्ता उपासते | MEA परयोपेतास्ते मे युक्रतमा मताः५२९॥ ये लच्चर मजिर्दैष्छमव्यक्रं पर्युपासते | सवंचगमचिग्यं च कूटखमचलं WANN सज्ियन्येद्धियय्ामं way समबुद्धयः | ते प्राक्ुवन्ति मामेव eaafed Tar: ४॥ केजऽधिकतर स्तषा मव्यक्रासक्तचेतकाम् | samt हि गतिदुःखं रेदवद्धिरवाष्यते॥५॥ ये तु सवरि adife मयि daa मत्पराः, अगन्येनेव यागेन मां ध्यायन्त उपासते॥ ६॥ तेचामश्ं समुद्धता ग्टल्युसंसारसागरात्। भवामि न चिरात् पाथं मय्यावेदधितचेतखाम् ॥ < ॥ इति मिरूपणम् । ताभ्यां भक्तेः प्राघान्यसिद्धेः मार्थवाद- लमायाति। wafread fe fadard प्रसिद्धं मस्हत्यर्थ- fafa, केवलाङ्रुमनष्टानेन क्तेशाधिक्यमेवेति ॥ ९९॥ अद्ध प्रसङ्ग द्धक्रः अद्धारूपल्श्डूपिशाचों निराकरोति,
नेव अद्रा तु साधारण्यात् ॥ २४॥
भक्रिनं सर्वथा श्रद्धालेन शङ्नोया अद्धायाः कर्ममाचा- PAT नचेवमनोखरभकरिरिति ue
[ख०९।यअा.२] = wifeeanrgsta भाष्यन्। ५ ५१
तस्यां तत्त्वे चानवस्थानात् ॥ २५ ॥ (गो ०।अ०६। Brey) | श्रद्धावान् भजतेयोा मांस मे युक्तम मतः,
इति fe श्रैतम्। तत्र भक्ता अद्धारूपायां श्रद्धाङ्गले प्रतीतेऽन वसधा प्रसङ्गात् अद्धाया अनङ्गतलात्। अन्यथा तस्यामपि Agra AQAA | तस्मारारमणोयारम्मे आरम्भणोय- aqraat साचमनवद्धक्रा अद्धा ATE Vidi अद्धाभकरि- समन्वित इति भेदेन क्यनाश॥२५॥ |
बरह्मकाण्डं तु भक्तो TAMAS सामान्यात् | RE
aaa ज्नानकाण्डमित्युत्तरकाण्डप्रसिद्धिनं ar- दिति मन्वान प्रयते | भकं ब्रह्मकाण्डं Baa न ज्ञानाथैम्। अन्ञातार्थज्ञापनस्य काण्डद्यसामर्थयात्। अन्यथा धर्मज्ञानां पुवकाण्डान्ञातमपि ज्ञानकाण्ड Bal नचन्ञानविधिः क्म वति येन तप्राधान्यादपि ज्ञागकाण्डं भवेदितिं। तस्माज् ज्ञानकाण्डमिति भरमः। किन्त ब्रह्मकाण्डमेव । अतएव (ब्रद्मदध०।पा०९। ०९) श्रथाता ब्रह्मजिन्ञासा दति afs- तम् । तत्तु मक्ययेलाद्धक्रिकाष्डमपीति ॥ ९६॥
दत्याचायंखप्नेश्वर विददरविरकचिते श्ाण्डिद्डश्रतद्धचीये भाग्ये प्रथमाध्याय दितोयमाङ्किकम् ॥ ° ॥
समाप्त प्रथमोऽध्यायः॥९॥
RR शाण्डिव्यश्रतदधनीयं भाग्यम्! [अ०२।या०९]
तस्या WR: साक्तात् प्रयल्नानिष्याद्यलेन fay षाध- नान्तरापेचा तचानरङ्गसाधनं ज्ञानं बहिरङ्गसाधनान्यपर- भक्तिप्रटतीनि तेषां विवेकाय दितोयाध्यायारमः।
बुदिेतुप्रवत्तिराविशरदरेरवघातवत् ॥ २७ ॥
afgagufafa: सा यद्यपि aafrare तथापि तद्धे द्रां अवणममनमिदिध्याषनादीनां तज्ञिष्यन्तयेऽनुष्टानमाव- RA | तत्किं सत् रते wa: शास्तायं इति न्यायात् सत् yada उत यावद्धकरिराच्छैम्। तत्राच्यते भक्रिपरिष्डद्धि- पर्यन्तं तकटृल्तिरावश्थको यथा त्रीडीनव दन्तील्यनेन विहित- जीद्यवघातस्य यावद्धेतुव्यमनुष्टानं wreard: तया दृटाप- कारकलाव्मनामाखिन्यनिरापयंन्तं ज्ञानाद्यनष्टाने यतनोय- fafan ron
तेषा मङ्गानां यान्यङ्गानि तदनष्टानं तु न प्रसज्यत TA चान्तरम्।
| तदङ्गानां च ॥ Sa I
तदङ्गानां गुर्वेनुगमनवेदाविरोधितकानुसन्धानश्मादीना- मप्यनुष्टानं य॒क्रम्। गद्ङ्गविकलान्यङ्गानि सेन्यसेनापतिवत् प्रधानापकाराय BAA ९८॥
इदानीं बृद्धिविषयपरिग्डद्धिखिग्यते।
तामेशर्यपरां काश्यपः परत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥ तां बुद्धिं परमेशखरेश्यादिमदिषविषीं निःश्रेयसफलां.
[न्रा] शाद्डिल्यश्रतद्चीयं are RR
BTA आचार्या मन्यते कुतः Maras: Waa a: खन्ञानाय परज्ञानस्यापेचितलात। wand जीवब्रह्मणार- aa भेद cfs i ee i | AAR बादरायणः॥ ३०॥
बादरायण आचार्यः पनः श्टद्धात्मविषचिणणोमेव मनुते तथाच BA (ब्रह्मना अ०४।पा०र९।ख०२) wala aa- गच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति चेति। wand जीवब्रहमलकस्यमाया मिथ्या ला च्छद चिदा त्ममा चनु द्ध सत्वन्नानलात् तदेव मृक्ति- फलायेति i se i |
उभयपरां शण्डिल्यः शब्दापपन्निभ्याम् ॥ २९१॥
शाण्डिद्य ्राचार्यस्वभयपरामेव मन्यते कुतः शब्दा fe वेदस्तथा भूते (कां ०। ए ०९।९०१) सवे खल्विदं ब्रह्म तव्जला- निति शान्त उपासीत । came एष म श्रात्मान्तददय- मेतद्भद्यीतमितः भमेत्याभिसम्भवितास्नोति यस्य स्यादद्धा म विविकित्छास्तोति इ are wifwe: wifwe: इति विषि- fara तदुभयविषयविदोा ब्रह्माभिप्रायलक्षणप्रेमभक्तिजन्य- जद्मसम्म वफललमा₹् | (तैन्तिरोयसं०।अ०७।प्र०९।अन् ०१० Hox) बबरः प्रावाइणिरकामयतेतिवत् पूवेशाण्डिल्यार्थलान्न निल्याजिल्यसंयोगविरोधः। agar वेदस्य भगवत्कटंकत्वमेव | अतेरपि (तेन्तिरोवार के । म्र०द।अनु०१९।द्गशक४)।
तस्माद्यन्ञात् सर्वंहृत we: सामानि aft इन्दा \६सि afat तस्ाद्यजुस्तस्रादजायत॥ fa)
Re भ्राखिस्यद्रतद्भीयं are) [अ*२।य्ा०द]
उपपि श्च मवति ब्रह्म खख पर मै र्यव स्तया अतं जीव- Sera च तथाच Hla: (त्ेन्तिरौयेोप०।४०९२द) यता वा इमानि गतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि safer यत् प्रयन्यभि- dfawanfa तदिजिश्चाससख। तथा (मी०।अ्र०९१। Ares) | ममैवं जीवलाके जीवन्डतः सनातन दूति। तच fa कसापमदंकम्। तस्मात् (eteize ४४२) ae- भस्यादि वाक्येमाभयवेाघनगमेवे पपन्तिमदिति २९॥
वेषम्यादसिद्रमिति चेन्नाभिन्नानवदवेशिश्ात् ॥ ३२ ॥
मनूभयविषयलमेव न सिद्धति वेषम्यात्। विषमं fe जग- त्कर्टलादिविश्िष्टे तदकटरलादिविशिष्टज्ञानमितिचेन्न यतः सा- ऽयं रेवद न्तः सेऽहमितिप्रत्यभिन्नावदकविशिष्टेऽपरवेशिष्यम- न्तरे सामानाधिकरण्यस्य खरूपाभेदांशगाचरकलेन agi पत्तेः। विशिष्टवेभिष्यबृद्ध रो तगिंकलात्। wa विमा ज- लचखणया खरूपाभेरापल्धितिरिति मतं aq छच्णया बाधस्य जचन्यतलात लच्छापस्थिता तद वच्छेदकापखितिरेतु सत्वा ख | अन्यया कदाचिच्छक्यतावच्छेदकमन्तरएापि शक्यरूतिभवेत् TATA तावत्॥ ९२ ॥ |
नच fas: परः साद नन्तरं विशेषात् ॥ ३३॥
नेवं खति जीवे पाधिक्रेशादि म्रमपि परमेश्वरे प्रसव्य तेति ay waa उक्राभेदवुद्धयगन्तरं क्प्रादोरात्मासम्बणि- लङ्ूपविशेषमिणंदादिति॥९२॥
[wonton] शण्डिल्यशतदधचौयं भाव्यम् । २५
ad तथेति चेन्न खाभाव्यात्॥ २३४ ॥
नन्वेवं auifcaeqey कर्॑लादि लक्षणं परमेश्वरस्य बाध्यते aad लात्मनि प्रतोतलान्न क्रंशादिवदितिचेन्न कटंलादेः पर- मेश्चरस्य खाभाव्यात्। नहि वङ्धरुष्णएसखाभाव्यमन्यया भवति । तस्माद खाभाविकलमुपाधिरिति । श्रत एव दपणादिप्रति- फलितविम्बे भाखति मालिन्यादिवाधेऽपि टठत्तिप्राकाश्ा- दिखभावस्याबाध एवेति ॥ २४॥
ननु परमेश्चरस्य aaa जवानां तु कथमागन्तुकः क्गंशादिरिव्यज् Vaare |
अप्रतिषिद्वं Tae तद्वावाच नेवमितरेषाम् ॥ ३५ ॥
नहि कस्यामपि gar परमेश्वरस्येशयं प्रतिषिद्धमस्ति येन रतिपन्नमपि बाधितं स्यात्। wea (द्छां०।ए०।९०४) सत्य- सद्ुःल्य दत्यादिना तख खाभाव्यमवगम्यते। नच जोवस्येव प्रतीतधमेल्यामे कारणमस्ति सदेवेश्वरलात् सदेव मक्रवात्। तदितरेषां ठु जीवानां नैवं खाभाविकः wife: कस्मात् तद्धावात्। श्रूयते fe (कां०।४०५४७।६९२) परं च्योति- रुपसभ्पद्यते खेन ख्पेणाभिनिष्यद्यते इत्यादिभिः तच ख भावले नेापपद्यते, उपपद्येतापि यदि परस्य क्तेप्रादिखभावः Bla नचेवं तस्माद्र ह्मभावलचणमृत्यन्यथानपपत्यापि जो- वानामेपाधिकी defafefa यद्यपि परस्यापि ararar- धिकमैश्चयथे तथापि aggre: कद्ाचिदपि नात्यन्तलयः।
E
२९ प्राख्डिल्यग्रतखनीयं भाष्यम्। = [Heaton]
जीवेपाधिबद्धौनां त॒ waar सत्यामत्यन्तलय एव । नहि भगवता माया शक्तिः चीयते जोवानामनन्तत्वेन agarcag- जनाद्यथं भगवतः प्रटत्तेरावश्यकलादिति। एवच्च (SKIT yooge) ध्यायतीव लेलायतोवेत्यादिश्रुतिः (ददार, पृ०४२५) ्रयातश्रादेणे नति amare aay जौवविष- fawafa ॥ २५ ॥
सवीनुते किमिति चेन्नेवस्ुद्यानन्द्यात् ॥ ९९ ॥
अय क्रमा मुक्तावपि यदा स्ववृद्धौनां विलयस्तदा परोापाधेः स्थिता प्रयोजनाभावात् तस्याष्यव्यन्तलये fa कत- aya खभाव दति tad भवति, जीवे पाचिवद्धीनामन- मलात् तादृशकाल एव नास्तोति युक्तं खाभाविकमेश््यम् | नच प्रागभावाः प्रतियागिजनकास्लत्वादित्येतावतापि काल- wana: सिद्धाति। आ्थेकद्ा सवै जजितप्रतियागिन इति चे ्प्रयाजकलात्। सवंकार्यश्एून्यकालानुमानं लत्यन्ततक- WIAA) अन्यया सवं प्रागभावाः कदाचिदजनितप्रतियागिन द्रत्यनुमानेन घ्वसानधिकरणः sare: सिद्धेत्। अरयादमे- वामुक्तः स्यामिति धिया मुक्तावयलतरप्रसक् इति चेत् फला- निखयेऽणेपायतानिखयेन तत्साधन प्रटृत्तिरस्तु | प्रत्युत सवं- मुक्तिनिखये तत एवाप्रटन्तिप्रसङ्ग cfs ae
श्रथेापाद्ानकटंवलक्तणमेश्वयं यदि परस्य सादजिकं तदा faatftaaa प्राप्तं ष्डदादिवदित्यत उच्यते।
[अ०र२।च्धा०१] शाख्डिल्यशतदचीयं भाव्यम् | २७.
प्रशत्यन्तरालादवेका्ं चित्सच्चेनानुवर्तमानात् ॥ BO ॥
प्रकतिनाम जडकायंमाचोापादानम्। सा विकाया नतु ब्रह्मस्पुरणरूपसत्तया प्रृत्यनुगतवेन च परस्य कटंलादि। नच प्रकृतिरेव सत्तेति aa, शक्यते जीवानामसत्वप्रमङ्गात्। तेषां प्रकते: परत्वात् । तस्मात् प्ररुतिलक्षणां मायाशक्रिमन्त- रालीकत्य परस्य कट लादि सखाभाव्यमिति न विका्यता। नदि मायया जन् मायावी मायाकार्य भवतोति । यद्यपि तादा- व्येन कायंत्मेव विकार्यं तच ada एव तथापि चीरादिवन्न खरूपपरिवत्तनेनं विकारित्वम्। यद्वा खाधिकविकारादेत्- त्वेन चरं प्रति दण्डादिवदविकायंलवमस्ति। तरेवेक्तं प्ररुत्य- न्तरालादिति॥२३७॥
ननु मायोापादानले मायायामेवर जगत् प्रतिष्ठितं तरि कथं (तैत्तिरीयखिलेपनि °। खं०२६) तस्मिन् ad प्रतिष्ठित- मिति त्या जगते ब्रह्मप्रतिष्ठा प्रतिपाद्यत दत्यतरोत्तरम्।
तठ तिष्ठा खृदपौढवत् ॥ ₹८॥
तस्मिन् ब्रह्मण्यपि विकारप्रतिष्ठानमविर्द्धं ए़दपौोटवत्। यया गदमध्यस्यपीटठे स्थितोऽपि ze तिष्ठति Se तिष्टठतोति व्यपदिश्यते तदत् ॥ ac |
ननु afe प्रत्येव ब्रह्मान्यथासिद्धमस्ठ॒ नेत्युच्यते |
मिथोपेकषणादुभयम् ॥ २३९ ॥
ay प्रतिखखेभयमपि कारणम् | परस्पर .चेतनाचेतनाग्यां ॐ 2
२८ शण्डिल्यशतद्चीय भाव्यम्। =» [eRe
aura सखशङरिविषयाय चाऽपेच्वितलात् fa कस्यापेक्तक- fafa eeu ददानों GATS व्यवदारलाघवाय पदाथ॑सद्धलनम्च्यते। `
चेत्याचितेाने SATA ॥ Be
चेत्या प्रतिः चिद् ब्रह्म तयानं ढतीयमयीन्तर मतरत्यर्यः | ननु न दतोयसय faafefgeat tea दति चेत्। अयमर्थः ब्रह्मभिनने ज्ञादलं म्रछृतिभिन्ने च ज्ञेयत्वं निषिध्यत ofa ig ct
अय प्रृतिपरुषयोारसम्बन्धे सवंकार्यबिलेापः | सम्बन्धे तु ख एव ठतीय इत्यत ATE
™“ . = ६.५ ५ a १.५ carts Poe Gee os \ -* ध ¢
{~स युक्ता च सम्परायात् ॥ Be It
मिय रइत्यनुवत्तते। at प्रकतिपरूषैण afger परस्पर म्रतिसम्बन्धूपा न ल्वागन्तृकः कचित् कस्मात् सम्परायात् अनादित्वादेव। तथाच गीतायाम् (च्र०।द।द्ा०९९) vata wed चेव विद्यनादी उभावपोति। अयानादिरेव सम्बन्धा- न्तरमस्िति चेन्न जडाजडविकल्पेन तयारनन्यवादिति॥४९॥
ननु प्ररूतिर्मिथ्यैव मायाहूपवात् तखाः (Warde ०२४०)
मायां त॒ प्रतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु मदश्वरम्। दब्यादिश्चतिन्यः। तथाच कथं वेदय पदा द त्यत ATS |
शक्तितवान्नानुतं वेद्यम् ॥ Be A
,अ०्र।चा०१] शखिल्यश्नतद्वीय ara | Re
वेद्यं प्रधानं नानुतं न मिथ्या afaqatfa कुतः शक्रि-.- ATS | नहि मायावी मायाशक्ति विना विहितागन्तकष्ष्टये प्रभवति । किञ्च (कां ००३९ २९) कुतस्तु खल BaF खाद- सतः सव्नायेतेति अतिः कायंस््ेन कारणसन्तां वदन्तो सवेश माइ नानुतलम्। श्रस्तितु wat भागवतो ष्टि सादु श्यसरकायंपेचा चेतनरृतशृषटिलान्ायिकषटष्टिवदिति। न- चादृष्टादिभिरशान्तरम् एकण्ह्यपेक्षायां लाचवाद्धामतत्ाध- “नेतरेषु चरदृषटदेतुतायां मानाभावात् एवं सवेकार्यंषु भिया व्यभिकषारादकनित्यसरकारिश्क्तसिद्धिः। तदवान्तरानेक- कल्पनं तु फलमुखमिति न गोारवायेति। विस्तरोऽख्धैव ठतीये
- दति॥ ४२॥ “sept fe गता प्रासङ्गिकी चदा प्रतमनुसरति। Py, 1
wor
AUT गम्या लाकवल्लिङ्गभ्यः ॥ ४२ ॥
यद्यपि जानामीच्छामोत्यादिवददं भज WATS इत्येव मादिना प्रत्यच्तगम्येव भक्तिस्तयापि तस्या दृढतरसंस्कारवेशि- wagur परिग्ररद्धिनं प्रत्ता निरतं शक्यते ज्ञानप्रामा- wad तस्मात् तत्निणया लाकवव्नातलिङ्कभ्य एव । यथा लकेऽनुरागतारतम्यं तत्कथाद्ावश्रुपुलकादिविकारैरनमीयने तददिति॥ ४२॥
म केवलं लाकवलिङ्गानि भवन्ति मदर्षो्णां खतिन्याऽपि ताभि fagifa बाडल्येन लच्छन्त इत्याद |
न
Re शाखणिख्यण तदीयं भाष्यम् । [अ०२।अा ०९]
सम्भ्रानवह्मानप्रोतिविर देतरविचिकिसामदिमख्यातितद्- MUTATE AT TART AMAT च स्लरणेभ्यो AS TA ॥ ४४॥ | यथाल्जुनस्य मम््ानम् | WaT तु छष्णस्य waaay yaya: | a apafa धमात्मा WAT प्रेम्णा च स्व॑ंदा॥९॥ बहुमानं यया TATAT: | पकत्तपातन तन्नान्ि aa पदे च तादृशि) बभार मेधे तद्रे बहमानमतिं नृषः॥२॥ प्रीतिर्यथा विदुरस्य। (मदहाभारते। उघोा०च्रन्स्स सषा ०२९९४) | *at प्रतिः पुण्डरीकाक्त तवागमनकारणात्। सा किमाख्यायते तुभ्यमन्तरात्मासि देदिनाम्॥२॥ विरह चथा गापीनाम् ( विष्ण॒प °। रे ५।शअ्र०१८। सो ०९७) गृरूणामग्रतेा वनुं किं ्रवीमिन नः त्षमम्। ata: fa करिव्यन्ति दग्धानां विरदाभ्चिना॥ ४॥ दतर विचिकिल्छा यथया श्ेतद्रीपनिवासिनाम्। नारदद- श्र नेऽपि fanafg: यथाचापमन्याः। (महाभारते। अनशा ०। ०२४) Blo Oe9)
afq करः WAST वा भवेयं श्ड्ःराश्ञया।
# यामे प्रीतिः पुव्कराच्त तवदश्रंनसमुद्धवा रति मृद्धित- मशाभारतपाठः।
[अण२।चअा०१] शएण्डिल्यश्तखचीयं भाष्यम् | Rr
नतु शकर लया दत्तं चेलोक्यमपि कामये॥५॥ afeazet यथा यमस्य | नरके पच्यमानस्तु यमेन परिभाषितः, fa त्या नाचिंता देवः awa: क्तेशनाशनः॥ ६ ॥ (विष्णुप०। रंभे द्। अ ०७। सा ०१०) । खपुरुषमनिवोच्छ पाश्डस्तम्। वदति यमः किल aa aU Ae ॥ परिहर मधुखदनप्रपल्लाम् | प्रभरहमन्यनृणणां न वेष्णवानाम् ॥ ७ ॥ तद चंप्राएखितिर्यथा इनूमतः । तेनेवाक्रम् | (वासमीकोये। उत्तर काण्डे, Toioo Brose) | यावत् तव कथा लाकं विचरिव्यति पावनो, तावत् खाखामि मेदिन्यां तवाक्ञामनुपालयन्॥ र ॥ qual कतरत्यानामपि मररद्ादोनां तदेकाराचधनायें प्राणधारणम् | wa एव श्रुतिः । (न्सिंदतापिनी | oe) यं सवं देवा नमन्ति aaa ब्रह्मवादिनञ्येति॥< ॥ तदीयताभावस्त॒ वसारुपरिचरस्य (महाभारते। शा०। We RAO छोा०१२९७१९८) MAIS धनं चेव Tad वादनं तया । * एतद्भागवतं सवेमिति तत् Waa षदा ॥ ve ॥ इति।
* यत् तद्धागवतं सवेमिति तत् chad सदेति मुडित- महाभास्तपाढः॥ १९९ ॥
RR शाणडिल्यश्नत सोयं भाव्यम् | [खअ०्टे।अआ० १
wasay तद्भाव यथा प्रह्नादस्य प्रसिद्धः। उक्तञ्च तनैव, ( विष्णुपु ° । ATU चर ०१९ । Brey) एवं सवषु शतेषु मक्िर्व्यभिचारिणी | Saat पण्डितेज्ञाला सव॑श्धतमयं ₹इरिम्॥ ११ ॥ त्जिन्नप्रातिकूच्यं यथा इन्त॒मागतेऽपि भगवति wave | तेनेवोक्रम्। (महाभारते | WAT Hoy ८ क्ञा०२ ६०४) Wate देवेश्र अगन्निवास। नमोऽस्तु ते शाङ्गगदौसिपाणे॥ भसद्य मां पातय लाकनाय। रथादुद्ग्राह्ुतणे संस्थे ॥ ve i आरआदिशब्दादुद्धवाक्रुरादिचेष्टितान्यपि suai) यद्यपि देषविपच्तभावादित्यतचेद मुक्तं तथापि तच रागलिङ्लेनाच च बह्कभक्रिपरिप्रएद्धि लिङ्गतयेति विशेष इति॥ ४४॥ ननु स्ामिन्यनुरागिणां तद नुग्रहतारतम्यवल्ु देषे्यादया भवन्ति तेऽपि किं लिङ्गानि Fare | देषाद यस्तु नेवम् ॥ ४५॥ तदखम्मवादेव | यथेक्तं भगवता दैपायनेन | (महाभारते, अन॒शा०।अ०९४८।९०१६४६। ्ञा०७६९) | न क्राधोा नच ATES न लाभा arg मतिः, भवन्ति saat भक्तानां पुरषात्तमे॥ इति | चिग्रुपालस्य तु fu समरणं ततः परा भक्रिस्तता afaftaa क्रमद्ति॥ ४५ ॥
[अ०्श।खअ०९] शगाख्िल्यशतदधकोचं भाष्यम् | RR
शय प्रायशो भगवद्वतारविषयाण्येव तानि fayifa स्यन्ते ब्रह्मज्ञा जन्यत्वात् पणं विषयता च भक्तयुके्यच सिद्धा- WATE | तदाक्यशषात् प्राद्भावेग्वपि सा ॥ Be It सा परा भक्तिः प्रादुभौवात्मविषयापि भवति कस्मादिदं ज्ञायते वाक्यशेषात् (गो०।अ०७।द्ा०२द) देवान् देवयजा यान्ति agar यान्ति मामपि। इति। प्रतिज्ञाताथंखिरोकरणाय देवतान्तरभक्तिनिन्दायां वा- IGT भवति (tol Woo च्धा०२९) at at at ai तनुं भक्तः अ्रद्धयाचितुमिच्छति। तस्य तस्या चलां agi तामेव facaraea ॥ दति। aa at at at यां भक्त इत्येतावदुकरार्थसिद्धो तनुप्यन्त- निर णग द्ध करे खता त्म विषयत तात्पर्यमन्नो यते | प्रकरणञ्च भक्ते- Tafa ॥ ४६॥ जन्मकमेविद शाजन्मशब्दात् ॥ ४७ ॥ जन्भ शरौराविनाग्डतवेदप्रण्यनदेत्यवघधभक्तदश्नादिकायाय भगवतः शरोरपरियद्ः। कमं च वेदप्रणयनादि | awMafeat जन््राभावफलाय भवति । यथा (ol Woe! Brod) जन्य कमं च मे दिव्यमेवं यो वेत्ति awa: | त्यक्वा दें, पुनजेन्म नेति मामेति साऽजन ॥ इति । नच जन््मकमवेदनख साक्तादग्टतलफलमुपपद्यते। किन्त तज्गतमनोामालिन्यनिटृत्तिद्वारा तदिशिष्टपरमेश्वरगाचरपर-
EF
ae शाण्डिल्य शतद्धकीयं भाष्यम् | [अ ००९]
भक्तिं जमयिला paramere भवति । तस्मात् प्रादुभावा- पनज्नगाचरलं परभक्रः शब्दादेवावगम्यत दति ॥ ०७ ॥
तच्च दिव्यं खशक्तिमातेोद्धवात् ॥ ४८ ॥ (मी ०।अ०४ स्ञा०<) sa aa चमे दिव्यमित्यचकिंदि- qa न wand घमयागाभावात तस्िल्लदृष्टासिद्धेः। नापि दिवि wad लाकजन्मन्ययाप्तः। किन्त जीवश्ररोरवन्न ग्तापादानकलमपितु खमायाशक्तिष्टतलम् | श्रत एव माच- धर्मे नारदः प्रति भगवद्वाक्यम् (ASTATTA | Aol Wo BBV BT wed_od) मायेषा fe मया wer wat wafe arr इति। तया गीयते (गी ०।अ्०४।या०६)
AIS सन्लव्ययात्मा श्ताना मीश्वरोऽपि सम् |
अरहछतिं खामधिष्टाय सम्भवामि युगे ar इति। मव्वाभातिकले शरीरलव्याघचातः मागायत्तने भमतिकल्- नियमात्। wa भोागायतनलमेव शरौरल्मिति चेन्न चेष्टा श्रयलस्य AM लाघवात dare तु क्रियागता आतिविशेषः। मच् क्रियेव चेष्टा षतश्ररौरक्रियायां तद्मवहारापत्तेः। मापि साच्लात् प्रयन्नजक्रियालमेव Yard घटादावपि चेष्टत इति व्यवदतिप्रसङ्गात्। सवंक्रियायाः साकात् परमेश्वर यत्रजन्यलात्। एवश्च परमेश्वरशरोरमाधकमानेन तच्छरोरवचेष्टासिद्धिरि- arat तावदिति। नच तच्वाधिक्यं तच्छरीरस्य ब्रह्माण्डाम्- पाद्ानतया घटादि वद तत्रभावात् दद्धियाप्ररतिलाख॥४८॥
[ख०२।खा०६] शाख्ल्यश्रतदचीयं भाष्यम् | २४
ननु खतः प्रयोजनाभावे कथं प्रवत्तंत इत्यपेचायामाइ।
मुख्यं तस्य हि कारुण्यम् ॥ ४८ ॥ लाके fe निरूपाधिपरदुःखदानाय प्रटन्तेषु कारणिक- व्यपदेशः | AMA तेषु मुख्यः छपाजन्यदुःखद्ानाय Tay वान्ततः wea निरूपाधिलं सम्भवति । नापि परदुःखप्र- ways तया धनाद्युपाधियुक्रे तंदव्यवदइतेः। किन्त मिरुपाधिपरक्तेशनाभिनोा भगवत एव Hel कारुण्छम्। तक्कत एवान्यप्रयोजनार्थिंषु areas गेण दति। तस्मात् जननोयादृषटमपेच्य खकारुण्यात् प्रठत्तिरिति ॥ se ti ननु (गी ०।चअ*६०।ञ्ञा ०२७) नराणां च नराधिप द्या- दिना विश्धतीनामपि भगवद्रुपलकथनाद्राजादिभक्ेरपि afm: स्यादित्यत ATE | | प्राणित्वान्न विश्वतिषु ॥ ५० ॥ जोवापाध्यनवच्छिन्नविषयेव परा ufmag प्राणादिजीवा- पाधियुक्रेषु राजादिषु रक्रिमक्रिफलेति॥ ५०॥ दयूतराजसेवयोः प्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ५९॥ WAIT दयूतराजखेवयोः प्रतिषेधः खर्यते परमेश्ररले त॒ aq स्यादिति॥५९॥ | वासुद् वेऽपीति चन्नाकारमाचत्वात् ॥ ५९ ॥ ननु (गो०।अ०९०। Blogs) दष्णीनां वाखुदेवाऽखरोति विष्ठतिषु अुतिस्लथाच राजादिवत् साऽप्यभजनीव एव खखा-
F 2
ad 99ण्िल्यण्तखूयीय भाष्यम् [अ०र।सखा ०९
दिति चेन्न परब्रह्मण एव छृष्णाकारमाज्रलात्। यथा पराशर राड । (विष्णुपु ° | HH ४।अ०९९। ज्ञा ०२) यदोवेधं नरः रुला WANG: WTA | यजावतीणे विष्खास्यं परनद्म Tefal दूति । जीवत्वे नश्च स्यादिति॥ ५२॥ प्र्मिन्नानाचख ॥ ५३॥ वा सुद् वविषये पर ब्रह्मप्रत्यभिन्ना च शूयते (नारायणे- पनि. । च्रयवंश्िरसि। wa ६। वाक्य) APA देवकी पत ब्रह्मा HURST: | सवेग्तखमेकं नारायणं gHcWEeqaNrcTy परब्रह्मख- खूपमिति। waa च प्रत्यभिज्ञा यथा प्रलये दृष्टानुभावेन युधिष्ठिरं प्रति माकण्डयेनोक्तम् (महाभार ते। वन ०।अ्र ०९०९। स ०१२००२९) यःसद्वा मया Fe: प॒रा पद्मायतेचफः । स एव पुरुषव्याघ्रः सम्बन्धी ते जनादन ॥ दति। तया (ARTA o शां ° | माचधमं। ०३४१५ सचा ०९९३२५। ९६) तपाभिरथद्श्योा fe भगवानिति Wat जनमेजयेना- fafeaa | AVATU AS war fe भगवान् लाकपूजितः । तं दृष्टवन्तस्ते साच्तात् श्रीवत्छाङ्विश्वषणम्॥ दति । चकारात् ARMY पलस्ररणलिङ्गात् ॥ ५२॥ afe कथं चिग्डतिषु तत्कीर्तनं aare ।
[अ०्दचअ०१] श्राणडिल्यश्रतदधवीयं area | Re
ष्णिषु ओष्येन AI Us It
Gite) अ०१०।सञा०२९) आदिल्यानामदं faufcarer तेषु sed परमे खर रेवति दृषटिमाचाथे बिग्तिकथयनं ag वाखुदवेऽपि दष्णिषु अष्टाऽयमि्येतप्वन्ा चदृष्टिविधाना्थ fasfay वासुदेवकीत्तनमिति॥५४॥
एवं प्रसिद्धेषु च ॥ ५५॥
ए वमनेन प्रकारेण वासुदे ववद्रह्मलिङ्कवन्षया प्रषिद्धेषु वरा- इन सिंदवाभनरामभद्रादिष भक्रिरपि मृक्रिफलति बोध्यम् । यदा एवं ब्रह्म लिङ्वत्तया प्रसिद्धेषु (भो०।श्र०९०। सा०र२) द्राणां शङ्रखासत्यादिविग्रव्यात्मसु ओषटयमानदृषटिम॑न्त- न्या। उक्तं हि स्कान्दे । BTM Go| Ta oo R91 Bro Vat)
दिष्णुरद्रान्तरं न्रयाद्यः श्रीगेय॑न्तरं तथा | aqme मूखेख्य वाक्यं ्रास्तविगरिंतम्॥ इति ) श्डरस्य ब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रसिद्धिः रत्यादे बडलमुपलभ्यत दति ॥ ५५ ॥ दत्याचा्यंखप्रेश्वरविददरविरचिते शाण्ड़ल्यग्रतदधनोयः ara द्वितौचाध्यायस्य प्रयममाङ्धिकम् ell
SAT दृटापकारको ज्ञानयोओे सम्पति प्रतिबन्धकद्रित- चय मुखेनापवग॑वत्यो गेणभक्तय उच्यन्ते | ° \ | > भक्ष्या भजनेपसंदाराङ्गाए्या TAA TST ॥ ५६ ॥ (tol Woes Bere)
ac शा णएटिच्यश्तदकीयं भाष्यम् | [अ०्द।ा०२]
भजन्यनन्यमनसो ज्ञावा उतादिमव्ययम्। aay सप्तमाध्यायप्रतिपादितपरभक्रिमनद्य तत्पञाद्गनं (गो ०्र०<। ख्ञा०९४) सततं कीत्तयन्ता मां यतन्तश्च दृढव्रताः नमस्यन्तश्च मां wat नित्ययुक्रा उपासते ॥ ९॥ इत्यादि | तत्यञ्चात् (गी०श्र०<। Boxe) ये भजन्ति तु मां wen मयि ते तेषु wawa इति तदुपसंहारस्ततस्तज (AAC ade अष्ट ०२।प्र०४।अन् ०६) चिचया यजंतेतिवत् सामानाधिकरण्येन भक्तिनान्ना भजनेन फलं भावयदित्ययैः | (ste) Ho) Ato.) एकभक्िविंचि- wa इत्यादौ भगवद्भक्ता भक्रिशब्दस्य प्रयक्रलेन STATA: भक्तिभजनयारेकार्थलाच। नाप्य परभक्िः फलभावनया विधीयते तस्या श्ररृतिसाध्यलेना विधेयलात् । नापि तस्या निःञ्रेयसदेतु लमन्ञातं ज्ञाप्यते (गो०।अ्०७।ङ्ञा०२३) मद्भक्ता यान्ति मामपीत्यादिना waa एव तनज्न्लापनस्यापि प्राक्त ara किन्तु परभक्रेविप्ननाशनसाधनाकाङ्कन्यां कोतंनादि- कमेवापकान्तं भक्तिश्ब्दननेाष्या ser ठतीयान्तेन fafew परभजनसाधनत्वे तेषु विधीयते दत्यबरार्थवाद्ाकाङ्कायां (गो ०।श०८। दा ०२८) मयि ते तेषु चाष्यहमिति पञखादन्वयः। aya um भजनं तेन चख मयि fefaftfa वाक्यं भि- Gai कीतत्तनादिषु भक्रिसाधनत्ेन (तेत्तिरोयसं०।अष्ट ०२। Hox wee) wad चुतमितिवद्धक्तिभब्दा ra: शक्य
[०२०२] शाण्डिल्यण्तदकौयं भावष्यम्। Re
संस्कारेण gay इति। यद्वा wea एभिरिति ware तासु मक्तिश्ब्दः (श्राख्चलायनग्रातद्०। श्र०<।खं० ८) उद्धि- इत् । श्रवा (गो ०।अ ०७।स्ा ०९९) चतुविधा भजन्ते मामिति भजनगणपाटात् Wea (गो ०।श्र०अच्चा०९८) उदाराः खवं एवेते दत्य दार्य॑गुणये गाद्वा गोाएव्मिति ॥ ५६॥
रागार्थप्रकीर्तिसादचयाचेतरेषाम्॥ ५७ ॥ एवं दि wae (गो०। ०९९ BTR) स्थाने षीकेश aa water * अगत् प्रहव्यत्यनुरज्यते च। इति | तत्न सा्तादेवानुरागायैलं RAT BAA! Arey ग्थात् (aol wee) Boks) सततं कीन्तंयन्ता मां यतन्तश्च दृढव्रताः | दूत्यादिनोाक्रानामपि तदव फलमिति wo il अन्तराले तु शेषाः स्युरुपास्यादे। च काण्डत्वात्॥ ५८ ॥ गी०।श्र०९।सा०९१) भजन्यनन्यमनसा ज्ञाला तादिमव्ययम्। (Aol ्र०९।न्ञा०२९) ये भजन्ति तु मां wer मयि ते तेषु wae द्येतथारन्तराले या गोाणभक्रयः BATT: परभक्वङ्गा- नि भवन्ति परभक्गिसन्दंशणदेवति भावः। ता यथा (गीता०। HVAT ९४।९५।२२।२५।९६।९७।९२८)
Be न्राण्िच्यकशनतखीयं भाष्यम्! [ख०२।चा ०२]
सततं कोन्तंयन्ता मां यतन्त इटव्रताः | ममस्यन्तख मां yet मित्ययक्रा उपासते it lt ज्ञानयज्ञेन चान्ये यजन्तो मामुपासते | WHat प्रयक्तन बङधा बिश्वते मखम् ॥ दति । तथा । अरनन्यािन्तयन्तेा मां ये जनाः पर्युपासते, तेषां नित्याभियक्रानां या गक्तेमं वहाम्यहम् ॥ ९॥ दति, तथा। | यान्ति देवव्रता रेवान् fags यान्ति पिदत्रताः। गतानि यान्ति तेज्या यान्ति मद्याजिनोऽपि माम्॥९॥ दति। पचर पष्यं फलं तायं यो मे wat प्रयच्छति, तदहं भक्युपइतमस्नामि प्रयतात्मनः ॥ ९॥ दति! तथा । | यत् करोषि यदञ्रासि यच्छुहाषिददासियत्। यत् तपस्यसि array तत् GCA मदप्पंणम्॥ tt प्रभा ष्यभफले रेवं मे च्यमे aaa: | दूति | तच नाक्नामभिधानं atta) wae यल्लख्ाच लाकि- काऽणङ्गताग्रस्तावादुक्ः। TSHA ARMAS ्टपवासाद्यन्- BAR| नमस्कारः सखापकषबाधककरभिरःसंयागादिव्या- पारः। ज्ञानयज्ञख fear म॒ख्यामृख्यभेदेन एकलषटयक्कवि- षयतया। तन्माचचिन्ता ठु ध्यानमनुरूतिख। यागः पजा भ गवन्तमुदिश्य पचादिदानश्च तथा विहितनिषिद्धसवंकम्मणां
[अ०्रश्या०्] शाख्छिष्यशतद्धजीयं भाव्यम् । | st
परमेश्वरे wauufafa | न केवखमेतान्येवाङ्गानि। किन्त (छां ०। ०९२९५) HAT HHUA (गो°।अ०९०।दा०९९) ्रादित्धानामहं विष्णरित्याद्युपासभादिश्ब्दकवखोहतान्यपि भक्ठिषाधनानि कुतः ब्रह्मकाण्डस्य अवंस्यापि भक्तितस्ठाधनप्र- तिषादकलादिति॥ ५८॥ ताभ्यः AAT THAT ॥ ५८ ॥
ताभ्यो गणभक्रिभ्यः पावि्यमन्तःकरण मालिन्यर तुद्रित- चयः सएव द्वार कुतः (Mol Woe | Ber) पवित्रमिदम्त्त- ममिन्युपक्रम्याभिधानात् । भक्तरन्तःकरणधमंलात् पाविश्च- स्यान्तरङ्गलादिति॥५९॥
तासु प्रधानयोगात् फलाधिक्यमे के 1 Lo 11
तासखेव कीत्तंनादिषु (गी०।अन्< क्ञा०२६) यामे भलया प्रयच्छति (गी०।अ०९।द्चा०९४) नमस्यन्त at war Carer प्रकरणादिसिद्धाङ्गभावेषु प॒नभेक्तिशंयागकथनं प्रटत्तभक्रोनां तदनुष्ठाने फ लाधिक्याथमेवेव्येक WIA मन्यन्ते॥ go ॥
नान्नेति जेमिनिः स्वात् 1 ६९ ॥
जेमिनिराचार्यस्त arg गाणलसिद्धः (qraaransra सख ०।अर०८। खं ° ७) श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेतेत्यादादिव भ्या कौ- May UW दानेन परभक्तिं षाधयदिति सषामानाधिकरण्य- सम्भरवाज्ञामभावेमान्याथे तां मन्यते न WaTATIY जारवा- दिति ॥६९॥
@
8२ ग्राशदिष्यन्रेतद्धवी्ये aa; [अण्शसा०द]
Saat यंयाकालसम्भवो खद्ादि वत् ॥ ९९ ॥ MURATA सहानष्टा नमेकेकन वी क्रमेण वाना नमिति चयः vat: । are कश्चिद ननष्टानेऽथन्येषां fae फललप्रसङ्गः दितीये विकच्पप्राप्तावर्थैक्यनियमः स्यात् ठती- यसव शास्तायं: | एकक्लतावन्यस्याननष्टानं च प्रसज्यते जारवात्। तस्मारे तेषां मिथो यभिचाररतु वमिति wary: । शिद्धान्तस्त auras साधनानि प्रमाणसत्वात्। किन्तु सहानुष्टाननियमो नास्ति प्रमाणाभावात्। Garg गन्धपुष्यधुपदीपनैवे्यादीना- मेकप्रयोगञख्रवणं तेषामेव सदहानुष्ठानम्। तदितरेषान्त् यथा- कालं यथाखम्भवमनुष्टानं ग्टदकृत्या द्ाविव यथा ग्टहसाधनदढण- स्तम्भाद्याररणं कदाचिदेकदा कदाचित् wan इति नद्येता- बता दणणदीनामकारणएलमायाति | तस्मात् यद्यादृशदुरितच्त- यमथ तत् तादृशद्रितचयं wat सवैः खखसाम््ये दिते परभक्तिसिद्धिरिति तथाच गोधते (ite pao Breve) बेद्धनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपेद्यतेष्ति) ६२॥ द अर्तु्टरे काऽपि बलौ ॥ CS तेषु we थः कञ्िदतिश्यानष्टानेन बलवान् भवति ख एकोऽपि परमेश्वर तुष्टिं जनयिला परभक्रये प्रभवति बहतर- भिथिलषरिच्याभिरपि यथा नेतरः प्रमुस्तुश्यति gafa चेके- नापि निव्येलीकसततशकृतपाद संवा दने तदत् 1 षरि तणा चम्य- तमेनापि दृ तर सेवितेन भगवत्मसादाद्धक्तिः wraa चया (ग ०।अर०९८।स्ञा ०५७) |
[अ०२। शा ०२ श्ाखिडिच्यगतस्कोयं भाष्यम् | [|
बुद्धियोगं समित्य afew: vad भव। afew: सर्वद्गौणि amurara afcafan दत्यादि। तया aretfeaaafa कसछविद्लम्। यथा (ब्रह्म पुर- च्र०<७।स्ञा०९६६)। ध्यायन् छते यजन् यञ्जैस्तेतायां दा परेऽ यन् | यदाप्नोति acratfa कले date केशवम् ॥ इत्यादिकम् । नच व्यभिचारो बलवत्प्रत्येकजन्यभक्ति प्रति कीरत्तनलादिना ₹रेतुलादिति॥ ६९॥ ननु कीत्तंनाच्ान्तरालिकार्नां स्वेषामेव पाविच्यं दार- मृत कषाश्चिदन्यदपीत्यत ATE | अवन्धाऽप्पणस्य मुखम् ॥ ९४॥ भ गवत्य्पितग्ुभाष्रुभकमंणां खफलाजननलक्षणएवन्धाभाव एव STITH यथोक्तम् (गी०।अ्र०८।द्या०२८)। प्एभाष्णभफलीरोवं मे च्यसे कमंबन्धनेरिति। श्रप्पेण मन्त्रोऽपि प्राणान्तरे | कामताऽकामतेा वापि यत् करोमि urge | तत् सव तयि संन्यस्तं लत्मरयुक्तः करोम्यहम् ॥ दति । नचेवं खातन्त्यप्रसङ्गः तत्कर णएबलेन पापाचरणाभावस्यापि तदङ्गलात्। यथया wa: न वेदबलमा्चित्य पापकर्मरतिभ- वेदिति। तस्म्नात् पाविच्यं तदितर्विषयमेवेति। wa a कमं खाश्रमविडितनिव्यनेमित्तिकाव्मकं बाध्यम् | सम्बगाच्र- मपरिपालनाद्रह्मलाकादिफखं तद्मात्री ane विलम्बः स्वादि-
G 2
88 शाखिडिच्य ग्रत द ज्ीयं area | [च ०२।शा ०२
त्यादि बन्धः । ब्रद्मण्यपिंते तु amfafe: | एवं कामाज्ञानङ- तकाम्यकमंपाययोारपि पञ्ादपंणे फलाभाव एव cfa ॥ ee ii श्रय Tima विग्रेषश्िगधते aa afaafaae यत्ख- रूपमच्यत यथा (कां °।ए ०६०) य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः परुषा दृ श्यते दिर णश्मश्रद्िरण्यकेश् इत्यादि । तथा (नार- दपञ्चरातरे | पटले९्१।सा०७२१)। ध्यः सदा सविटमण्डल मध्यवर्ती | नारायणः सरसिजासनसन्निविष्टः ॥ HATA मकरकुण्डलवान् किरौटी। हारी हिरण्लयवपृषटेतश कुः चक्रः ॥ ९॥ दूत्येवमादि । तच किमेवंविधेव्येव ध्याननियमः पृणप्रादुभा- बाद वा यथाञ्चतेखिति। तच ष्येयखरूपश्नवणाक्ियमप्राप्ताव- च्यते। ध्याननियमस्तु इष्टसोकयात् ॥ ६५ ॥ ध्याने ध्येयनियमकथयनं दृष्टां नानाविषयले चित्तविक्ते- पसम्भवात् | तस्मात् साकयीर्थमेव तत्कथनं ज्ञेयम् । श्रदु टा यैत विकल्यादिप्रसङ्गात् | तस्माद्यथाञ्रुतेष॒ व्यवसा । श्रत एव गा- पीनां शि्ररुपालादेख तज्नियममन्तरेणेव ध्यानस्य दुलेभं फल- मुपलब्धमिति ॥ ९५. ॥ त्यजः पूजायामितरेषां नेवम् ॥ ६६ ॥ (मो ०।अ ०९। द्ध ०२५) यान्ति मद्याजिनाऽपि मामित्यत्र यजि. किं प्रसिद्धज्याति्टामादि विषयः किंवा पुजावचनद्ति।
[ FoR oR | WALI भाष्यम् | ४५
vara यजिः पूजायामेव प्रयुक्रः कुता nrad विष्णं पज- येदिव्यादिना नित्यकाम्यपृजा ताद्य विदिता तस्याः परभ- ङ्गतलमाचमच विधीयते aa तादथ॑म्। इतरयागानांतु न aa तं तेषामोशरोदेश्छकलं भक्तिसंयोगखोाभयं विधातव्य- मिति वाक्यभेदः स्यात्। श्रय विष्णवे उरुक्रमाय aa चरुभि- व्यादि विदितस्य भक्तिसंयेगोाऽस्ितिचेत् सत्यम्। काम्यानां तत्फलेनेव निराकाङ्कतात् | जीवनमाचनिमित्तकनित्यपूजा- are भक्तिसंयागविधी बाधकाभावात् fra सतताप- खितिलाघवाचेति । अरत एव areua दिंसायुक्तधमनि- न्दायाम् | (महाभार ° शां °।अ ०२६५ | ए ०६९९ । स्ञा ०९४७०) । सर्वकमंखदहिंसां हि धमत्मा मनुर ब्रवोत्। कामरागा fe हिंसन्ति afeaat aye aT: tt विष्णं ये चाभिजानन्ति धमारेव यजन्ति ते । aaa: सुमनेभिख् तथापि यजनं Waa ce neta श्रथ पृजाप्रस्तावादधिकरणत्रयम् | पादोदकं तु पाद्यमन्यापरेः ॥ ९७ ॥ एवं सयते | (नसिंद पृ०।अ्र०५९। सो ०४६) गङ्गा प्रयागगयपसष्करनेमिषाणि | पण्यानि यानि कुरुजाङ्गलयामुनानि ॥ कालेन तीर्थसलिलानि एनन्ति पापान् | पादादकं भगवतः प्रपृनाति सद्यः ॥९॥ Tas तत् किं पादसयुक्तं जलं पादोाद्कमृत पादे दकका-
ay Wifes भाव्यम् | [अ०२।अआ०२]
त्सृष्टं जलम् । त्र पाद्यमेव पादोदकं कुता ज्ञायते न्य याऽव्याति प्रसङ्गात् । तथाहि भगवतः साकात्पादसम्बन्भा न सम्भवति । नाप्यवतारदारा । तस्याप्यनुष्टाटसख्िधानाष- म्भवात् । किन्तु पूजाधिष्ठानम्रतिमापादखन्बन्धादुपचारस्तत्रापि प्रलिष्ठितायाः श्रप्रतिषितायास्त पजाथमावाहने सति तथाच शालियामगिलाद्यधिष्टाने पादाभावे तन्नं TA । तेवं व्या- wat पाद्यमेवास्तु प्रतिमाद्यव्यण्तव्यवडितसम्बन्धकन्य- नाप्रषङ्गात् ॥ ९७॥ सखयमपितं याद्यमविगेषात् ॥ ई८ ॥
पुजाया भगवति दन्तनेवेद्यभिमाखादिकं Bud era दत्यादिना प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन विदितं afew सालतत्वाविशेषादेव भगवद्क्रन खयमभमपि ay भाजनधारणादिना खोापकार्यमि- त्यर्थः । खयमपि aed प्रतिपत्तिः सिद्धति । wasraa वजनीयमेव यथया अ्रन्ाद्युदेणेन त्यक्रपुरोडाश्रस्यापि उत्तराद्धात् खिष्टक्ृतमवद्यति यजमानपञ्चमा प्रोडाभं wa- यन्तो ति प्रतिपत्तिस्तयेद मपि वच्नादव। SUT सालतेग्या- ऽपि न प्रतिपादयेत् परद्रव्यलात् । वचनादिति चेन्न महि वचने खवजंनमक्तम्। अरय ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दद्यादित्यादिना त्रा णता दात्मनेऽपि दानप्रसङ्ादितिचेश्न दानस्य eaquwea परखलापादानदूपलात्। नचेवं प्रतिपत्ता युक्तं पुरोाडाश- स्यापि यजमाने प्रतिपत्तिदशनात् क्रयादिवत् प्रतिपन्तिरपि स्ञलापादिकव । तदेवं यचान्यसालताऽखंपन्तिरू खयं यदणे-
weer] शाण्दिस्यशतदचीयं भाष्यम् । 8७
नीणंवेगण्वं षरिदार्धमेव | तथा खयं दत्तपाथ्ादिधारणेऽपि जञेयंभिति। किंञ्च (गोभ।अ्र०द्।सा०९२) तैदंत्ताभप्रदायेभ्यों यो WE सतेन एव सद्रत्यच षमानकटढंकलात् was षमा- नकम लप्रतीतेः। क्रासमभिव्याहतनंनः सामानाधिकरण्छेना- न्यात् ACMA तष्नात्तोचपरवे मानाभावात् | तस्मा- दाधकं विना देवेभ्यो दत्तमपि भाक्रव्यमितिध्येवम्॥ ec निमित्तगुणाव्यपेक्षणादपराधेषु व्यवस्था ॥ ९८ ॥ (बर्पुराणे। Wo QR Bare 8) देवपूजापराघास्ते दाचि ua चरिंकौर्निताः। . इत्युपक्रम्य दाचि णापर धास्तन्तप्राय- faurf च विहितानि तच किं खवपराधवजनं पूजाङ्गमुन कंषांचिद्धजेनमङ्ग कषां चित् षरंषायं दति । ware (बरा द- पटर ०१९४ स्ञो ०६१) ARUN पुष्येण या मामचंयते नरः | परतनं लख वच्छामि तच्छएव्व वसुन्धरे ॥ ९1 इत्यादि | तच्राकम्छानां Waal पयृदस्तलान्न पुजाङ्गवभ्। किन्त पुजाक्रमप्रयेरभमष्य भ्रमपदिनाप्पणे ad तन्निमित्तमपेच्छ प्राय- fan यतर त॒ (बरादपु°अ०९५।दा०द६) WTAT गन्य- माल्यानि धुपंयोा मे प्रयच्छलोत्यनन पुजाक्रमभङ्गापराधे तन्त- HA पूजाङ्गलाद्गवेगुण्यपरि हारात् तप्राय्ित्तस्या क्तं द्र- BAA । यत्र पूजामन्तरोण (बरादपु०।्र०९९५।सा ०९) दन्तकाष्टमखादिला UB मामुपसप्यंतीत्यादि श्रतं aa व्यक्त- मेव पुरुषाथंलमिति व्यवद्धेवेति ॥ ६९ ॥
gx wWieanagira भाष्यम् । [खन्रया०२]
एवे पूजाया भक्तिसंयोागसिद्धो (ato wee Bre Ra) पत पुष्यं फलं तायमित्यनेन भगवदुद्श्वकद्ानमाचख्य भश्यङ्गलवि- चिरित्याइ। । पचादेदानमन्यथा डि वेशिश्चम् ॥ ७० ॥ यद्यदि टतमं लाके यश्चान्यह्यितं we | तत् तद्धि देयं Mad देवदेवाय चक्रिणे ॥ इत्यादिना प्राप्तस्य भगवदुदटषटकसवेदानसख मश्छङ्गलवि- far) अन्यथा पचादि चतुष्टयविशिष्टदानमेव स्यात्) प्रत्येक- fat वाक्यमेदः। awa पचरादिन्रव्देन ore दावमनुद्य (afatia do) उपव्ययत इत्यनेन निल्यापवीतसख दभीाङुत्- वदङ्गत्विधिरोव ym tia lee I BHAA पर देतुभावाच करियासु BIG: ॥ ७१॥ ता भक्तयः WHA WAG एव कुतः परभक्रिदेतुलात् इतरघमजन्यलवाच यथया (गे०््र०४।सञा०९०।१९) बद्वा ज्ञानतपसा पूता मद्धावमागताः। ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तां थेव भजाम्बहम् ॥ दूति । -भावशब्दद्च भक्ते AIM: | गङ्गाजले fa न वसन्ति ae: | देवालये पचिगणएणा वसन्ति ॥ भावोाञ्द्ितास्ते न फलं लभन्ते | ating देवायतनाच मुख्यात् ॥ CATS तया (गोण्च्र्ञ।द्धा०९६)
[अण०्र। ०२] शण्डिल्यशतद्धवीयं area | ४९
चतुर्विधा भजन्ते मां जनाः सुकृतिनोऽजन ॥ इति । श्रच पुव्वेसुकतजवाद्धक्तोनां तास्तथा मुख्याः । एतेन भक्रिमोर्मांसायां विचारो युज्यते न कम॑मोमांसा- यामिल्युक्तम् ॥ ७९॥ ननु भक्तानां न गेाणम॒ख्यभावस्तथा सति (गी ०।अ्र*्॑ञा। ६) चतुविंधा भजन्ते मां जनाः सुक्तिनोऽर्ज॑न । mat जिन्नासुरथीर्थी ज्ञानी च भरतषभ ।॥दति। चतुणां तुष्यवदभिधानं किंङतमित्यत are | गोणं चैविष्यमितरेण स्तुत्यान् META ॥ ७२ ॥ wre चेविष्यमेव तासां मुख्येन सादचय्थेरवणं तु स्हत्य- GA! यथा राजसमभिव्याहारेणामात्यानाम् | एवञ्च पाप- चयविपद्द्भारादिनिमित्तं सरणएकोत्तंनाद्या्तभक्तिः ज्ञानाये यज्ञाद्याचरणं जिन्ञासाभक्रिः। यथाच (ददा ० प्र ०५९१) तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्यणा विविदिषन्ति awa दानेन तपसाऽ- नाश्कनेत्यादि | तथा (We Wo UL Tile Bs) सखकर्मणा तमभ्यच्यं सिद्धं विन्दन्ति araat: विष्णुपु °।- Bo so Or ०९६) a चलति निजवणेघमता a: | सममतिरात्मसुहदिपच्तेपच्ते ॥ ग ररति नच दन्ति fafgee.* स्थितमनसं तमवेहि विष्णभक्रम् ॥
* सितमनस.म(तप्ठ.मसम्। नि
wo प्ाख्िल्यशतदधजीयं भाष्यम्। [अ०२।चखा०य२्]
इत्यनेन खसवणा्रमविहितवेदानुवचनादोनां ज्ञाना मनुष्ानं जिज्ञासा afm: 1 श्रथा्थिता भक्रिरपि दिधा ततै- का परभह्यथं क्रियमाणा पवाक राज्यखगीद्यथे क्रियमाणा च कीत्तनादिरूपाऽपरा | यथा (विष्णपु ०।अ०।अ्र ० ऽ। द्वाद) भौमान् मनोरथान् कामान खगिंबन्द्ं परं पदम्। प्राग्नाव्याराधिते fastr निवाणमपि चोत्षमम्॥ इति | तच fadrwutfa: परभक्रिदारेति परभक्तिप्रयोजनार्यिता (मो०।शअ०्८प्ना०१८) ये भजन्ति चमां भ्या afa a तेषु चाप्यदमित्यनेन सदेकवाश्चलात् | यच्च भागवते (खन्ध ७।च् °- ५।स्ञा०९२।२२) mau कोत्तनं विष्णोः सरणं पाद् सेवनम् | रचनं वन्दनं दास्यं स्ख्यमात्मनिवेदनम् ॥ दति पुंसार्पिता विष्णा भक्रिखेल्लवलचणा। दति, तदेतेव्वेव यथाययमन्तभावनौयम् | तदेवमुपाधीना मेषामृपधे- augusta aig इति।॥७२९॥ मनु कौ्तनादीनामङ्गते कथमाश्यादिषु Aare घरते दत्यपे चायाम॒च्यते।
बद्र नतर स्थमभय मवे्टिसववत् ॥ ७३ ॥
सरणकीत्तनादीनां परभश्यङ्तया तदन्तगतत्रमनारभ्य फलान्तरश्रवणात् तद्धादिभावेनात्वषाऽपि। यथा राजदया-
न्तं ताप्यवेष्टिः प्रधानापि WAIT. फलान्तर सम्बन्धात् तत
[WoRATOR | शण्डिल्यणत दको यं भाव्यम् । ae
उत्क्व्यते। यथावा दस्पतिसवः कचित् प्रधानमपि वाअपे- याङ्ग तद्त् प्रमाणसच्वासत्वाभ्यां विशेषात् । एवं प्रमादात् कुवं्तां कमं प्रच्यवेताष्वरेषु यत् सरणादेव तदिष्णाः स्पे खादिति ata: i दूत्यनेन सव॑कमंणां नेमित्तिकाङ्गतेनापि wea: | खभा- age खगादिफलाय प्राधान्यं चन विर्द्धमिति॥ oe ॥ द्दानीमान्तभक्रीा farafqeaa | SAMA: AMSAT प्रायित्तभावात् ॥ ७४ ॥ सरणकीत्तनकयानमस्का रादीनामान्तंभके निवे्रसल्त- त्पापङतनरकान्तिमतां तन्तत्पापच्तयदेतुलेन कथनात् यथा (विष्एप ०।अ० I> BIBT ०२९।दद्) पापे गुरूणि गुरुणि लघूनि च लधुन्यपि। भरायिन्तानि भैतरेय जगः खायंभवादयः॥ ९॥ प्रायखिन्तान्यश्ेषाणि तपःकमोद्मकानि वे। यानि तेषामशेषाणां छष्णानस्मरणं परम् ॥ २॥ तथा (fame ie ६।अ ° श्लो °<) यन्ना मकीत्तंनं भ्या विलायनममुत्तमम्। भेतेयाश्रषपापानां wasatfaa पावकः ॥ एवं (महाभार ० रणा ० ।मोाच्ध ०।अ०९२४१५।सञा०९२२०१५। ९२२०६) सवाञ्जमाभि गमनं स्वतोथावगादनम् |
न तया फलद साते नारायणकया Bar ii H 2
४९ ` ्राख्छिल्यग्तद्धत्रोयं भाव्यम्। [खअ०२।अ०श]
पाविताङ्गाः MAST: श्रुलेमामादितः कथाम्। नारायण्ाञ्ज्यां Vt सवपापप्रणाञ्चिनीम्॥ इत्यादि | तस्माद्युक्मान्ता faawafafa ॥ ७४॥ भूयसामननुष्ठितिरितिचेद् प्रयाणमुपसंदारादत्छपि ॥७५॥ स्यादेतत् न्यायविरोधादेतदचनानां खसख्पपापविषयत्वमेव UMA | अन्यया सयः के्रसाध्यानामननुष्टानलक्णमप्रामाण्य- मितिचेन्न तेषामामरणमृपसं दारस्ररणात् क्तं शाधिक्यात्। यथा (विष्छप०।च्र ०२।अ०६।ज्ञो०२९) तस्माद्जिंश्रं विष्णुं संसरन् परुषो सने । न याति नरकं ब्ररद्धः aufeanens: ti ईत्यनेन सातत्योपसंहारात् | उपक्रमापसंहारयारकार्थ- त्वादिति भावः। गचापक्रमे कालः sua येन तदिरोधाद्- पसंहारस्य भिन्ना्थतापि भवेत्। तथाच क्तशसाम्यादितरेषां माननुष्टानमप्रामाखखम् (faa ०।अ० २।अ० ६। सला ° au) प्रात- fafa तथा सन्ध्यामध्याङ्कादिषु संस्मरन् इरटेतदवयत्थानुवाद एव । नाप्यनुतक्ताधिकारिकमिद्म् । (विष्छपु°। He २।अ०६। Ue 28) छते पापेऽनुतापो वे यस्य पुंसः प्रजायते | प्रायिन्तन्त् तस्येकं हरिसंस्मरणं परम् ॥ दृत्यस्यापि सवेप्रायिन्ताङ्गानुतापस्यानुवादलाद्कमित्य- स्यापि प्रायिन्तान्तरनेरपेच्छस्छ न्यायप्राप्तस्यानु वादः | TIT वाक्यानि भिद्येरम् विशिष्टविषया भवेयुः | श्रता चच्छब्दान्त-
(Seger) शाण्डिल्यशतदघोयं भाष्यम् ५३
गंतल्वाद्ययायथमनवादलान्नार्थवादतव पुदवाक्यानाम् । अत एवान्य्रापि (विष्ण॒प ०।अ्० ३।अर ०७ ज्ञा ०२ ४।२५) किङ्करा दण्डपाशावा न यमा नच यातनाः समयोस्तस्य यस्यात्मा कंशवाखलम्बनः सदा ॥ चक्रायुधस्य नामानि सदा waa कीत्तंयेत् । arity विद्यते ae सु पविच्रकरोा aa: i इत्यादिभिः सातत्यमुक्रमिति ॥ ७५ ॥
लघ्वपि भक्ताभिकारे मदत्तेपकमपर सवंदानात्॥ OE II
wafa सरृतसरणकोत्तनादि महतामपि पापानां चेपकं नाञ्नकं भवति। यतो भक्राधिकारे प्रायश्ित्तान्तराणां सर्वेषां त्यागलच्णदानिप्रतोतेरित्यथंः। यथा गीतम् (at अ०्१८।सा० ६६) | सवधमान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज । शरदं AT सवपापेभ्या मात्तयिव्यामि ary: i इति। अचर हि न काम्यकमत्यागपूवेकल्मयैः काम्यत्यागे पापा- भावात् किं भगवता माचणोयम्। श्रय पापान्तरं ATH काम्यत्या गस्यादृष्टाथेलापन्तेः नित्यमेमित्िकयोरपि त्या गपूवै- कता न तस्यार्थः aareana यदि विधिरस्तिन ततः पापं fa मोच्चणोयम्। श्रय नास्तोति वाच्यम् । मैवम् । एवं वाक्यमेव तद्विधानात् पापाजनकलात् | अय सवेधमान् परित्यज्येत्यनेन संन्यासिन मन्य तदधिकारिकमिदं तेषामवकोणोदिप्रायञ्धि-
४५९ शाख्ित्यशतदश्ीयं भाष्यम। [अ०२।च्ाण्श्]
न्तादिख्मरणात् तेः ष विकस्यप्रसङ्गात् पूवेवन््हतामननुष्टानं चस्यात्। नच सातत्येन तदोषपरिहारः।
महापातकयुक्राऽपि व्यायन्निमिषमच्युतम्।
पमस्तपस्ली भवति पद्धिपावनपावमः॥
इत्यादिना लघ॒नाऽपि मर त्क्तेपकलात्। किच्च संन्यासा-
अमस्यासन्निधानेन बुद्यनारोददात्। तस्माद्यथा लाके सवान् वि- Bla at asa RIS नाश्रयिय्यामोत्यच क्तशनाश्कान्तरदहानिः WRIA | तथयान्तरपापनाश्कान्तरत्यागाऽवगम्यते वाक्यादेव, एतेन aufsamafauraaa सरेकाध्यायपाटठेऽपि न तदि- षयकलवं प्रकरणएसन्निधानयोाः सबललात। किञ्चासिन्नध्याये। (मो ०।अ०९८द्ा०२) काम्यानां कर्णां न्यासं संन्यासं saat विदुरित्यादिना काम्यकमेत्याग एवोक्रान सन्यासाश्रमः एवश्च प्रायखिन्तान्तरत्यागसङ्कल्पेन केवलभगवन्नामादिभिरान्तिं यस्तत्त॒मिच्छति तदधिकारिकमेव सष्टत्सरणादि। तथाच भिन्नाधिकाराद्ुषणानां न समुदितिः। नापि क्तंश्भयान्ूय- सामननृष्टानम् | (मी ०ञ्रम९८्।स्ञा०्र)
दुःखमित्येव यत् कमं कायज्ञंशभयात् त्यजेत् ।
स छता राजसं त्यागं नेव त्यागफलं लभेत् ॥
इत्यनेन तादृश्रसंन्यासस्य देयलात् | (विष्णुपु ०।अ० ६ ।-
Wo Orato)
कलि कल्मषमल्यु्ं acafine नुणणम्।
प्रयाति विलयं सद्यः षडे ्रानुसंख्ते ॥ इत्यादि,
[०२ चा ०२ | ए्ाखिल्यण्तदधचीयं भाष्यम् ५१
तदधिकारपरम्। एवम् (गो०।अ्र०९।प्ना०२०।२९) अपिचेत् सुदुराचारो भजते मामनन्यभाक् | साधुरेव स मन्तव्यः सम्यग्यवस्ितिा fe an fai भवति धमात्मा शश्वच्छान्तिं निगच्छति, arma प्रतिजानोहि न मे भक्रः प्रणश्यति॥ इत्यनेन तथा (नुसिंदप्०।अर०स्।च्चा०२८।९२९) नारकाः छष्णषटष्ोति नार सिंहेति च॒क्रुः । दति संकीत्तिते विष्णुलारकंभाक्तिपू्वकम् | AIT यातनाः सवास्तेषां नष्टा मदात्मनाम्॥ दूत्यादिना च भत्यधिकारः gan दति। wa कीत्तंन- स्यो च्ारणएत्वमाचमिड प्रतीतम् नतु प्रथमान्तपदेनेत्यादिनि- यम दति॥ ७६ ॥
तत्स्थानत्वाद नन्यधमंः खले AANA || ७७ ॥
(विष्णपु ० ०२।अ०६।न्नो०२४) प्रायश्चित्त तु aaa ₹हरिसंसरणं परमित्यादोा ना माऽतिदेशेन प्रायित्तान्रध- aga मन्तव्यः। प्रायखित्तस्थानलात् तत्खाने तद्धिधा- नादित्यर्थः। यथया (श्राश्वलायतश्रौतद्ध०।अ०९।खं ०७) खले वाली युपे भवतीत्यत्र पद्ररुनियेाजने युपकाय खले वालीवि- धिरिति। न युपधमंस्याष्टाखिकरणदेः प्रसङ्गस्तददद च नखले- मादिवपनानां प्रायञित्तचमणामप्राक्चिरिति। नकीतंनादेरपि पापक्षयदतु लात् प्रायखित्तमेवेति वाच्यम्।
५९ शाखिदिल्यग्रतदबौयं भाष्यम् । [०२०२]
प्रायो नाम तपः प्राक्रं few निश्चय saa i तयानिञखयसंयक्रं प्रायिकमिति waa ॥ Tata aed प्रायञ्चिन्तशब्देा ae: way Ary tha ध्येयम् ॥ ७७ ॥ ° ~w ~ ्रयाङ्गानां प्रधानाधिकरणनयत्यात तदधिकारखिन्तयते।
आनिन्दययोन्यधिक्रियते पारम्पयात् सामान्यवत् ॥ ७८ ॥
निन्दितचाण्डालादियोानिपयंन्तं भक्रावधिक्रियते संसार- द्:खजिदासाया श्रविश्षात्। wu वेदाध्ययनानधिकारात् कथमवेवर्णिंकानां स इतिचेत् aare पारम्ययादिति। (पूरव मोमांसाख०श्र०२पा०्।८्०२) चादनालचणाऽथा धमः (उत्तरमोमांसादध०।अर०९पा०२१।्० 2) शास्याजिलादिति- न्यायादलेकिकाऽथैः अुत्येकसमधिगम्य इत्यत्र न विप्रतिपद्या- महे । किन्त स्तो शृद्रादोनामितिहास्पुराणादिदारा चाण्डा- लादीनां च रुत्याचारवदुपदेश्रपारन्पययैण ज्ञानमपि श्रतिमू- aaa भवति । यथा तेषां सामान्याऽरिंसाधमादिन्ञानम्। अनन्यया तद्सिद्धप्रसङ्गादिति॥ ७८॥
अता द्यविपक्रभावानामपि AAA ॥ ७८ ॥ यतः सवाधिकारोऽतः खलु येषामत्र परभक्तिविपक्कभावं न गता तेषां श्वेतद्वीपे भगवक्लाकं परभक्रिसाघ्रनानृष्टानं सर्यते। यया (मदहाभार०।शां०।माक्तघ्मं। नारायणोये। Wo VS TiBle ९२७७८॥९२७७९)
[Seoqaree) च्राण्डिल्यश्तस्जोयं भाव्यम् । ६९
RUTATATA: PASAT महाप्रभः | तच नारायणपरा ATAATSRITT: ॥ एकान्तभावापगतास्ते भक्ताः प्रुषोान्तमे । दत्याध्ुपक्रम्य तेषां परभक्तिसाघनानुष्टानं श्रुतम्। (महा- भार०। Ato ATAWA | We Ra Ti BT eo VR OE ९।९२७९२) सरिताशाभ्यधावम्तस्ततस्ते मानवा द्रुताः । शताश्जलणिपटा wer wa इत्येव वादिनः ॥ तता विवदतां तेषामश्राषं विपलध्वनिम्। बलिः किल्ापक्रियते aw देवस dae ॥ cafe तस्मात् waa तदधिकार दृति । wa एव (उत्त- रमीमांसाद्ध०। Wey पा०। ९६) तदुपर्यपि बादरायणेन सम्भवादिति जितम् ॥ ec ॥ अथय विपक्रभावानामपि कथं न aera दलयो हतेन श्यते ।
d ५ क्रमेकगल्युपपत्तसतु ॥ ८० It
तुखागतशङ्ाव्यवच्छेदाथः। नारायणोय एव श्रुयते (मा- भार०।शां०।अ०द४६।सा०९९२२८३) येऽतिनिष्कलृषा लाकं पष्छपापव्रिवजिता इत्युपक्रम्य ्रादित्यमण्डलद्ारा श्रनिर्द्ध- भदयुखसंकषंणवयूदक्रमेण गतिमभिधायाभिदहितम् । (महदाभा- ० शां०।अ०२४६।दा०९२२८२।९१२८९)। समाडितमनस्कास्तु नियताः संयतेद्ियाः। एकान्तभावापगता वासुदेवं विरश्न्तिते॥ दति
ae wiheanretd wea) [ख०२।चखा०२ |]
क्रमगत्धभिघानम्। तया पञ्चादुक्रम् | (महाभार ०। शां °।- माचधमं। अ०२५०। सा ०९२५ ४८९३२१५ ४९।१३५५ ०) | येतु दग्धेन्धना लोकं पुष्डपापविवजिताः, तेषां लयाभिनिदिष्टा पारपर्यक्रमाद्रतिः ॥ waar चेव ते गत्यां गच्छन्ति परमं पदम्। मूनमेकान्तधमाऽयं श्रेष्टा मारायणम्रियः ॥ अगला गतयस्िख्ो यद्भच्छ मधव्यं दरि म् । इत्ये कगत्यभिधानं च पक्षमक्रिविषयलेनापपद्यते। WT विरोधात् तस्माद पक्विषयखन्नक्लाकलाभ इति॥ ८० ॥
उत््रान्तिसुतिवाक्यशरेषाच ॥ ८१॥
उत्क्रान्तो (नो०श्र०।न्ञा०९०) मत्या युक्ता योगबलेन देवेत्युपक्रम्य (Fo Wo Ti BT ०९१) |
श्रामिल्येकाक्रं ब्रह्म व्याहरन् ATATATA ।
यः प्रयाति त्यजन् दें सयाति परमां गतिम् ॥ CAAA AVY AAMT: | (Toit cB okey) |
अग्रिज्यातिरडः We षण्मासा उन्त रायणम् |
तज प्रयाता गच्छन्ति ब्रह्य ब्रह्मविदा जनाः॥ इति MASA: श्रुता। तया । (oie Ti Bro vs) |
शराब्रह्मभुवनाह्ञाकाः पुन रावत्तिनेाऽजन ।
मामुपेत्य तु कोन्तेय पनरजनम न विद्यते ॥ दतिवाक्यशेषे लाकापक्रमादुपशन्दमरिन्ना च तत्मोपला-
[aor] शणडिल्यश्रतद्धबीय भाव्यम् | Ke:
कप्रा्िरविपक्षभावानामेव यक्ता विपक्षभावख म तल्लाकग- मनमपि फलं य॒च्यते तत्फलस्याक्यिलात् aera साघनान- नष्टानश्रवणाच्च। किञ्च श्रविपक्रभक्ेस्तत एव क्रममुक्तिखिद्ध तत्का लोनस्मरण विधिवेयथ्थप्रसङ्गात्। मच तेन परभक्िसम्- खयो चर ते। (गो ° He TIRTC RR) परुषः स परः पार्थं wat लभ्यस्तनन्ययेत्यन्यनिरपेक्तमाक्तसाधनल्ावगतेः। तस्मात् तल्ञाकऽप्यधिकारः। भारतग्रमेस्तु ( विष्ण॒पु° Hogi Weal खा ०५) ।
न खल्वन्यत्र मत्यानां war कम॑ विघोयते।
दव्यनेन कमात्यत्तिहेतुतेव । भक्तिस्ठ न afar
wa तदङ्गानामप्रा्षिः स्ादितिचेन्न प्रधानप्राप्तावेवाङ्गप्रा- पेनिंषादस्थपतियागाङ्गवदिति। श्एद्रादोनां त॒ वैदिकमन्त- जकर्मनिदट््तिर्नतु स्मरणकीन्तनादेर्भक्रिसाघनयखेतति तावतेवा- धिकारसिद्धा न विद्याप्रयुक्किकल्यना युक्ता ॥ ८९॥
aq तडं मद्ापातकिनामपि परभक्रावेवाधिकार- स्तया तद ङ्गाङ्गवेदानुवचनादावपीत्यत WE |
मददापातकिनां तवति ॥ ८र॥
पतनदेतुपापरतानां च पनरात्तिभक्रावेवाधिकारः प्रा- यिन्त वन्नान्य् तत्पापक्चयस्य स्वापे्तयाऽभ्यदिं तलात् zara agaa पापमित्यादिना। तदपगमे तु सुतरामधिकारबि- द्भिः॥ ८२॥
12
९० प्राख्िख्यगतखूनोयं भाष्यम् | [खर्र।खा०२]
श्रथेकान्तिकप्रस्ावात् सवधम: किं परभक्तेः भिन्न शति श्रद्धा पिश्राचोमपाकराति।
सेकान्तभावे गीतार्थप्र्भिन्ञानात् ॥ ८३॥
सा परा भक्रिरवैकान्तभावेा नान्यः कुतः Mawar प्र व्यभिज्ञाञ्चवणात्। यथा नारायणय एव (महाभार Nie | माचधण०।अ०२१५ ० कस्ा०९२५१५९।५२।५४) सदापनिषदोा वेदान् ये विप्राः सम्यगाख्िताः। पटन्ति विधिमास्धायये चापि afawfau: 1 तते विथिष्टंजानामि गतिमेकान्तिनां नणाम् | aay wa: कथिता faa खछषिणायवा ti दति wa प्रव्युत्तरम्। समृपोढेष्वनोकषु कुरूपाष्डवसेनयोाः। aaa विमनस्के वे गोता भगवता waa ॥ दति । तस््मादेकान्तिता परभक्रिरिति।॥स्र॥ अय Tasha Vara जनयन्त AT STATA |
gut maa सर्वेषां FATT ॥ ८४ ॥ परां भक्तिं waa सर्वेषां मक्रावुपयागः। तयादि सहे तुकं भगवानाह (Mle mwMeqciyre ae | यद्दं परमंगुद्धं मद्धकव्वभिधाखखति, भक्तिं मयि परां छवा मामेवेवयत्यसंश्रयम् ॥ टति। तचेतद्ध मंस्यापदेश्फलमपि ब्रह्मभावापत्तिरित्येवा्थसिद्धा
[चछर ०।य्ा ०२ | शाण्डिच्यशतद्धचीयं भाष्यम् gt
ufa मयि परां adfa किमयमाइ । तस्या मोच्तसाधमलेन AMA | WA एवेपरिचरवसः (महाभार ०।शां ०। अ ०९९०। स्ञा०९२७९८) BTM धनं चेत्यादिना परमेश्वरानुरक्रि- sua wafeg प्रदर्िंतमिति खतः प्रयेोजनलाभावात्। तस्मात् सवषां मुक्रिरेतुवेन रतानां परभक्रिजननेन मुक्रा- aaa इत्यभिप्राय उन्नीयत दइति। मचाभयजनकत्व तस्य RAAT AMARA | एवच्च दृष्टायैता भवति are ति॥२८४॥
दत्याचायंखश्रेश्वरविद्वदरविरचिते ्ाण्डिल्यश्तद्धचीये भाष्ये दितीयाध्यायस द्वितीयमाह्िकम्॥ #॥
समाप्तखाध्यायः॥ &
भजनोयाच्षमलेन भक्ररत्तमता BA: |
भक्रतद्भावतखाज भजनीय निरूप्यते ॥ ९॥ भजनोयेनादितोयमि द छत्श्लस्य त्ख द्पत्वात् ॥ ८५॥
arate श्चैयसिद्भिरिति ag निणंयः ।
ज्ञानं सन्तागसा जातिजत्यादोा तदसत््लतः॥९॥
सत्वे वा ने्टसम्बन्धकल्यनागारवादपि।
ASAT परं ब्रह्म सवचानुगतं खतः ॥ २॥
तदमेरे दृश्यमाचरे TRUTH सत्पर।
wer न्नानमितोदृक् स्यात् vara: सन्धिेतिचेत् ie ॥
dz wifeanraa wea; [खन्द।ा०९]
afe खरूपधीर्नेव सत्यलेनान्पखितेः। तदुपादानविषये ज्नानेच्छाृतिर्तुना॥ ४॥ तासां सुविषयलत्वेन तुत्वे लाघवं महत् | यत् तत् सविषयं ब्रह्म गुणवन्नैव गेारवात् ॥ ५॥ कालदेद्योापाधिङक्ृता तज्न्नादलादिकल्यन ॥ ८५॥ तच्छक्िमाया जडसामान्धात् ॥ ८९ ॥ तस्य ब्रह्मण रेश्वयंशक्िि मा येति Maa (गो ०अ०ञ।्ञा०९४) देवी येषा Wa मम माया दुरत्यया, मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्तिते॥९॥ मयाध्यकतेण प्र्टति; खयते सवरा चरम्। देतुनानेन केन्तेय जगद्िपरि वर्त्तते ॥ २॥ aaa तु कायाणां वेचिश्यान्नानतत्तः। कार्यसत््ोपपत्यथं त्रद्मसन्ताशतेरिति ॥ ९॥ मिग्यालस्ानुषक्तश् तन्धिष्यालं न साम्प्रतम् | तत्वश्चानेन बाध्यत मिश्ालमितिचेन्नरदि॥ २॥ मिश्यालस्याप्तथ्यलात् waa सुतरां सितम् । मिश्यात्वस्व च सत्यत्वे दृ श्सत्यत्वमागतम् ॥ इ ॥ अ्रलोकानामभानाच भाष्यते तु WI aq! र्जा सपादिभानं यद्न्यथाख्यातिरेव षा॥४॥ श्रन्यस्य सद स्वाभ्यां बाधाधारव्यवस्ितेः। सा माया जडसामान्ये Has नित्यमेव तत्॥ ५ ॥ अनन्यया तु व्यवसा स्यात् तस्माचिच्जाद्यनित्यता ॥ ८६॥
[षण्श्ा०१] शखिल्यश्तद्धकीयं भाव्यम् |
व्यापकलवाद्माप्यानाम् ॥ ८७ ॥ एवं व्यापक तत्त्वेभ्य व्याप्यतत्चसमङ्धवः | व्यापकानां डि तादाव्याद्माणेपादानता मता।॥९॥ न तावत् समवायेन भेदसम्बन्धगेारवात्। शब्दानां समयोाऽपयेवं प्रङ्गगादिकया लघुः ॥ २ ॥ aaa सर्वकार्येषु कारणएलं परेशितुः | निमिन्तलं fe तदुद्भवो द येष्वनुगलवतः ॥ २ ॥ age साषिभास्याया wares यते faa: | argarar बुद्धितत््व्यभिचारोऽपि सम्भवेत् ॥ ४॥ सुपनोत्यितस्य प्रलयादुद्धः प्रथममुद्धवः। कायकारणभावादि बुध्वा निन्मोति a ay: a खते fafararaer सेतन्यापाधिभावतः। नैखादि वत् UIT सप्रकारप्रकाशिनो॥६॥ (ङा ०।४ ०३८ ८)
करिथ्यामीतिसङ्धल्पादददड्ारोद्वसतः।
स tua बहखामित्येवमादिश्जतिरतेः ॥ ° ॥ बुद्धे विकारेच्िच्छछादावनुगलाददङ्कतेः। साण्येकतच्चं aa तु बुद्धिव्या पकभावनात् ॥ < ॥ titsy छृतिजन्यलात् तक्नेयत्याद EEA: | मा चाभ्तेद्धियादीनामदद्धारोाऽपि कारणम् tt € तजर शब्दस्यश्ररूपरसगन्धर्वसंञ्चया | सामान्यान्येव श्ब्दादिख्धूलानां चापि Sag: nye
8
प्राणिल्यश्रवद्जीयं भाष्यम् | [खणद।अा०१]
waa ay एव स्यात् तत्वानामितिचेदतः। विकारयहणे जातिवत् तद्रभ्वितेः ॥ ९९ ॥
एवं व्यापकतच््रार्नां व्याप्येष्वमृगमः क्रमात् |
ब्रह्मादि सवेतत्वानां घटोपाद्ागता स्फुटम् ॥९२९ ॥
न कम॑णान्यथासिद्धिरि₹ ATE युश्यते । तादाव्यादन्यथासिद्धेरतादात्म्बप्रयोजकम्॥ ९२॥
एवं कारणएतत्वानां माक्ापाथतया पुनः ।
निर्मितिः प्राणिवद्यादे रताद्ात्म्यात् एयक TUR ॥ ९४ ॥ ¦ श्रासगप्रलयादीनां बुद्धिनास्तिग यत् कचित्
सुषु जोववद्धनां खयोऽनन्तः स माषे uy son अरथानोश्वरसाद्यानां बुद्धेः सगे न युश्यते। क्रमाद्िनिगमाभावादित्येतत् Saas ॥९॥
न प्राणिवुद्धिभ्योऽ सम्भवात् ॥ SE ॥
~ e ~ क्रमादेवर्पिंसगादिः gad we बुद्धितः । सम्भवाङ्खूतसगे7ऽयं ARIAS A बुद्धिमान् ॥ ct ॥
निर्भायाच्चावचं yay निमिमते पिवत् ॥ ८८ ॥
उचावचानिग्धतानि धमाधमानसारतः।
मिमाय मिभमिंमीतेऽसे वेदां सद्धितकाम्यया ॥ ९॥ यया पितात्पाद्च पचानज्ञोते न्ना पयत्यपि । हितादहितपरोहारो वाक्येसददयं प्रभुः ॥ २॥८८॥
[wogiwten] शाख्िखश्रतद्नोयं भाव्यन् |
भिन्रोपदेशान्नेति चेन्न SETA ॥ ९०॥
अथायमीश्रो नैव हितः पिमे यतः |
षापसाधनङिखाभिर्मिं्यामेपदे शनात् ॥ ९ ॥
दति Sq प्रधानांभ्रफल वेण्या चयपेचचा |
अङ्गहिं साफलासखलानाडहितसलदविधानछत्॥ २४ ` : लम् क्रलङ्गहिं वायाः धानेकफंखतलवतः।
न सामान्वनिपेध्ड. fares प्रसव्वते ॥ ₹॥
gure कुं दित्येवं बिकखस्वम्बा भवेत्}. `
तस्मादिगेषादन्यच स्याद्यदादवनो यवत् ॥ ४ ॥
श्रताच्यतेङ्गदिंसावाः स्यादपुवंस्य Egat |
UTE Gy सामान्यदिंरेव्येवाऽविरोधिता ॥ ५. ॥
WY प्रबलदुःखस्याननुबन्धोष्टदेतता |
faquisd नजा बुक्रखद् भावस Fas: ॥ ६ ॥
तथाच सवग्रादिंखादसख दुःखाद्चदेतुता |
सत्यं यागाङ्गदिंखातो यदुःखं प्रबलं न AAI © ॥
प्रधागफलसैस्यादेर्ने यत्यान्नान्तरीयकम् |
श्न्ययातिप्रसङ्गः खात् प्रबललानिरक्ितः॥ ८ ॥
तस्माज्वातिविग्ैवोऽयं दुःखेषु प्रबललता |
प्रायिन्तादिमरणे प्रयागममरणे$पिवा॥€॥
अत्मरत्यारृत दुःखं तत्फलापेक्या खघ ।
श्रत प्रल्यवम्े fe प्राह पञ्चभिखाऽपि ATI Ve ॥
स्वत्पलाश्न बशोयस्वाद्यज.दुःखस् गेारवम्
uy.
६९१ शाख्िल्यशतदजीयं भाव्यम् | [weg utes]
पर्यद्चिकरणाक्छगं खच saa दर्जिंताः॥ ९९॥ (मन् GoW oR Boge)
पञ्चद्धना गृदस्वानामिति wiry सादितम्।
ग सामान्यविन्रषाक्िनं पन्ये सुतरां यया i ve (विष्णु ०।अ० ३।अ ° ६ ०९८।१९)
रङ्गोपजीवी पशुहा ATH शरणं व्रजेत् ॥ ८० ॥
ञति प्रसङ्गा रो ताना मयूर्वमथ चिग्यते |
कर्टंभाक्रगतं तत् किमथवा परमेश्वरे ॥ ९॥
फलमस्ादराद रायणो इष्टत्वात् ॥ ९९॥
(उष्लंरमोमांसा०शअ्र०९पा०्२।८्०२) राजादिरोाषताषाग्यां gear कर्मणां फलम् | SATE TS एवाह भगवान् बादरायणः ॥९॥ तन्न कट गतं पचे जातेषटिफलदश्नात्। अथ arma मागः कस्जिक्तित्येव Fea ॥ २॥ अन्यन्याञ्रय एव स्यादुभयोः खव्यपेखणात् | नस्मादृष्टतया रोाषताषाभ्धां परमेशितुः ॥ ₹॥ हिताहितफलप्रा्चिः फलाद् गता भवेत्। ` नाणुदेश्वगतलेन व्यापारान्तरकल्पमम् ॥ ४॥ BUA राजसेवा TAIT रस्यते । aa एवेशरप्रोतिप्रदलं कमणां WAT ॥ ५ ॥ (गी ०।अ०९२न्ञा०२०)
[अणद।आा०१] शाण्डिल्यग्रतङ्बीय भाष्यम् | qe
येतु धमाग्टतमिदं बयाक्रं पयपासते |
अह्धाना मत्परमा मक्रास्तेऽतीव मे प्रियाः ॥९॥ राषताषादिस्वेऽपि न संसारिलमोशितः। तदृत्तलाददुःखलाज्ञित्धमुक्रतयापि च॥६॥९९॥
AACA इष्टम् ॥ ८२॥
प्रलयो व्याप्त्वानां AIRTRATAA: | व्यापिकायां दि वयाप्यघटारि खयद शनात् We eR इ्व्याचार्यश्रीखभेश्चरविददरविरचिते शाण्डिद्धग्रतखनीये भागे ढतीयाध्यायस् प्रथममाद्किकम्॥ ९॥
जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावे हि म॒क्तिरित्यभिधीयते | तददिवेकतयाजापि भजनोय विवेचनम् ॥९॥ अन्यस्य क थमन्यलं घटेतेति वितकयन् । Marat भगवड्धावे याम्यतामाड खत्रत् ॥ २॥
तदैक्यं नानालवेकत्वमुपाधियेगदानाद्ादित्यवत् ॥ Le
(कां ०।ए०२००) wd खखिवदं ब्रह्म Ae नानास्ि कि- WA (गो ०।अ०९३।स्ञा ०९२।९४) | यया प्रकाग्रयत्येकः Be लोकमिमं रविः । Sa सेचौ तथा wee प्रकाभ्यति भारत ॥९॥ aan चापि मां विद्धि खवेखेचेषु area
दव्यादिभिस्तखधेकलमेव खभावः । उभयथा चात्मप्र्ययः K 2
१७ Wifes भाष्यम् | [अ ०द।च्या०२]
स जोवेापाधिबुद्धिरात्मानुरुतः। तथाच aia: एकधा ब- धा शेव दृ ष्ठते जलचग्धवत्। (faye *२।अ०१६।ञा०- RR) | सितमोलाटिमेरेन aaa दुष्यते aa: | aragfefacianta ata: सम् एयक waa et द्ति। ततः परभया जोवापाधिबद्धि हाने सति पनरेकत्व- मण्वि्द्धं यथादित्यसखय प्रकाज्ाक्मनः प्रतिबिग्डोपाधिदप्रंण- द्यपगमे तदत् ॥ ९९ ॥
` पथगिति चेन्न परेणासम्बन्धान् प्रकाश्ानाम् 1 ९४ ॥
wag धरस्परमत्यन्तभिन्नाः प्रकाशाह्माम एव जीवाः अन्यया कञ्चिद्मकरः afase दति व्यवखा न स्यादिति चेन्न कर्यचिदनोख्रसाद्यानां तथा सश्धवेऽपि रेश्रसाद्चानां तद- सम्भवात् । कथम् । अकाञ्रात्मनां परेण परमेश्वरेण सडह द्रष्टल- ङ एललच्षणसम्बन्धाभावात् तेषां खप्रकाशतयादित्येनेव प्रदौ- पानामप्रकाशनात् | तथयाचानोश्वरत्मसवंज्ञलं Wad च ब्रह्मणः स्यात्| अथय प्रकाश्यास्तेवां जाद्यप्रसक्ान्रापि मिया- बद्धिटत्या मका लुम्। तद्धि तमेऽभिच्धत्येव गेवान्नःकरण- BUST । नच तद् योग्यत्वे तत् सम्भवति । म खस्वावरण- जनिदत्तावपि Star शोपान्तरप्रकाश्य इति बाङ्जाग्बनकरप्रका- At: क्िरोपाधिकोऽष्येकधरमा येन (ददा ० Fo owy ) खथ व्यातिरेवायं पुरुष द्रत्यार् गणे च्येतिःअन्दः | ATT
५५८८१५११ ED
(wogreren] श्राखडिल्यशतङजोवं भाष्यम्। १९
खिदाद्मा जगस्मकाशकलवेनेव सिध्यतीति न तजर परापेक्षा, fay मनोाधर्मभ्रमतच्चधियारधिष्टानतया कात्मसिद्धिरम्तयु- देव बद्धिटृत्तीनां तु जण एव श्ानलसुखलव्यवहारः। fa माममात्मनां भेदे बुद्धितस्वभिदा खिता | बन्धमेलव्यवस्थाने नित्यमुक्रात्मनां कुतः ॥ ९ ॥दइति॥९४॥ अथ विकारिश शव सन्तात्मानेा ज्ञानेच्छादयस्तङ्कुणाः नानामीच्छामि सुखीत्यादिप्रद्यवादिति मतं frcraare |
न विकारिणस्तु करणविकारात् ॥ ८५॥
न श्लानादिविकारवन्त श्राद्मानोा ufaqaefa कुतः सुखापलम्भारेः करणखगतव्वेन ज्ञानादीनामपपन्तेरात्मनाम- विकारिवलात्। तथाहि gama: सकरणिकत्याद्यन- माने तादृशकररणासमन्ध ताराग्येन स्वात् सुखारयोा मात्मविकारा strata प्रतीतलाद्धारलादिवदित्यनमानाख। एवमरन्वस्यापि कारणतादर्त्म्येनेव मनसा दणम् | FART मालये तद यदणम्। कालेपाधीनां कालववदिति दिक् weal |
WY HY MAN ब्रह्मभाव इद्यपेकल्लायामाइ।
अनन्यभकश्या तदू दविवदविलयादतयन्तम् ॥ ९६ I
(ग oqo TIRTRy) TET स परः षाथ भशवा NASA TAT | यखान्तःख्ानि श्तामि येन सब्बेमिदं aaa it
ge शाखल्वश्रतङ्जोयं भाष्यम्। = [We gyaten]
दति yaa तथा (गु सिंह omer) amma पुषे यराणे मुके किमथे करियते ग यतर इति । aera परमक्तिमा- चण युद्धेरत्यन्तखयं सति ब्रह्मानन्दावार्तिखकषणा afar: wad: । तथाच तदोयबुद्धिविखयप्रागभावस्टल्ित्रह्मागन्दा- atfrafatcia awed चितम् । अथ ब्रह्मानन्दावाकतैः fe- द्धेमापुरषायेवमिति चेन्न ग्रामादिवद्िगिष्टतया प॒मर्थलात्। श्च बद्धि्जविपाधिमंता भगवत एव बुद्धितत््वाभ्यपममात्। अन्यया ददं Guay सुखत्वमिति श्ञानाव्नातेनिंत्यतया तदि- शिष्टस्य पमयाभावप्रसङ्गात् ईदाहृत्योविंकश्यकल्ाभावात्। तस्मादसिद्धापरागेण सिद्धे श्रपीच्छाकतो इति कत्यसाध्यल- ज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकमिति चेत् श्ेनादोः बखलवदनिष्टानुबन्धिल- तिरोधानादिवात्कटरागेण छत्यसाध्यतलमपि fatrara प्रव- न्तिंतमिति किमनुपपन्नम् । आ्रानन्दं ब्रह्मणा रूपं तख ara प्रतिहितमिद्यागमादपि तथयालमध्यवसेयमिति ॥ < ६॥
श्रय परभक्िसिद्धा जीवनादृष्टमोगवदितरेषामपुवाणा- मपि मोागेनेव लय इत्यनिमाच् एव स्यादित्यत उच्यते।
आयुशविरमितरषां तु डानिरनासखदत्नात् ॥ ९७ ॥
आत्मरतः सत्यां (कां०।ए०४६०) तस्य तावदेव चिर यावन्न विमोच्छे श्रय amg xfs तथा (विष्णुपु °।अ०९। MOR olBIoRe )
धमा्थकामेः किं ve मिस्य at खिता । समस्तजगतां ae ae भक्तः खिरा लयि ॥ ९॥
[Sequner|) शाख्ल्यशतखचीयं भाष्यम्। ७१
तथाच श्रायुर्जीवनाडष्टं तश्माचमेव चिरं परभक्रा सत्या- मपि मुक्िप्रतिबन्धकं तावदेव tafe: | इतरेषां धमा- धमाणां जीवनादृष्टलये सुति बुद्धेरत्य खये भोगास्यदस्याभा- वादुद्धिभागाभाव एवेति नानि दति बद्धेरपि विकायत्वेन कारणत्वात् । ATT तददृ्टारेतुलं कारणान्तराभावे फला- निष्यत्तावपि ₹देतुलाच्ततेः | तस्य भगवन्ताषरोाषरूपस्यापि लयः कालात् प्रशयसामयोता वा चथाङ्गापुवाणामङ्गवेगष्ाद्- जनितपरमापुवाणां खय citi ब्रह्मार्पणं तु प्रतिबन्धकोग- तकमंणामवन्धायेति सवंमभवद्यम् । परंपरयेव श्ञानाग्रिना Haga इति॥<॥ रुखतिरेषामभक्तिः स्यान्नान्नानात् कार णासिद्धेः ॥ ८ ८ ॥ श्रथ जीवस्य dare: किमन्नानङ्ता aa: ` उताभक्तितस्त च छखचरमेतत् awa id it aise Magma मुक्तिरेषां चयी गतिः। जीवन्मुक्तिः परा भक्रिस्तद सिद्धिस्तु संखतिः ॥२॥ खापि भक्तेः कामनानामभावादेव तिष्टति। भक्री सत्यां निवर्तत तथाचोक्तं महषिंभिः ॥ ३ ॥ (विष्णपु ०।अ ०९।अ०९। सज्ञा ०५९) | तावद्ाल्तिष्ठु सा वाञ्छा तावन्मोदस्तया सुखम् | यावन्नायाति शरणं लामगेषाघमेाचनम्॥९॥ amiga इष्टिज्ञानान्तद्धानिरि व्यते | रख्जषपादिरेदनामभावात् तदसम्भवात् ॥ ४ ॥
‘eR ' आादिष्यशतदजीयं area; [ae ater]
aatia चोारयमकिड्रताडनानि
रैन्यानि तानि तपनाह्मजरश्ंनानि। जन्ताररुममतरङ्गकरङ्गढब्डा- WALTHAM HSA ATA: ॥ इति॥९य८॥
wat नेचाणि शब्दलिङ्गाक्तभेदाद् द्रवत् ॥ ९९ ॥
एषां Marat चणि aaah साधनानि श्र्थप्रमितेा प्रमाणग तानीति यावत्। प्रमितलाविशेषेऽपि areafa- श्यात् चेविध्यम्। तानि चयथा ज्ञायमागयोाग्यपदपदाथरूपः शब्दः शाब्दप्रमाकरणम्। AG प्रयममभिधानमलाकिकभक्रे- WHATS प्राधान्यकयना्थंम्) तयथा श्जायमानव्याप्यप्त- धर्मलिङ्गज्ञानमनमितिकर णएमस्माकं सत्कायवाज्ज्ञायमानत्वम- प्यविर्द्ध म् । प्रत्यक्षप्रमितिकर णन्यच्ञाणि विषयसब्बद्धानि ता- निच मनःग्रोचलकक्तरसनघ्राणानि षर् GUAT: ATTA तमेऽभिश्वय विदात्मप्रकाशमानाथोकारां स्वदत्तं जन- यन्ति श्रत Varma (Mowe iyi Brow) स्वदारेषु देर- ऽस्मिन् vate उपजायते इति । जोवबरह्िरूपमनसा दुःखा- दिविकारास्त नाज्ञाताः सन्तीत्याद्रप्रकाशेनेव प्रकाश्यन्त दूति न aa सच्वत्यवकल्पनं गारवात्। एतदेव साच्िभास्य- त्वम् । एवं शब्दान मा नप्रत्यच्भद्ात् जोष्छेव यया इद्रस्छ जण चक्तरधिष्टामानि नाधिकाजि न न्दुनानि तदखब्रद्याग्मिरू- qafasifa) उपमानं त॒ शक्तिगरहमाता्थे तच्च सामान्यता-
[अ०द।खा०२] शण्डिल्यशतद्धनीयं भाष्यम् | ७३
दृष्टानमानसदकारोण प्रसिद्धपदसामानाधिकरण्यात् कविकाव्य- परिच्छेद वन्धनसापि सम्भवतीति जिव्वेवान्त्ंतमिति म पथक् | प्रमाणविचारऽस्माभिन्यायतत्तनिक्षे वेदान्ते तत्तनिकषे ख fasfaa दति मेड प्रतन्यते।
जोवबुद्धिमनोा नाम तत् सद्धा चविकासवत्।
स्चगपद्यायोगपद्ये frat तेनापपद्यते॥९॥
द शराऽदंहतेर्व्वीवबुद्धोनामद्भवा यतः।
बद्ध दुःखादिवत् साच्ताददन्वमपि ग्यते ॥ ९॥
माचाग्डतेद्धियादौनां भगवद्ुद्धिजक्मतः।
भ गवदुद्धिवेद्यलाचिदाय्ाद्यं तयेद्धियैः॥ इ ॥
मतानि पञ्च AAT: पञ्च चेकादभेद्ियम्।
WHA UMA परे भा स्तत्वसं यहः ॥ ४ ॥
ति षद्धिंशतितच्वानि॥<९< i विस्तरो भावाविकाराः स्युः क्रियाफलसंयेगात् ॥ १००॥ भ्सङ्ग दुत्मन्तिलये चिन्त्येते तचोत्यन्तिराविभावलचणा
खत ua क्रियायोग्यता तथा तिरोभावस्तदयाग्यता एवं दद्धि हानादये विकारा एव भवन्ति। ga: करोति चरं ना- शयति घटभिल्यादा धालर्थफलसम्नन्भव्यपदेशात् ते च खत एव घटन्ते नाषतः। तथाचाक्तम्। (गो०।श्र०२।खआा०९६) नासता विद्यते भावा नाभावो विद्यते सत इति। एवं भवति मश्यतीत्यादावपि क्रियाश्रयलं प्रतीयते। तख सत एव सम वति। सचाद्टयचणसम्बन्धा नाशप्रतियागिलं च तदर्थः श्राद्य-
L
ॐ8 | श्ाख्डिल्यश्तदोयं भाष्यम्। = [eR TR]
त्वस्यानिरक्रेः। मचाविभावस्याविभावागम्तरावश्यकतेऽनवखागे- रवयोारन्यतर प्रसङ्गः चटसामग्या एवाविभावस्ाविभावला- ql अन्यथा उत्यन्तेरत्यत्तावपि तथालप्रसङ्गात्। wag घटस्य पुवपूवौविभवतिरोभावपरंपरेव अआगभावसिरोभाव ए नाशः सच कदा चिदात्यन्तिकाऽपि यथया देवदन्तशरी- TA यथावा AMISH | अरन्यान्यात्यन्ताभावो च पर- स्यरविर्द्धघर्मतदधिकरण्यानातिरिच्येते। waar भावेऽण्- भावान्तर खीकारप्रसङ्गमादिति। प्रलये तु प्रलयाख्यविकारा- तिरिक्रख्य विकारस्याभाव एव । Farce Gara fas- न्तोति न कोऽपि दाषः । पयंवखिता चिलक्तणी भक्रिमी- मासा॥
परिवीतपौतवसनं धनोापमम्।
श तपचपचसदृ शायतेच्चणम् ॥
टतवेणरेपर मण्डितं गवाम् ॥
इदि Asay केस्हभविग्डिषणं मरः ॥ ९॥
गेडच्छावलये विशारद इति ख्यातादग्डद्भूमणेः।
सवार्वीपतिसावंभोामपदभाक प्रज्ञावतामग्रणोः॥
तस्मादाख जलेश्वर बुधवरः सेनाधिपः स्ञाष्टताम्।
SRT कृतं तद ङ्गजनुषा सद्धक्तिमामां सनम्॥ २॥ दति श्रोखभ्रेश्वरविद्दरविरत्िते शाण्डिद्मशतदचौये भाषे दतीयस्याध्यायसख दितीयमाद्िकं समाप्रञ्चाऽध्यायः॥ 2 ॥ समाप्रेयं भक्तिमीर्मांसा॥
BIBLIOTHECA INDICA
COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS
PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF THB
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL.
New SeErtres.
THE APHORISMS OF SANDILYA, COMMENTARY OF SWAPNESWARA,
THE HINDU DOCTRINE OF FAITH.
ए. B. COWELL, M.A.,
FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, AND PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE; AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.
CALCUTTA: ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL.
1878.
HERTFORD : PRINTED BY STEPHEN AUSTIN AND SONS.
PREFACE.
CoLEBROOKE, in his account of the P4fichardtras or Bhaga- vatas,! says that “a passage quoted by Samkara Achérya in his Commentary on the Vedénta Sitras (ii. 2. 45), seems to intimate that the promulgator of the Péiicharétra system was Séndilya, who was dissatisfied with the Vedas, not finding in them a prompt and sufficient way of supreme excellence (para-Sreyas) and final beatitude; and therefore he had re- course to this édstra.” This however is not the work trans- lated in the following pages, as the doctrines impugned by Samkara do not agree with those of the present work; nor does it contain the passage quoted by him, or that quoted by Govindananda in his gloss, which declares that one syllable of a tantra is superior to the four vedas. Dr. Hall, in a note to his edition of Wilson’s translation of the Vishnu Purana,’ quotes some lines from Nagesabhatta’s gloss (the Guruvydkhyad) on Govardhana’s Saptasatt, which condemn as repugnant to the Veda the doctrines of the Paicharatras, the Bhégavatas, the Bauddhas, the Daigambaras, the Lokéyatas, etc.; and he adds that these verses are preceded by a de- nunciation of Sdéndilya as heretical. This may very probably refer to the supposed author of these aphorisms; but this allusion does not carry us very far back, as Nagesabhatta
1 Essays, vol, 1, p. 438. 2 Vol. v. p. 379.
1V PREFACE.
was contemporary with Jayasimha, Raja of Jaipur, who lived in the beginning of the eighteenth century.!
The name Sandilya is found in a well-known passage of the Chhdndogya Upanishad (iii. 14), which recurs with a few verbal differences in the Satapatha Brahmana (x. 6. 3) ; the sage is there represented as declaring that the soul within us is Brahman. His doctrine is directly referred to in Aphorism 31 of the present work, and the Commentary quotes the passage from the Chhdndogya Upanishad. This doctrine is called the S4ndilya-vidyé in the Ved4nta-sdra, and it 18 there characterised as consisting of devotional meditations directed towards Brahman viewed as possessed of qualities rather than as the Absolute. The author of these aphorisms apparently accepts his view as the true one, and contrasts it with those of Késyapa and Badarayana (ct. Aph. 29-32), the former of whom is represented as holding that Brahman is other than the individual soul, while the latter holds that the soul is nothing but Brahman, its apparent individuality being only an illusion. But: the Sandilya-vidy4 after all very imperfectly corresponds to the doctrine of the Sdndilya sutras, which are properly a Mim4msé of faith (bhakti), as distinguished from the purva-mimdmsd which treats of cere- monial works, and the uttara-mimdmsd which treats of know- ledge. Their peculiar tenet is that liberation can only be produced by faith. The mundane existence of the individual soul has arisen from the want of faith, not from the want of knowledge; and faith alone can abolish it. Faith effects this by abolishing the internal organ, which is associated with the soul and disguises its real nature. Knowledge is only useful inasmuch as it removes the mind’s foulness,
1 Hall’s Preface to his edition of the Sdikhyasdra, p. 37 note.
PREFACE. Vv
which consists of unbelief; it thus leads to faith, and this to liberation. Samkara’s view of knowledge is clearly expressed in the following passage of his Commentary on the Swet&Swatara Upanishad, which will serve to bring the two views into sharp contrast. ‘When men, disregarding the fruit, perform works only for the sake of Yéwara, these works become indirectly a means to liberation, as being a means for producing that purity of the internal organ which is a means to knowledge, which is the means to liberation.”!
The Badarayana mentioned above is of course the author of the Vedanta sitras, but I am not certain about Kasyapa. There is no celebrated Vedantist teacher of that name; and it 18 therefore probably intended as an allusion to Kan&da’s school. Kandda is so called in the TZrikdndagesha and in Samkaramiéra’s Upaskdra, pp. 160, 161; and the Vaiéseshika school, like the Ny&éya, generally holds that individual souls are infinite in number and distinct from the Supreme Being.? The doctrine itself, if taken as a branch of the Vedanta, very much resembles that of Raménuja, who flourished in the first half of the twelfth century; but, though I know of no positive grounds for assigning to these Aphorisms an earlier date than the thirteenth century, I should certainly .be inclined to allow them a somewhat higher antiquity.
Still the absence of all direct allusion to these Aphorisms in medieval Hindu writers proves that they must be com- paratively modern. They are the work of some anonymous teacher, who ascribed his doctrine to the ancient rishi Sandilya, |
" यदा पुनः फलनिरपेचमी acres कमानुतिष्ठन्ति तदा मोचसाघनन्ना-
नसाधनान्तःकरणशुचिसाधनपारंप्येण मोषसाधनं भवति | (Bibl. Indica edit. p. 254.) | 2 Cf. the Commentaries on the Vaiseshika 30088, ii. 1, 18 and iii. 2. 19, 20.
vl PREFACE.
partly because he wished to conceal its modern origin under a name belonging to Vedic times, and also because the Sandilya-vidyd supplied a convenient vantage-ground for his main doctrine of the necessity of faith. He bases his doctrine on the Bhagavad-gité, which -he mentions by name in Aph. 83, and evidently quotes in Aph. 84; he applies to it the word Sabda in Aph. 22, and the later commentator does not hesitate in several places to call it sruti
The original text of the Aphorisms, with Swapneswara’s Commentary, was edited by Dr. Ballantyne in 1861 in the Bibliotheca Indica. He had intended also to publish a trans- lation, but this project was never carried into effect. Just before he left India, he had a fragment of his intended translation set up in type, containing the greater part of the first four pages; but it was never revised nor struck off. I have borrowed some of his phrases and notes in the commencement of the present translation; and I have also found assistance from some of the notes written in his MS. of the text now in the India Office Library (No. 8) in London. These notes end abruptly at Aphorism 31. |
I have endeavoured to make my translation as faithful as I could; but I have not hesitated to insert between brackets those missing links which Hindu writers-so often presuppose that their readers will supply, and which are generally in-
1 Swapneswara was a native of Bengal (Gaudz), and he quotes the Gauda recen- sion of the S’akuntalé in his commentary on Aph. 6; but I know nothing as to his date. There isa MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library of another Commentary by Bhavadeva, which must be considerably posterior to that by Swapneswara, as it
not unfrequently takes a line of his commentary and treats it as an original aphorism, .
just as we sometimes find the modern Nyfya writers do with regard to the ancient commentaries on the Ny4ya 80788 (see Colebrooke, Essays, vol. i. p. 283). Thus in p- 71, 1. 6, he takes as a stitra the passage tasya bhagavattosharoshar tpasydpi layak kdldt pralayasdmagrito vd. He also omits certain sdtras, treating them as part of the original Commentary
PREFACE. Vil
dispensable to the correct understanding of the argument. . I am too deeply sensible of the difficulties of Hindu philo- -sophy to hope that I have always caught my author’s meaning. Hindu philosophy, like Aristotle’s works, has everywhere pitfalls for the unsuspecting reader, often hidden under some ‘apparently simple expression; and I have no doubt fallen ‘into. some of these unawares. My translation would certainly have been better, if I had been still residing in India and had been able to consult, as I used to do, the Pandits of the Calcutta Sanskrit College. I would here, however, gratefully acknowledge the considerable assistance which I have received in many difficulties, more especially in the third Chapter, from my old friend and teacher Pandit MaheSa Chandra Nydya- ‘ratna. He kindly sent me by letter explanations in Sanskrit -of several passages which puzzled me; and some of these I have translated at length in the notes to my translation. He also sent me many various readings from a good MS. in the Sanskrit College Library, some of which have been of great use for correcting the printed text.'
One of the chief points of interest in the Sdndilya sutras is their relation to the history of the Hindu doctrine of faith (bhakti). This doctrine, originally propounded in the ‘Bhagavad-git& and subsequently developed in the Puranas and especially in the Bh4gavata, has become a widely spread tenet of medisval and modern Hinduism; and the Sdndilya sutras are no doubt one of the many offshoots of the theory. The date and history of its origin in India are at present un- known, and, in the general absence of historical data in Hindu literature, we may well fear that they will always remain so.
1 T have also used a thin paper transcript of the MS. in the Bodleian Library, lent to me by Professor Max Miiller.
Vill PREFACE.
Dr. Lorinser, Prof. Lassen, and Prof. Weber have maintained that the doctrine of bhakti arose in India as a more or less direct reflexion of Christian ideas; but strong objections have’ been urged by Dr. Muir, in the preface to his “ Religious and Moral Sentiments from Sanskrit Writers,’ and by Pandit Kasinaéth Trimbak Telang in the preface to his excellent trans- lation of the Bhagavad-gité. I cannot pretend to speak posi- tively on the controversy ; I would only confess to a somewhat hesitating inclination towards Prof. Weber’s moderate opinions on the question. The idea expressed by the phrase micrevew cis Tov Qeoy is peculiarly associated with Christianity ; and bhakti, as distinguished from the older $raddhd, appears, so far as we can trace it, to have risen suddenly on the Hindu horizon ; but it is possible that it may have been, like so many other great conceptions, a natural product of the isolated activity of the Hindu mind. Anyhow, it is deeply interesting to trace the parallel; for the reader can hardly find a more striking commentary on Sandilya’s bhakti than those words of Augus tine, whether we view their likeness or their difference, ‘quid est credere in Deum? credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum 176, et ejus membris incorporari.”’
४. B. COWELL. 04487702, Aug. 10, 1878. | ।
THE APHORISMS OF SANDILYA.
FIRST CHAPTER. |
VICTORIOUS IS THE SUPREME LORD.
A COMMENTARY on the hundred Aphorisms of S4ndilya is now uttered by Pandit Swapneswara, in reliance on the supreme deity; great is the marvel of the wine of Govinda’s two feet, which whoso drinks does not become bewildered, while those who drink not do! |
It will be declared hereafter that Liberation is the soul’s reaching the state of Brahman. And as souls are absolutely identical with Brahman, their mundane condition is not natural to them, but is caused by their disguiser, the internal organ, which consists of the three qualities; just as is the case with the redness of such a thing as the [colourless] crystal, pro- duced by the proximity of such a thing as a China rose.
And this mundane condition, just because it is due to a disguiser, is not to be removed by knowledge, but by the destruction of (1) the disguiser or (2) the disguised, one or ‘other, or else (3) by the destruction of the connexion between them; for not even by the most skilful looking is there cessation of the erroneous perception of redness in the crystal, so long as there is contact with the disguiser [the China rose near it]. Now in the present case [when we discuss our threefold alternative] the destruction of soul is impossible, be- cause the manifestation of all being depends on its existence ;
nor, again, can the connexion between the two be destroyed,
1 ८ : ; ) + KAW ई. = “~ ^. ` न eo मं : ^ cs pe raga "ae ११
=
2 The Aphorisms
because that is nothing else than the nature of them both [soul being all-pervading and therefore of course in conjunction with the internal organ as well as everything else]. Consequently by exhaustion the third alternative only is left, viz. that the cessation of the error can only arise from the destruction of the disguiser, and not [as Sankara Ach4rya and his followers hold] from the knowledge of soul. And for the destruction of the disguiser another cause [than that suggested by San- kara] is to be sought; and this is devotion to the Lord, which, as being something supramundane, is established by the Veda and authoritative tradition [and not by the ordinary processes of perception and inference |.
And so in the Bhagavad Gita (ch. xiv.) the adorable Krishna himself declares that faith in himself is the cause of liberation, which is defined as the attainment of divine beatitude through the dissolution of the internal organ, which consists of the three qualities; this he declares, beginning [sl. 6],
“Of these ‘Goodness,’ by reason of its purity, is illumining and healthful; it binds, O sinless one, [the soul which in itself consists of uncaused bliss and unspecialised knowledge] by association with happiness [not intrinsic but occasioned by motives] and by association with knowledge [such as is not absolute and objectless thought, but is associated with objects]. Know that ‘foulness,’ consisting of desire, arises from asso- ciation with a thirst; this, O son of Kunti, binds the embodied soul by association with action [giving rise to merit and demerit,—obstacles alike to liberation]. But know that ‘dark- ness’ is born of ignorance, and is the bewilderer of all the em- bodied ones; it, O Bharata, binds by carelessness, inertia and sleep;”! and winding up with [sl. 26] _
“And whoso worships me unwavering, with the devotion of faith, he, having passed beyond these qualities, becomes worthy of existing as Brahman.”
1 The translation of this extract is chiefly borrowed from Ballantyne.
of Sdndilya 3
And this does not imply that the knowledge of the soul is useless, for knowledge is an auxiliary to devotion [or faith] ‘by washing away the filth of unbelief; but knowledge cannot abolish the imposition of the property [7.e. personality | belong- ing to the disguiser, the internal organ, which is in direct connexion with the soul [any more than the knowledge that he has jaundice will prevent a man’s seeing a white shell as yellow]. Hence this is clearly declared in such passages as that [in the Gita, ch. xiv. 19],
% $ [ला he knows what is beyond the qualities! he attains
my state,”’ and again [iv. 41],
^ He who by knowledge has cut away all doubt.”
And’ the soul’s mundane condition is not [as the Vedantins say | caused by ignorance, so that its removal could be likewise said to be effectible by knowledge, because there is no proof thereof ; and also because in the absence of the proper cause, particles of silver, it is impossible that silver should arise from a shell mistaken for it, [and so too this actual world cannot be produced, as they hold, from ignorance, which they declare to be itself unreal]. And moreover, the text, “how, O gentle youth, could it thus be that Being should be produced from Non-being” (Chhandogya Upan. vi. 2), which establishes the existence of the cause as inferred from the existence of the effect, declares the positive reality of the world; and especially do such texts as that (Ibid. 11. 14) “whose will is true,” etc., declare the reality of the Supreme Lord’s creation. Nor has the venerable Badar4yana asserted in any Sutra that the world was produced from Ignorance; on the contrary, by rejecting the doctrine of a dream creation, he has asserted the reality of the waking world. .Nor was this rejection only employed exoterically as an illustration, for there is no proof for such an assumption.
1 ८५ ६.८, what underlies the phenomenal.” — Ballantyne.
4 The Aphorisms
But the theory [which Vedantins allege] that existence, thought and joy are essential [and constitute soul] is not tenable. Joy, etc., are not directly modifications of soul,! —for they are perceived as reflected in soul,: just as pale- ness is, [as when a man says ‘I am pale,’ aham gaurah, where the paleness does not really belong to soul but to body, and is reflected on soul]. It is simplest to suppose that the perception of joy, etc., is through an instrument [६.९. the internal organ], because perception is an action [which implies an instrument]; and therefore joy, etc., are instru- mentally produced by interpenetration,? just as sound is pro- duced by the auricular organ.’ [Joy, etc., thus interpenetrate the mind as a quality its substance, and are only reflected on soul.] Others [as the followers of the Nydya] hold that joy, etc., reside by interpenetration in their instrument the mind, because joy, etc., are qualities apprehensible by an uncreated organ [as they hold the mind to be], just as sound is apprehensible by an uncreated organ [because consisting of the uncreated ether]. On either view the illustration drawn from sound will equally hold, because joy on the one hand and sound on the other are equally qualities apprehensible by an intangible organ [mind and the auricular organ being alike intangible]. But the proof of the reality of soul is found in the fact that it reveals all existence [for if there were no seer or knower, nothing could be seen or known]. All this will be made clear in the second portion of the third Chapter.
Therefore, since there is a wish‘ to make a full discussion
1 “As a waxen cube might be one modification of a piece of wax, and a sphere might be another modification of numerically the same piece of wax, when that same cube has been rolled into a ball.” —Ballantyne, note.
9 They exist in the mind by interpenetration (or intimate relation) as qualities or affections, not in the soul by identity as essential constituents. In the comm. on Aph. 99 they are called the modifications of the internal organ.
3 “The auricular organ is that portion of the indivisible ether walled off within the fleshly ear (as a portion of indivisible space is walled off within the limits of a jar).’’ — Ballantyne.
* The Sanskrit Coll. MS. reads vidhstsd for vivited.
of S‘andilya. 5
of the nature of Faith (bhakti), inasmuch as it is the cause of - the attainment of man’s highest end, just as there was for the same supposed reason, in the Pirva Mimémsé, a wish to make a full discussion of the nature of duty (dharma), we have the following propounded as the first aphorism.
Now then there is a wish to know faith. (1).
The word ‘now’ (atha) indicates the commencement of the discussion,—it does not [as at the opening of Jaimini’s apho- risms| indicate subseguence.' For there is here no necessary subsequence to any preliminary study of the Veda, since it will be hereafter declared that even men of degraded castes are competent to enter upon the present inquiry. Nor does the word ‘now’ imply [as in the Veddnta aphorisms*®] a subse- quence to a previous acquirement of tranquillity, etc. [as a necessary preliminary|; because it is simply the desire of liberation which makes any one competent to engage in this inquiry into the nature of Faith. Thus there is the following — passage in the Swetéswatara Upanishad (vi. 18),
“To Him who at the beginning created Brahmé, and who gave the Vedas to him,—to him the God who reveals the know- ledge of himself, do I, desirous of liberation, fly for refuge.”
Nor again is the word ‘now’ intended to imply a benediction [as in the Yoga aphorisms,?] [at the commencement of a new work], for its mere utterance [without any reference to its actual meaning] has this auspicious benedictive power. There- fore its true meaning is that the inquiry into the nature of faith is to be entered upon by him who desires liberation.
1 Thus the Commentator on Jaimini’s first Aphorism explains the atha there as ‘‘now, ४.९. after studying the Veda while residing in the family of the teacher.”
2 Thus the Commentator on the first Vedanta aphorism, says, ‘“‘here the word now means ‘subsequently to the student’s attainment of the four requisites,’ $.८. a perception of the distinction between the eternal and the transient, a scorn of the transient enjoyments of this world or the next, the possession of tranquillity, self- restraint, etc., and the desire of liberation.”
3 Thus the Commentator on the first Yoga Aphorism says, “‘the word now implies the commencement of a new topic and it also serves as a benediction.”
6 The Aphorisms
The phrase in the aphorism ‘a wish to know’ implies ‘inquiry.’ Although ‘faith’ which is ‘an affection fixed on God’ is not something to be effected by works like the ‘duty’ and con- sequent ‘merit’ [which are the great topic of the Parva Mi- 70६718६], nor something to be known like Brahman [whose know- ledge is set forth as the great end of the Vedanta}; yet even when faith has been perfected. by its proper antecedents, viz. good works, mundane and inferior devotion, etc., it is still liable to be destroyed by the weight of such false objections as ‘ this is not faith,’ ‘this does not lead to supreme bliss,’ ‘this aims not at the highest object,’—as a wife’s faith in her husband [by unfounded calumnies]. Hence the word ‘then’ in the apho- rism implies that a thorough discussion is favourable to faith just because it helps to abolish these wrong views. ‘ Because the abolition of false objections is to be expected from it, therefore is there a wish to know the nature of faith,’'—this is the full meaning of the Aphorism. Hence we read [in Prahldda’s prayer to Vishnu in the Vishnu-purana, I. xx. 16], ५ [7 whatever thousands of births I may have to pass, O Lord, through them all may my faith in thee, Achyuta, never be shaken ;”! this very prayer that his faith may remain unshaken implies that he expects that the inevitable attempts to shake it will be counteracted. And therefore the discussion of faith is only so far fruitful as it is ancillary to faith which itself bears the fruit [in the form of the summum bonum |.
But it is objected that faith is no proper subject for dis- cussion, because it cannot enter within the range of the ordi- nary understanding, as it does not assume any practical form belonging to daily life.—the author therefore propounds its characteristic [or definition | in the following aphorism :
In its highest form it is an affection fixed on God (Iswara). (2). _ In the words ‘In its highest form it,’ we have the subject;
1 The reading achald for achyutd is clearly wrong,—it destroys the play of words on which the force of the original partly depends.
of S‘éndilya. | 7
the rest of the sentence is the predicate. The words ‘in its highest form’ are added to exclude the lower forms [which will be described hereafter]. The words ‘on God’ have reference to the proper topic of the present work. ‘It,’ Faith, is thus generally an affection, the object of which is a being who is to be propitiated (or worshipped) ;! but here in this treatise it is a particular affection of the internal organ having the Supreme Being as its object, and its special character is easily known by examining worldly affection, etc. As it has been said by Prahlada, who possessed this highest faith in Vishnu (Vishnu Pur. I. xx. 17)
८ May a passion as fixed as that which the unreflecting feel for worldly objects, never depart from my heart ever remem- bering thee.”
In this verse by the word ‘passion’ (priti) an affection is meant, inseparably connected with happiness. Otherwise, if priti were taken in its other meaning of ‘pleasure,’ the locative case of ‘object’ would be inappropriate, as the idea of object is foreign to that of pleasure [for we can speak of the ‘subject’ and ‘cause’ of pleasure, but not properly of its ‘object’]; and the same-objection would hold if priti were taken to mean the perception of pleasure, for as that perception would have the pleasure as its object, you could not properly talk of the object of an object. Therefore we have taken as our definition the notion of an affection, together with its proper object. Nor need it be suggested that the meaning of the aphorism is ‘a pleasure produced by its object,’ for the grammarians lay down no rules for a locative as the case of the producing thing. And again, as the passage before quoted, ‘let my faith in thee, Achyuta, never be shaken,’ proves that God is the object of faith, the same thing must be meant here by the word priti, as the two words (bhakti and priti) both form one continuous sentence. The distinction
1 Arddhyavishayakardgatwam.
8 The Aphorisms
between the two passages is that in the first we have the petition for faith in each successive birth, in the second we have the petition that this faith, under the example of an affection for a worldly object, might be always preserved. And we must anyhow bring in the idea of ‘affection,’ as without affection - you cannot have the pleasure produced by an object. And to the same purport is Patanjali’s aphorism (Yoga Sutras 11. 7), “Affection [or ‘desire,’ rdga] is what dwells on pleasure.” This affection it is which is the essence of faith, as will be seen by its being found accompanying all the characteristic marks which will be mentioned hereafter [see Aphor. 43, 44], and it is also proved to be so by its being the simplest ex- planation. Faith could not be described as partly consisting of remembrance and partly of celebrating with hymns, etc. ; because it would not always be found associated with these;} nor again could it consist in the mere knowledge of God, because this might be found even in those who hated him. Nor again can it be defined as the knowing God as an object to be propitiated [or worshipped]; for faith is not always found present in [these outward acts of] praise, homage and other acts of worship; and again we should then have to use the expressions ‘he is full of faith,’ ‘he is full of affection,’ even in reference to one who by compulsion or through fear had the idea that God is to be propitiated with praise, etc. If you say that we should define faith as ‘the knowledge of God as the proper object of worship, accompanied by affection, etc.,’ let us rather say that it is simply an affection (as our Aphorism declares) ; and so in the Bhagavad Gita (x. 9),
“Those whose thoughts are on me, whose spirits are fixed on me, admonishing one another and always speaking of me, are contented and glad. To these who are ever devoted to me and serve me with affection, I give that devotion of mind by which they attain to me.”
1 Ananugamdt might be taken as used similarly to the anugamdt of Vedanta Sat. i. 1, 28, ‘because they would not be always found to apply.’
of S‘éndilya. 9
Here we have described the faithful devotedness of those whose thoughts and spirits are fixed on Him, but not of those who merely know Him as the proper object of worship. And hence we read in the Smriti! that even the [ignorant] milk- maids obtained liberation as the fruit of their faith, because their affection was excited by the sight of Krishna’s lovely form. The preposition anu (in anurakti) is not a mere affix whose separate meaning is merged in the definition, but it is used here to show that the affection arises after (anu) the know- ledge of the greatness and other attributes of the Adorable One. “If this were so, should we not have to grant that this faith of ours has also the nature of the affection felt towards a father?” We reply, No, because only the world [and not any particular individual] is identical with the Supreme as being His off- spring [cf. the Vedic passage, where the father addresses his son, ‘thou art myself under the name of a son’]. “Ought we not to add, to make our definition complete, that true faith has for its object the Supreme unmodified by any assumption of inferior form?” But this would not include the case of the milkmaids, etc., who had faith in God as conditioned by an external manifestation. Well then, let faith be an affection having as its object the Soul unconditioned by its disguise, intellect (buddhi). Thus faith towards an object conditioned by an external manifestation and faith in the infinite Supreme will be equally included.
From the promise of immortality to him who abides in Him. (8)
‘To him who abides’—7.e. has faith—‘in Him,’ ४.९. God,— immortality is promised as the reward in the Chhandogya Upanishad (ii. 23. 2)—“‘he who abides? in Brahman goes to immortality.” Therefore any possible indifference to knowing Him, either on the ground of its having no fruit, or only an inferior fruit, is excluded.
1 Vishnu Pur. v. 13. 2 S'ankara explains brahmasamstha as brahmant samyag-avasthitah.
10 The Aphorisms
If you say, tt 18 knowledge,—no, because the knowledge of one who hates Him ts not an abiding in Him. (4).
“But does not the term ‘abiding in Brahman’ (brahma- samstha) imply only the knowledge of Brahman, and not faith in him; and so knowledge alone has the fruit of immortality annexed to it?” This objection however has no weight, as the term ‘abiding in him’ must mean faith and not mere knowledge, from the fact that we never use such a phrase as ‘abiding’ in reference to one who hates the object, however much knowledge of it he may possess. Thus for instance the ministers, friends, etc., who are devoted to a king, may be fitly described as abiding in him, but not his rival kings. . We must here bear in mind the well-known principle that the determination of the Vedic sense of a word is just like that of the secular sense. Hence in the legend of Chirakérika (Mah4bh. S4ntiparva, 9526), in the lines,
“During that time having reflected on that failure of samsthd in his wife, The sage spoke thus distressed, shedding tears in his sorrow, ! the phrase patnt-samsthd-vyatikrama means a failure of devotion in the wife towards her husband; hence the word samsthd 18 really a synonym for faith (or devotion, bhakti). And 80 too the same meaning is to be concluded with regard to the apho- rism of Badardyana (Ved. 8. i. 7), “Because Liberation is de- clared of one who abides in Him” (fan-nishthasya).
And from its inferiority thereto. (5).
Because knowledge fails before faith, as a means to libera- tion. The ‘and’ of the aphorism is intended to show that this
1 This refers to a curious legend of Gautama’s dilatory son, Chirakfrika. The sage one day offended with his wife had gone to the forest, leaving an order that his son should kill her in his absence. The son however deliberates so long on the pros and cons of the command that his father has time to grow cool and returns to countermand it
of S'éndilya. 11
reason is additional to that given before. Thus it is said in the Gita (vii. 23), “They who worship the gods go to the gods, those who are devoted to me go likewise to me,”’ and so in other passages. Thus too Krishna’s speech to Prahlada (Vishnu Pur. I. xx. 20), ‘As thy mind filled with faith in me wavers not, So thou, by my favour, shalt even go to Nirvana.”
“But is it not said in the Swet4éwatara Upanishad, ‘having known Him, a man goes beyond death,—there is no other path for going thither’? Liberation is thus declared in the Sruti to be the fruit of knowing, and therefore, if the passage of Smriti seems to contradict it, it must be interpreted in a different sense from the obvious one.” We reply, No, for even here ‘its inferiority thereto’ is allowed. For the word ‘ beyond- death’ (atimrityu) is not conventionally used in the sense of ‘liberation,’ but rather for that which must be present as the indispensable condition in order that one may pass beyond death; and so it should rather express that faith whereby there 18 a passage beyond death; [since we take it as one word ati- mrityum rather than as two ati mrityum] in accordance with the well-known grammatical paribhésh4 on Pan. u. 3. 19, which en- joins that the meaning produced by a case-affix (kdraka) 18 of superior force to one produced by assuming a complementary construction.! We also see that faith does produce this passing beyond death from such lines as those of the Gita (xu. 7),
५ 0 those, O prince, whose hearts are fixed on me,
I shall ere long be the deliverer from the sea of the world and death.”
There is also a text to the same effect in the Veda (Rig V. vii. 59. 127), “We worship Tryambaka, of grateful fragance,
1 8.८. it is better to take atimrityum as one word governed as an accusative case (k4raka) by the verb e¢é, than to take mrityum as governed by the preposition ati and therefore forming a complementary part of the sentence, and only in indirect
connexion with the verb, cf. Pan. ii. 3. 19. 2 It is also quoted in Taitt. Samh. . 8. 6.
12 The Aphorisms
the augmenter of prosperity; like the cucumber from its stalk, may I be delivered from death, but not from immor- tality.” Here ‘worship’ (yajana) means ‘faith’ (bhakti), since the kalpa so explains 1४." Nor is it any real objection to our interpretation that the word bhakti does not occur in the text of the hymn, because this equally applies to ‘libera- tion’ [which is not found directly mentioned in it either]. Consequently we learn from the eternal Veda itself the in- feriority of knowledge.
But it may be still asked “why should faith be defined as a form of affection?’ To meet this, the author replies,
It ts an affection from its being the opposite of hatred and from the Vedic expression ‘taste.’ (6).
Faith (or devotion) deserves to be called an affection, because it is the opposite of hatred. In secular language the terms ‘he hates,’ ‘he is devoted,’ are applied to persons whose dispositions are mutually opposed; and amongst men the opposite of hatred is universally acknowledged to be affection, not knowledge. And so in the Vishnu Purana (IV. xv. 12), having first described Sigupé4la’s uninterrupted hatred for Krishna, the Purana goes on to say, “This divine Vishnu, if named or called to recollec- tion even with uninterrupted hatred, confers a reward which is hard to be obtained by all gods and demons; how much more will he reward them who possess perfect faith?” So too we read in Atri’s Smriti, “Remembering Krishna even with hatred, Sigupéla, the son of Damaghosha, went to heaven; how much more one who ‘is wholly intent upon him?” where we also find faith represented as the proper opposite of hatred. And so too we read in the Git (xvi. 18),
“Those detractors who hate me [present] in their own and
others’ bodies,
1 Apastamba’s kalpa directs that the priests, as they recite these words, are to toss the baked flour cakes into the air, and to wish aloud to receive them from Bhaga, the deity who presides over good fortune (see Taitt. Samh. vol. ii. p. 88). Swapneswara seems to connect bhaga with bhakti.
of S‘andilya. 13
Those fierce haters, the vilest of men in their mortal lives, I continually throw, wicked as they are, into the wombs of demon mothers. Born in a demon womb, deluded from birth to birth, And never finding me, O son of Kunti, they go thence the lowest road. And as the opposite of this state of mind, it is right that faith should be described (as in Sut. 2) as an affection whose object is God Again, from the passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad (ii. 7), “having obtained the taste, he becomes full of joy,” a ‘taste whose object is Brahman is understood to be the cause of liberation which is the manifestation of the joy of Brahman. Now this ‘taste’ is the same as ‘affection,’ as is clear from the line in the Gita (i. 59), “Taste itself retires, having seen his supreme indifference to taste ;’”! where taste means affection for worldly objects. In accordance with this we find the very word anurdga used for ‘faith’ in the Vishnu Purdna (IV. iv. 4), where, after describing the ascent to heaven of Rama, Lakshmana and others, it proceeds to say, “the people also of the city of Kosala who had a fervent affection (anurdginah) for those incarnate portions of the supreme Vishnu,—having their minds fixed thereon, ob- tained possession of the same world with them.” Therefore we conclude that not knowledge, but ‘faith’ in the form of affection has supreme bliss as its fruit. ‘But is it not wrong to take opposition to hatred as the characteristic mark of affection, because this will equally apply 1 I have followed Schlegel in his translation of this line, as the author of the Commentary seems to have explained it in some such way, or he would have hardly quoted it alone without the preceding line. The Commentators on the Bhagavad Gita all take rasavarjam as for rasam varjayitwd. “In the case of the embodied soul which forbears to grasp (as in fasting), the different external objects retire, leaving
only desire behind; but desire itself retires, when it beholds the Supreme Soul in him (the wise man).”
14 The Aphorisms
to indifference and thus include too much?” We reply that the proper effect of hatred is a cessation [from all acts of kindness, etc.], and the true opposite of this frame of mind must be a state of action [which would not apply to in- difference]; and we see this action in the earnest following of the devoted after the object of their devotion, while in the case of those who have the opposite feeling we find an entire cessation from this following. Hence the phrase ‘the opposite of hatred’ is used in the Aphorism, with an eye to this oppo- sition between them as manifested by their respective effects. The argument (when drawn out in the full technical form’) will be as follows: Faith must be an affection directed to a par- ticular object—from the fact of its being a particular quality of the soul, which is different from any merely selfish feeling as to that object being the means of attaining one’s own in- terest, and which yet produces as its effect a following of the object, etc.; whatever is not so, is not so [t.e. whatever is not an affection will not have the two subjoined characteristics], as, for instance, hatred. And another ground of our definition is found in the fact that we see with the increase of the affection a correspondent increase in the following of the object, etc.’ And again, we may put it in this form; whoever is devoted to a certain object, (the absence of indifference being clearly understood) in him resides that particular quality which we call ‘faith’ [or ‘devotion,’ |—a quality which must be the opposite of hatred and tend to produce a following of the object, from the fact that it 18 a special quality of the soul producing this following; just as is seen in the parallel case where there is the feeling that such and such an object will be a means of obtaining one’s own interest.2 Thus we conclude that it is an affection, and at the same time show that
1 For this form of the syllogism, see my note, Colebrooke’s Essays, vol. i. p. 315. What follows is only to repeat 1). 1-10 in a technical form.
2 This is interesting as an instance of Mill’s Method of Concomitant Variations.
3 This feeling is also the opposite of hatred and tends to produce a following of the object from the same reason.
of S‘dndilya. 15
it 18 different from the feeling of promoting one’s own interest [as this latter feeling can be itself used as an illustration of the working of faith, and therefore of course cannot be identical with it]. And again, the argument 0 fortiori ‘how much more so, in the case of the devoted?’ only holds good with regard to a quality opposite to hatred, as in the Gita (ix. 32), “They who fly to me for refuge, even though born in mean births, [obtain salvation ; | how much more then holy Brahmans and pious royal sages?” So by that previously- quoted passage in the Gitaé (xvi. 18), where Krishna says that he throws into demon births those who hate him, he shows that as hatred is the cause of transmigration and worldly existence, so its opposite, an affection directed towards the Supreme Being, in the form of ‘faith,’ causes the abolition of all worldly existence by destroying [the internal organ which is] the dis- guise of the soul. This is expressly declared in that line,
“Never finding me, O son of Kunti, they go thence the
lowest road.”
From the expression ‘and’ in the Aphorism we infer that faith is also an affection, because it possesses the character- istic signs of earthly affection, such as horripilation, etc. Thus there is a well-known passage in the Sakuntalé (Act iii.'), where the king says,
५८ 8116 reveals her affection for me by her cheek with its down
erect.” But if faith were a different quality of the soul, there would be a needless complication in having to assume a special set of characteristic signs for it [which in themselves were not new |,
Some authors hold that Affection is a species of ‘wish’ as it also arises from the knowledge of the fact that its object will produce a desired end, as is the case in sacrifice, etc. But we hold that ‘affection’ is distinct from ‘wish,’ just as hatred is, and this we infer from the facts of consciousness, as we can
1 This is quoted from the Bengali recension.
16 The Aphorisms
feel, ‘I love, I have an affection for, and yet I do not wish for,’—since ‘wish’ refers only to what one has not attained, but affection refers equally to what is attained and what is not ; and indeed it would only be a useless complication, to en- deavour to show that it is always to be defined as a wish. This is a summary of what can be said on the subject; and we therefore consider that our definition has been now established to be correct. |
“But is not faith an action? and an action is not com- petent to produce supreme bliss, according to such passages 17 Sruti as that [in the Taittiriya Aranyaka, x. 10. 21] ‘not by work, nor offspring, nor wealth, but by abandonment of all these have some attained to immortality.’”
The author proceeds to refute this doubt in the next apho- rism.
It is not an action, for, like knowledge, tt does not depend on effort. (7).
This faith cannot properly be an action, because it does not follow an effort of will. Whatever does not follow an effort of will, is not an action, as for instance knowledge; for knowledge depends on the presence of the proper evidence, and a man cannot, at his pleasure, produce it or not, or alter it. And so too with faith. The affection felt by its subject towards a beautiful woman, children, etc., cannot be produced in its different manifestations by the man’s own exertions alone; but in the case of the devotion which we speak of, it depends on the man’s good deeds in former births, inferior de- votion,? etc.
Hence indeed is the endlessness of its fruit. (8).
Since faith is not an action, its fruit, beatitude, is rightly
1 There is an important technical gloka current among the Pandits, Jndna-janyd bhaved tchchhd, tchehhd-janyd bhavet kritih, kriti-janyd bhavech-cheshtd, cheshtd- janyd bhavet kriyd. Kritt here means yatna ‘volition.’ ‘ From knowledge arises desire (SodAnois), from desire volition (xpoafpeots), from volition conscious exertion
of the muscles (४06६८), and from this action.” 2 For this, see infra, Aph, 56, etc.
of Sandilya, 17
held to be endless. If it were an action, even immortality [which the Chhéndogya Upanishad promises as its reward, see Aph. 3] would have to come to an end, in accordance with that text of the same Upanishad (viii. 1. 6), Just as here the world gained by work perishes, so too hereafter the world gained by merit perishes.”
And from the use of the word ‘worship’ (prapatti) in the case of one who has knowledge, fatth is not knowledge, as in other cases where ‘worship’ is used. (9)
Krishna says in the Gita (vii. 19), ‘After many births he who has knowledge worships me;
One who knows that Vasudeva is all,—such a great-souled one is hard to be found.”’ |
This ‘worship’! is spoken of as pertaining to one who has knowledge; and this would be unsuitable, if faith were the cause of knowledge [and not rather, as we hold, its conse- quence]; as we see also in other cases where the same word ‘worship’ is similarly used. Thus immediately after the passage just quoted from the Gité, we read
“Having their knowledge carried away by various desires,
they worship other deities.”
By this passage, which is meant to blame the worship of other deities, the worship of the Supreme is indirectly praised? By this word ‘worship’ faith towards the deities is really meant and not the knowledge of them; for this is the only sense of the word which we can recognize as used in both cases. From the use of the word ‘and’ in the Aphorism, we infer that the mention, in the Gita, of faith [implied im ‘ worship’ | as subse- quent to knowledge, is another reason for faith not being the same as knowledge. Thus we read in the Git (xv. 19),
1 The Comm. on Bh, ©. explains prapadyate here as bhajati; prapatts therefore = bhakti, t.e. devoted worship. 3 The MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit Coll. Library reads tact: ग प्रप्तिः. 2
18 . The Aphorisms
५ Whosoever unconfounded knows me Purushottama, He knowing all, 0 Bhérata, worships me as identical with all things.’’! And so too again (ix. 13), “Having known me the first of beings and indestructible, they worship me with minds entirely fixed on me,”’ and again (x. 8), “Thus having known, the wise worship me, filled with rapture.” Therefore faith is not the same as knowledge.
Although, from the very fact of its being an affection, it is certain that it is different from knowledge, this discussion is needed to obviate a doubt which might otherwise arise, that the word ‘faith’ might mean, in a secondary sense, the know- ledge of Brahman.
Here, however, a question is raised,—“the words of the Bhagavad-Gité are not a direct authority in the form of ‘inspired words’ (sabda) as the Vedas are, but only secondarily as ‘tradition’ (smriti), as being comprised in the Bharata, and hence how can the Aphorism lay such stress on the ‘word’?”’ Here some explain it as meaning the inferred word [i.e. it is inferred that what is in an inspired book of tradition like the Git& must be found somewhere in the Veda, all Smriti deriving from thence its authority]. We however affirm that what constitutes a Veda is the fact of its being uttered by a divine Person and relating to an unseen object, and this character is not wanting in the Gité. Hence we see the well-known epigraph at the end of each section ^ क bhagavad-gitdsupant- shatsu ;”’ and these slokas have been only recorded? [not com- posed] by Vy4sa. And thus declares another Purana,
1 80 S’ankara; S'‘ridharaswimin explains sarvabhdvena as ‘in every way’ (sarva- prakdrena).
9 Cf. Manu, viii. 255, “ What the witnesses, thus assembled and interrogated, shall positively declare concerning the limits, let him record (ntbadhnfydt) in writing, together with all their names.”
of Sdndilya, 19
“The Gita is to be attentively recited,—what need is there of other long compilations of Sastras ? That Gité, which itself issued from the lotus-mouth of Padmanfbha.”’ Nor is there any fear of its thus coming within the prohibition which forbids a 8४078 to hear [as is the case with regard to the Veda],—because that is certainly settled by the general permission for all castes to hear the Bhérata,' just as is allowed to be the case with passages praising Om, etc. If our op- ponent should maintain that the Bharata is meant for all castes, excluding the Git4, we reply that without the Git& the well- known sum-total of 100,000 अनार could not be completed. And thus has it been declared by the teachers, “Those mantras of the Vedas, inserted in the Bharata, etc., they use in a secular sense, omitting the rules of their private reading.”’
Thus ends the first daily portion of the first chapter of the Commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of S4ndilya composed by the most learned teacher SwapnesSwara
Faith having been defined as a direct cause of immortality, the second daily portion is here commenced to discuss the nature of knowledge, concentration, and faith, as respectively the means and the end.
This [ faith] is the main thing, since the others depend upon it. (10).
The word ‘this’ is used in the Aphorism to remind the reader of what was mentioned at the close of the first daily portion. This highest form of faith is the main or principal thing, since it is regarded by the others, the knowledge of soul, con- centration, etc., as the end to which they are to be subordinated. Thus in the Chhandogya Upanishad, after the passage begin-
1 Cf. the current lines, ‘The three Vedas are not to be heard by women, इता 88, or titular Brahmans; so the sage through pity composed the Bh4rata narrative.”
20 The Aphorisms
ning “that which is immensity is felicity,” we read (vi. 24), “the soul is all this; seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, he becomes devoted to the soul, rejoicing in the soul, mated to the soul, having his happiness in the soul, he becomes self- resplendent.” Here the idea of ‘sight,’ as implied in the words ‘seeing thus,’ is used as subsidiary to the highest faith, described by the words ‘devoted to the soul’. (déma-ratih), with a view to remove the error that it is not lovable, etc. As in such cases as ‘the ascetic [or ‘staff-bearer’] repeats the initia- tory phrase after his guru,’ ‘he causes the cow to be milked, himself wearing his thread reversed,’ ‘knowing he offers,’ ‘being wealthy he is happy,’ etc., the words ‘staff,’ etc., are subsidiary,—so here too ‘seeing’ is subsidiary to faith; and the other things, ‘thinking’ and ‘knowing,’ are added over and above as not irrelevant, inasmuch as they are conducive to what is mentioned as the main point. So too ‘rejoicing in the soul,’ etc., are a relevant repetition, inasmuch as rejoicing is always found -present where devotedness is; otherwise the clauses of the sentence quoted would be divided, and ‘devoted- ness’ would be the subject, and ‘seeing,’ etc., would be the predicate, or vice versd [ ४.९. the clauses would not be consecutive attributes of one and the same subject]. Therefore the ‘see- ing’ is subsidiary, according to the rule of the Prior Mim4msa (111. 1. 2), “it 18 subsidiary because it subserves another thing as its end.” Hence the divine sage! (Mahébh. Sénti P. ch. 194) declares the superior excellence of one devoted to the soul, “He who abandoning his natural actions, in deep meditation, is always devoted to the soul, Becoming himself the soul of all beings, goes thereby the highest road.’’?
1 8.९, Bhishma. The Bibl. Indica text reads Manu, but the Sanskrit Coll. MS. reads munth for manuh.
2 I follow here the Mah&bh4rata text sarvabhitdtmabhis tasmdt sa gachchhed uttamdam gatim, |
of Sdndilya. 21
And from the subject-matter’s belonging to faith. (11).
Faith [as described by ‘devotedness’] constitutes the subject- matter from its having the end bound up with it; therefore ‘seeing,’ as being included as a means thereto, can only be subsidiary.
If you say ‘it is the effect of seeing,’—no, because the pronoun ‘tad’ is interposed. (12).
“But may we not say, ‘Immortality defined as self-resplen- dency, is really the effect of seeing, and so it is just the reverse of what you have been maintaining,—.e. seeing will be the subject-matter ?’” we reply, No, because the pronoun fad is interposed, ‘he becomes self-resplendent.”’ By this word ‘he,’ the subject close at hand is represented, ४.९. ‘the one devoted to soul,’ and not the more remote subject ‘seeing,’ since there is no reason why that which is separated should be brought into close contiguity. If you maintain that its being the sub- ject-matter is itself a sufficient reason [why ‘seeing’ should be meant], we reply that this would be a case of the logical fault of ‘mutual dependence’ (i.e. reasoning in a circle).
And from visible experience. (18).
We see in common life that the knowledge of his beauty causes affection for a young man in a girl’s mind,! but affection does not cause knowledge. Hence we conclude that know- ledge is a subsidiary, because we see by experience that it aids affection. And again we see that the knowledge that ‘nature’ is pitiless, limited, unlovely, etc., causes distress of mind to living beings, while the knowledge that Soul is all-merciful, of unlimited power and infinite beauty, dispels distress; and hence arises the highest form of faith.
Hence it is said in the Gita (v. 17), |
‘They who think of the Supreme, whose souls are bound up
in Him, who abide in Him, and find their refuge in Him,
1 Cf. Damayanti’s love for Nala.
22 The Aphorisms
They go thither whence there is no return, having all their sins removed by knowledge.” And 80 too in the Ayurveda,! “Thought, firmness, and knowledge of soul, etc., are the best medicine of the mind’s ailings.”
And therefore from the absence of knowledge in the case of the milk- maids. (14).
Since knowledge is thus a means, as being manifestly sub- servient, the Smriti, rejecting all visible means, declares that the milkmaids attained liberation solely by devotion to the Supreme One, from the consequent abolition of all foulness of mind, etc. As we read in the Vishnu Purana (V. xii. 13),
“One virtuous damsel, having all her merits cancelled by the intense rapture of thinking about Him, and all her sins ex- piated by the agony of not obtaining Him,—meditating on Him, the cause of the world, identical with the supreme Brahman,—ceasing to breathe, obtained liberation.”
Here the presence of deep devotion is inferred by its signs of pleasure and pain, and thereby® liberation; such is the meaning of the passage. Just as you can obtain the fruit of the sacrifice with unshelled golden berries and thus obviate all need for any intermediate operation,® so in the case of the milkmaids we have liberation produced directly by affection ; and hence knowledge is clearly understood to be only a sub- sidiary means; but if knowledge were the main end, no fruit would be produced in its absence. Nor can you say that the
1 This occurs in the Ashtanga-hridaya, i. 23; for an account of this medical treatise by Vagbhata, see Prof. Weber’s Catal. Berlin Libr. No. 929-934
2 The Bibl. Ind. has a bad misreading na for tena in p. 15,1. 6 infra; the Sanskrit Coll. MS. has tena.
3 8.९. knowledge produces the removal of mdlinya and that causes bhakti and that liberation; but if there be no md/inya there is no need of jndna, but you can have bhakti at once and then mukti, as the unlearned gopis had; just as in making an oblation of boiled rice you must first shell the rice; but if you make an offering of golden grains (an offering described in the Ny4ya-m4l4-vistara, x. i. 1), you have the result at once without the trouble of shelling. Avaghdta=jndna, and the husk= mdlinya
of Sandilya. 23
milkmaid’s intense thinking about Him could be the required knowledge of the identity of the soul and Brahman,—because there could not be the recognised concurrent causes of know- ledge, as hearing, pondering, etc.; but it is merely a case of remembrance closely bound up with affection. Nor is it to be explained as a case of ‘persuasive enforcement of a previous injunction’ [1.6. arthavéda,—‘ knowledge’ being really intended, and ‘affection’ being only brought in to illustrate it—], because the subject had not been mentioned before [so there could be no such enforcement]; and there is no direct ‘injunc- tion’ near [as there should be to constitute a true arthavdda].
Lf you say ‘he knows by his faith,’ we reply ‘no,’ because it 18 ‘re- peated knowledge’ which is thus aided by faith. (15).
The opponent now urges the fact that this view directly contradicts §ruti and consequently all arguments based on the ‘subject-matter’ (Aph. 11), ‘relative position’ (Aph. 12), and ‘sign’ (Aph. 14) are precluded.!—*Thus it is expressly declared in the Gita (xviii. 55),
1 The Mim&ms& arranges the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another, in the following order. 1. S’ruti or a definite text, as ‘let him offer with curds,’ where curds are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. Ltriga ‘sign’ or ‘the sense of the words,’ as leading to an inference, as in the text ‘he divides by the ladle;’ here we infer that the thing divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. Vdkya ‘the being mentioned in one sentence ;’ as in the text “‘(I cut) thee for food’ thus saying, he cuts the branch ;” here the words ‘ (I cut) thee for food’ are ancillary to the action of cutting. 4. Prakarana ‘the subject-matter viewed as a whole with an interdependence of its parts,’ as in the darfa-ptirnamdea sacrifice, where the praydja ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, a mystic influence (apirva) which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the prakaraya proves them to be ancillary. 5. Sthdna ‘relative position’ or ‘ order,’ as the recital of the hymn éundadhwam, etc., ‘be ye purified for the divine work’ in connexion with the mention of the sdundyya vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. Samdkhyd ‘title,’ thus the Yajurveda is called the special book for the adhwarynu priests, hence in any rite mentioned in it they are prima facie to be considered as the priests employed. The order represents the relative weight attached to each, the first, ¢ruti, being the most important, the last, samdkhyd, the least, (Cf. Jaimini’s Sééras, ili. 3. 1-14; Nydyamdidvist., iii. 3. 1-11; Mimdmsdparibhdshd, pp. 8,9; Veddnta-shtras, iii. 3 44,49). The objector in the text maintains that (4) (5) and (2) are precluded here by the gruts (1) from the Bhagavad-gita
24 The Aphorisms
‘By faith he really recognises me, how great and what I am ;
Then having really known me, he forthwith enters into me.’ Now just as in the sentence (Taitt. Samh. 1. 5. 8) ‘he draws near to the gérhapatya fire with an Aindri verse,’ [the word aindryd implies the instrument, ] so here, according to the rule mentioned above that ‘the meaning produced by a case-aflix is of superior force’ in Sruti as well as in secular writings, it follows that faith (being in the instrumental case) is to be con- sidered as the cause of knowledge. With regard to the Apho- rism ‘from visible experience’ (Aph. 13), although there is no need to refer to Sruti, where we have the aid of visible ex- perience and the matter is within the range of sense-perception, perception fails to inform us how far an affection towards Brahman is to be aided by knowledge. The fact that we see knowledge have such an effect in the case of the love of a young girl, etc., is, I allow, a prima facie ground for a similar inference in regard to the affection towards Brahman; but all that this reasoning could end in would be a ‘sign,’ leading to an inference, [but, as we have said, this is precluded, as we have a direct text of the Gité in opposition to it].”
We reply, if the Gité had used the words “he cognises me”’ only (jdndti), we should have granted what you say; but its term 18 abhydndti, and this implies the knowledge of some- thing already previously known. So the first knowledge is ancillary to faith and promotes faith as its fruit; afterwards faith seeks to aid knowledge when strengthened by repetition in the form of abhijynd or ‘revised knowledge,’ just as we have the shelling of the rice by repeated acts of shelling separate grains. The latter part of the verse is added to correct the impression which might be produced by this aid rendered by the effect ‘faith’ [to its cause ‘knowledge’ ],—‘then,” ४.९. after faith has been strengthened by the strengthening of know- ledge, ^“ € enters.” Therefore this is not properly to be called a Sruti, but rather a confirmatory repetition (anuvdda) obtained by a deduction of reason.
of Sdndilya. 25
He explains this still further. And this had been declared before. (16).
Before the lines in the Git& (xviii. 55) “by faith he recog- nises me, ’—after having declared “he becomes fitted for union with Brahman,” Krishna goes on to say (xviii. 54), |
^^ प्कश become Brahman, being contented in soul, he
grieves not, nor desires, Feeling perfect equanimity towards all beings, he obtains the highest faith in me.”
Since the devotee, as one who knows Brahman [by being united to Him]! has no need for further knowledge, we can only take the following lines as an illustrative repetition [and not a fresh declaration of अप].
Therefore even an alternative view ts rejected. (17).
By our thus settling the position of knowledge as a means, any attempt to consider knowledge and faith as possibly alter- native ends, is precluded. There can be no alternative with regard to an end and ameans. The word ‘even’ in the aphorism implies that still more is the view of their both being held as ends together, precluded.
‹ Faith towards a god’ applies to something other than the supreme, because it 1s coupled with something else. (18).
It is said by the Sruti somewhere (Swetésw. Up. vi. 23), “He who has supreme faith towards a god, and as towards a god, so towards a teacher, To him verily great of soul all these objects as declared reveal themselves.” Here the expression ‘faith towards a god’ must be under- stood as relating to a being other than the Supreme [éwara, because it is coupled with faith towards the teacher, for there can be no such juxtaposition in the case of that highest form
1 In p. 17,1. 8, read WTAATAY with Ballantyne’s MS. (Ind. Office Lib.) and Sansk. Coll. MS.
26 The Aphorisms
of faith, which leads as its fruit to immortality. But we do not dispute that Indra and the other gods, when worshipped, promote the fruit, knowledge, as they do good fortune.! This is what the close connexion proves, just as the meaning of the word uléka is proved by the connexion [of the context, 1.९. whether it means in a given place Kanada or an owl®]. This explanation is added as confirmatory of the previous argument.
But concentration is for both, since tt looks both ways like the praydja. (19).
Concentration on the other hand is subsidiary to knowledge and to faith, since fixedness of mind is necessary to both. “But may we not apply here the principle of the Ptrva Mimamsd (iii. 1. 22) that ‘subsidiary portions of a sacrifice stand as such on the same level and so cannot be connected with each other ;’ and therefore how can concentration, which is subsidiary to the principal end (faith), be also subsidiary to the means (knowledge) P”
He replies “like the praydja.” As the praydja ceremony 18 subsidiary to the vdjapeya sacrifice, and is also subsidiary to the dikshantyd which is a part thereof, 80 it is here, since there is the same proof to establish yoga as being subsidiary to both. Or we may perhaps say that concentration, which was originally undertaken as subsidiary only to knowledge,’ is accidentally [or secondarily] conducive to faith. In the same way we must consider that indifference to worldly objects is conducive to both. |
“But is it not hard to go counter to the traditional teaching of Patanjali [in the Yoga-sitras, 1. 23], in the aphorism, ‘from the meditation on God,’ where the worship of the Supreme, as implied by the word ‘meditation,’ is meant to be conducive to
1 The Sansk. Coll. MS. reads éruta-phalavat for éubhavat, a var. lect. which serves as a comment. 2 This explanation of ulikavat is merely conjectural.
3 In p. 18, 1. 6, I read with Sans, Coll. MS. योगानुष्ठानं.
of Sandilya. 27
the attainment of mystic contemplation; and so how can faith be the principal thing?” He replies,
It is by the lower form of faith that mystic contemplation is pro- duced. (20).
The ‘meditation’ here mentioned is the lower, not the higher, form of faith; and by ४ is mystic contemplation pro- duced,—hence there is no contradiction whatever with the doctrine of Patanjali. And to the same purport are the two succeeding aphorisms of the Yoga, “His name is Om,” “Its repetition and reflection on its meaning.”
If you say ‘faith is to be avoided as being an affection,’—no, be- cause it has the highest aim, like union. (21).
This aphorism is introduced incidentally from the mention of the Yoga-sastra. It may be said that faith also should be alto- gether avoided by one who wishes for liberation, because it does not differ from the affection characterized [and condemned] in the Yoga Aphorisms (ii. 3), “affection, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence are the ‘afflictions.’”” But this is not a true view, because faith has the highest aim, as its object is Féwara. A certain feeling is not to be avoided from the mere fact of its being an affection, but from its being an affection connected with mundane existence; just in the same way as it is not mere ‘union’ that is to be avoided but union with what is evil, [for to be in a state of union with God is a state devoutly to be desired]. And so in this alleged inference, “faith in FSwara 18 to be avoided, because it is an affection,” we must supply the limiting condition (or upadhi) which is required to narrow its too great comprehensiveness, viz. its being connected with mundane existence or its not being conducive to liberation. And this faith is not devoid of the quality of ‘goodness,’ for this is expressly declared to be its characteristic, in that line of the Git& (xvii. 4) “those with the quality of goodness worship the gods,” etc
28 The Aphorisms
This [ faith | indeed [1s the highest] from the express declaration of ita superiority to the performers of sacrificial acts, to those who Sollow knowledge, and to those who practise concentration. (22).
This form of worship is indeed the highest,—this faith has the highest character. This is every way ascertained, since the Gita declares (vi. 46, 47),
“The yogi is higher than the ascetics, he is counted higher
than even those who follow knowledge,
The yogi is higher than those who perform sacrificial acts ;
therefore, 0 Arjuna, be thou a yogi.
And of all yogis, whosoever with his soul intent on me
In full belief worships me, he is accounted by me the most
devoted.”
Here there is to be understood a gradual climax of the
different subjects, caused by the successive superiority of their respective characteristics, asceticism, etc.; but of course no sub- sidiary can be reckoned superior to its end; therefore faith is the principal. _ The author now quotes a passage to avoid the possibility of this erroneous tenet rising up as if it were countenanced by the supposed purport of éruti [as had been attempted by the objector, in § 15]
From the question of the superiority of faith having been settled by question and answer. (28).
- Here the whole of the twelfth chapter of the Git& is an example in point. Arjuna’s opening words form the question ; “They who in faith worship thee, thus constantly devoted to thee, And they who worship the indestructible and the unmani- fested,— which of these knows most of yoga?” The answer follows, “They who fixing their mind on me, worship me, ever de- voted,
mmm SS ge TOD et PEE ee Sane ae a | of Sdndilya, 29
Endowed with the highest belief, they are counted by me the most devoted.!
But they? who worship the indestructible, the indescribable, and the unmanifested,
The all-pervading, the inconceivable, the unchangeable, the unmoved, the permanent,
Restraining all their senses, indifferently affected towards all,
These verily attain me, being intent on the welfare of all.
Their labour is the greater who fix their thoughts on the unmanifested,
The path of the unmanifested is with difficulty obtained by embodied beings.
But they who are intent on me, having transferred all their
` actions to me,
And worship me, contemplating me with unfaltering con- centration,
To them a deliverer from the sea of death and the world
I shall ere long be, son of Prithé, as their thoughts are fixed upon me.”
As this question and answer definitely determine the superi- ority of faith to knowledge, this passage cannot be considered as only a rhetorical description [1.6. arthavdda, but it is to be accepted as an authoritative statement |. In other words the dialogue is intended to settle a doubt, not to commend faith. The point insisted on is, that to pursue the subsidiary path [of know- ledge, apart from faith, | only leads to additional toil.
The mention of belief (sraddhd in the extract from the Gita, 8. 2) brings in a doubt that faith (bhakti) may be a kind of belief (Sraddhd) ; he proceeds to lay this demon.
But it is not the same as belief, because it has a wider range. (24). Faith must not be universally supposed to be identical with
1 These have faith (कवा). 2 These have knowledge, and according to S’&ndilya’s view follow the lower and more rugged path.
30 The Aphorisms
belief (Sraddha), because belief is merely subsidiary to cere- monial works; but not so is faith in Yéwara.
And because there would be a regressus ad infinitum, tf faith were the same as that [#.e. belief.| (25). It is said in the Sruti (Gité, vi. 47), “He who, believing, has faith in me, is accounted by me the most devoted.” 1
[Now faith cannot be the same as belief for three reasons. |
i. For if faith were really the same as belief, this verse which declares belief to be a subsidiary part of faith would involve an ad infinitum regressus, and therefore belief cannot be thus subsidiary to itself. For under your view we should have one belief a subsidiary part of another belief, since you hold that faith is only the same as belief; and as this same subsidiary belief would be itself faith, you would next have to assume a new belief to be in turn its subsidiary part, and this in the same way would require a third, and so on ad infinitum.
ii. Again, just as the opening verses of a ceremony? do not require any opening verses to be subsidiary to themselves ; and the rinsing the mouth (which is a preliminary to all ceremonial 8008) does not require a preliminary rinsing for itself [as each would thus involve a similar regressus ad infinitum]; so [if faith were really the same as belief] it would not require a prelimi- nary belief as its subsidiary part; [but this is definitely settled by the verse from the Gita; and consequently our assumption of the identity of faith and belief which led to this contra- diction of Sruti, must be false].
111. And a third argument against the identity in question is found in the ordinary phrase ‘endowed with belief and faith,’ which directly speaks of them as distinct
1 Here ‘ belief’ is subsidiary to ‘faith,’ according to the rule ‘ that which charac- terizes the agent is a subsidiary part of the ceremony to be performed;’ as in the injunction ‘let him who desires heaven offer the sacrifice,” where the desire of heaven is considered to be subsidiary.
2 For the drambhaniydh, cf. Ait. Brahm. vi. 6.
of Séndilya.. 81
But the Brahma-kanda is directed to faith as its end, since with regard to tts producing subsequent ‘knowledge’ it ts only on a level [with the pirva-kénda]. (26).
He now replies to the objector who says, that, “if knowledge were not the principal end, the uttara-kdnda or latter part of the Veda [४.९. the Upanishads] would not have been universally considered to be the portion which treats of knowledge [as opposed to the purva or karma-kanda, which treats of ceremonial works].”” The portion of the Veda which treats of Brahman is revealed for the sake of faith, not for the sake of knowledge, since the object of both kandas is equally to declare what was previously unknown; otherwise, we should have had a jndna- kdnda, declaring the knowledge of ceremonial duty, revealed in the pirvakinda. Nor is there any positive injunction (vdhi) in regard to knowledge, which, by its own predominant force as vidhi, might thus lend an authority to the jndna-kdnda as such. Therefore the general idea of the jndna-kdnda 1s a mistake; it should be properly called the brahma-kdnda. Tence we find it expressly said in the Brahma-sitras, ^^ Now, then, there is a desire to know Brahman.’’! It is therefore also a bhaktikdnda, as its true end is faith.
Thus ends the second daily portion of the first chapter of the Commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of S4ndilya, composed by the most learned teacher Swapneswara.
1 8.९. it is brahma-jijndsd and not jndna-jijnded; it should be therefore bhakts- kdnda, not jndna-kdnda.
32 The Aphorisms
SECOND CHAPTER.
As this faith is not directly to be produced by effort, other means for its attainment are to be looked for; of these means the one most closely connected is knowledge, the extraneous ones are inferior faith, etc.; the author therefore here com- mences this second chapter to ascertain what these respective means are.
The practice of the means of knowledge is to be continued until puri- fication is produced, as in shelling rice. (27).
‘Knowledge’ is the certain knowledge concerning Brahman. Although this is not to be attained by mere effort, still the practice of the means thereto, such as hearing, considering, profound meditation, etc., is indispensable for its attainment. “But are we to understand that the student is to practise once for all, according to the rule that ‘the meaning of the sdstra is fulfilled when once performed,’ or is he to continue to practise it until his faith is thoroughly confirmed?” To this it is thus replied. It is necessary to practise hearing and the rest until faith is completely purified; just as in the rule “he shells the rice,” the meaning of the 88879 is that the man is to continue the pounding until the rice is completely cleared of its husk, so from the analogy of this visible example the student must strive to practise knowledge and the other means until he has abolished the mind’s foulness.
If it be [ironically] suggested that it does not follow that the means subordinate to these means should themselves be practised,—the next aphorism supplies the answer.
And of their respective means. (28).
It is also proper to practise the respective means which are themselves subordinate to those direct means of producing
of Séndilya. 33
knowledge, ४.९. such subordinate means as following the teacher, studying such doctrines as are not contradictory to the Veda, tranquillity, etc. The primary means are not able to produce the end without their subordinate means, just as the general 18 useless without his army.
The question is next discussed as to the purification of the objects of the understanding.
Kasyapa holds that the understanding should be fixed on omnipo- tence, from its being other. (29).
The teacher KaéSyapa! holds that the understanding obtains supreme bliss as its end when it has as its object a Being endowed with the Supreme Yéwara’s attributes, as omnipotence, etc. Why so? because this Supreme Being is ‘other’ than all individual souls, and those individual souls depend on the knowledge of this ‘other’ in order to know themselves. In this theory there is an absolute difference between the indi- vidual soul and Brahman.
Bddardyana holds that tt should be fixed on Soul alone. (80).
The teacher Bddar4yana on the other hand holds that it should have as its object pure Soul, and so the Brahma-sitra (iv. 1. 3), “but they recognise and declare it as the Soul.” In this doctrine, as the notion that the individual soul is Brahman is really false [as there is properly no such thing as an individual soul at all], and the only positive truth is the knowledge of the one soul as essential intelligence, this alone leads to liberation.
Sandilya holds that it should be fixed on both, [inferring ४] Jrom the revealed word and reason. (31).
The teacher SAndilya, however, holds that it should be fixed on both,—why ? because ‘the revealed word,’ the Veda, declares so (Chhind. Up. iii. 14). After beginning, “ All
1 I do not know who this teacher is,—his doctrine evidently corresponds to that of
Raménuja. 3
34 The Aphorisms
this verily is Brahman, for thence doth it proceed, therein doth it merge and therein doth it live, thus let him worship it with a tranquil mind,” it then goes on, “this is my soul within my heart, this is Brahman, this shall I obtain, having passed from hence. He who is sure of this and has no doubt, [becomes Brahman]; thus saith the teacher Séndilya.” Thus having discussed the point, the Veda declares that he who knows both objects, obtains the end of becoming Brahman, which is produced by faith and love, defined as directed to Brahman. There is no real contradiction [as a thoroughgoing Mimamsist, who holds the eternity of the Veda, might object] in consequence of a juxtaposition of the eternal and the non- eternal in the same sacred text, because it is to be explained as referring to some former SAndilya, just as in the similar mention of an individual name in the well-known passage, “Babara 18581811 desired” (Taitt. Samh. vii. 1. 10).1 But in reality the Veda is to be regarded as having the Supreme | as its author, [but not as having existed from all eternity. | And the same thing is to be inferred from the text,? “from that universal sacrifice sprang the Rich and S&man verses, the metres sprang from it, from it the yajus arose.”
The same view can also be established by reason. Brahman is described in the Veda as possessing all power and also as being identical with the individual soul. Thus the Sruti says (Taittiriya Upan. iii. 1), “From whom verily these beings are born, by whom, when born, they live, whom they approach, whom they enter,—him do thou seek to know.” And so in the Gita (xv. 7), |
“A portion of me is in the animate world, become the indi-
vidual soul, eternal.” In these circumstances what can destroy what? Therefore such sentences as that in the Chhandogya ‘that art thou,’ etc., prove that both should be known.
1 Cf. Muir’s Sanskrit Texts, vol. iii. p. 77, etc. 2 Rig V.x. 90. Taittiriya Aranyaka, iii. 12. 4,
of Sandilya. 35
If you say this is impossible from the incompatibility,—not so,— because each may want certain special characteristics [without affecting the partial identity] as in the case of two recognitions. (32).
“But is not the view that this knowledge is to have both as: its objects, impossible from the incompatibility of the two objects? for the knowledge of an object distinguished by its inability to create the world, etc., is incompatible with an object distinguished by this very creative power, etc.” This is not true, because the being a receptacle of some common qualities may depend on a partial identity, without that thing which is characterised by some attributes being necessarily also charac- terised by some others,—as we see in the case of such cogni- tions as ‘that is this same Devadatta,’ ‘that is I,’ [where the ‘Devadatta’ of yesterday and to-day, and the ‘I’ viewed under similarly different circumstances, are respectively identified in spite of some peculiar attributes]. For the knowledge of the special characteristics, which distinguish certain given things, must cause certain exceptions and limitations, [thus the ‘ Deva- datta’ of to-day and yesterday, which are thus identified, are respectively distinguished by certain peculiar attributes of time and place |.
“Then you hold that there can be the knowledge of identity by means of the indirect (or secondary) mention of a thing [without its distinguishing characteristics|.”"! I reply, No, । 1 The direct meaning of a word is called ‘denotation’ (abAtdhd) ; when this direct
and principal meaning is incompatible with the rest of the sentence, we must have recourse to the indirect power of ‘indication’ (/akshand). Thus in the sentence
‘a herd-station on the Ganges,’ the primary meaning of Ganges is incompatible, and
therefore we reject the direct meaning (abhidheya) and take the indirect or secondary
one (lakshya) of something connected with the river, as its bank. So here the
Devadatta of to-day and yesterday are evidently distinct, and they cannot be abso-
lutely identical, as they would be, if the words were to be accepted in their primary
meaning; ‘ Devadatta’ is therefore taken in its secondary meaning as viewed apart
from the time, etc., in connexion with which he is spoken of. It is this residue of .
separate properties peculiar to each, as time, space, etc., which is the distinguishing characteristic (avachhedaka) which here establishes the relation /akshyatd.
36 The Aphorisms
because knowledge by means of indirect or secondary mention is always of an inferior kind [to that given by means of direct mention or abhidhd| and because it is only the presence of the distinguishing mark of this relation (avachhedaka) which causes the knowledge of the thing thus indirectly indicated.! Other- wise we might sometimes have the recollection of the thing directly denoted by a word (abhidheya) without the distinguish- ing mark which determines its being thus directly denoted [for the relations of abhidheyatd and alakshyatd equally require the presence of an avachhedaka].
Nor could the Supreme One be considered as subject to affliction, be-
cause a difference would be seen immediately after [the prima Jacie identity]. (88)
Nor can it be objected that, if this were so [i.e. if the indi- vidual and Supreme Soul were identical], the Supreme Being might be also defined as possessing affliction, etc., which belong to [the internal organ] the accidental disguiser of the indi- vidual soul; because, after the aforesaid recognition of their identity, there would follow the especial determination that all affliction, etc., were distinct from Soul.
Tf you say ‘ the same holds of power,’—no, because tt {8 natural [to the Supreme]. (84).
‘But would it not follow that power, defined by making, etc., would be excluded from the Supreme Being, just as afflictions and the like are; whereas the abstract quality of
1 Every case of such a relation as abhidheyatd, lakshyatd, etc., must have an ava- chhedaka or determining notion which will be present to characterize it. In abht- dheyatd this will be the divine will or (according to others) sanketa, ‘human con- vention ;’ this determines the special meanings of different words, and is therefore called pravritti-nimittam; in lakshyatd this will be the special circumstances which cause an incompatibility between the primary meaning of the word and the rest of the sentence. In this last case it is these special circumstances which produce the know- ledge of the secondary meaning. Thus in the sentence ‘a herd-station on the Ganges’ it is the idea of the river’s surface, as incompatible with a solid house, which suggests the secondary meaning ‘on the river’s bank,’
of Séndilya. 37
power, viewed as residing in the soul [apart from all action], is not like affliction, etc.” We deny it, because making, etc., are natural to the Supreme Being. The naturalness of heat to fire cannot be altered; therefore it is non-naturalness which constitutes the accidental. Therefore in the case of the sun as reflected in a mirror, we may exclude from the original the foulness which we detect in the image, [as this is only accidental ; | but we cannot exclude the roundness, brightness, etc., which are natural to the sun.
° But is not the power of the Supreme Being real; how then can affliction, etc., be foreign [and accidental] to individual souls?’’ He proceeds to account for this.
The power of the Supreme ts not disputed ; and it is not thus in the case of the souls other than He, because they have his nature. (35).
The power of the Supreme is not denied in any Veda, that such a generally received belief should be held untenable. Rather we learn that power is natural to him from such passages as that in the Chhandogya Upanishad, “he whose will is truth,” etc. Nor is there in his case any reason for his abandoning attributes once known to belong to him, as we hold that there is to individual souls, since he is always the Lord and always liberated. But affliction, etc., are not thus natural to the individual souls other than God,—why ? because they have his nature. For we read in the Chhaéndogya Upani- shad (viii. 3), “he attains to the supreme light and appears in his own nature,” etc., and this would be impossible, if affliction, etc., were natural to the individual souls. It would indeed be possible if affliction, etc., were natural to the Supreme also, but this is not so. Therefore we conclude, because libera- tion, as defined as becoming identified with Brahman, would otherwise be impossible, that mundane existence [with its inevitable afflictions] is only accidental to embodied souls. Al- though M4yé is a non-natural power of the Supreme, still it does not follow that this his disguise will ever be absolutely
38 The Aphorisms
abolished ; but the internal organs, which are the disguisers of the individual souls, will be absolutely abolished, wherever faith is produced towards the Supreme. The Maya-power of God never ceases, because, as the number of individual souls is infinite, its exercise by him is ever necessary, for their mun- dane existence and manifold service. And therefore such passages as those in the Sruti (Brihad Arany. Upan. iv. 3, 7), ‘‘he as it were thinks, he as it were moves,” etc., and again (Ib. ii. 3, 6), “hence there is this definition, ‘he is not this,’ ‘he is not this,’ etc., refer to the individual soul, [not to Brahman. |
If you say, ‘what [becomes of God’s power| apart from all souls ?’ —not 80, from the infinity of internal organs. (86).
“But even if the liberation of individual souls is only gradual, still when all internal organs are abolished, the dis- guiser of the Supreme [his Méya-power] will necessarily sur- cease, from the absence of all reason for its continuance; and then what becomes of the power which you have called natural to 0०? We demur, for, as the number of internal organs which disguise the individual souls is infinite, such a time will never come; and so our view still remains reasonable that power is natural to God. Nor can we conclude that such a time will arrive, from the maxim “all antecedent non-existences!' produce their opposites from the very fact of their being antecedent non-existences,’—[because the number of souls is infinite. | Nor can you say that all the antecedent non-existences will eventually have produced their opposites, because there is nothing to necessitate its being so. And there is an utter absence of argument to establish the probability of a time devoid of all effects; otherwise you might hold that there once was a time when no antecedent non-existence had as yet pro- duced its opposite, and consequently infer a time when there
1 I suppose there is here the tacit assumption that all individual souls have a pr&- ६५१००8९४ of mukti. (89018१६ is the non-existence of a jar before it is made.)
of Sandilya. 39
was as yet no destruction [or emergent non-existence].! If you say that “such an idea as the possibility of my being one of the unfortunate souls who may never be liberated, would cut the sinews of effort towards liberation,” I should reply that rather there would be every reason for effort, if there is a certainty as to what are the means, though uncertainty as to the attainment of the end; and on the other hand, it would be rather the idea that all will be certainly liberated, which would really lead to a paralysis of effort.
“If by the power which is natural to the Supreme, you mean the productive power of a material cause, then it will follow that the Supreme must be subject to change, just as clay (the material cause of jars) is.’ We reply
Brahman is not subject to change since matter is interposed as a screen,® following Him as He exists as thought. (87).
Matter is the material cause of inanimate effects, and is subject to change; but not so Brahman; the creative power of the Supreme is really through the development of himself and his being obeyed by matter. Nor can it be said that matter alone is existence, because this supposition would lead to individual souls being non-existent, as they are other than matter. There- fore we hold that creative power, etc., belong naturally to the Supreme, and that he throws a veil before himself in the form of his m4y4é-power or matter, [on which he works]; and there- fore he himself is not subject to change, just as a magician who seems to create by illusion is not himself the subject of illusion. Although [as the S4nkhyas say] the very fact of | being an effect means being changed, since the cause and the effect are in their substrate identical, yet [when God creates] it is not such a change as involves a change of form, as in the
1 The true view is that the succession of mundane existence (samsdra) is eternal 6 parte ante and ¢ parte post.
2 Matter (prakyrits) acts as a screen and stops the influence of change on Brahman.
3 In p. 27, 1. 7, the Sansk. Coll. MS. reads -vikdryo for -kdryo.
40 The Aphorisms
case of milk becoming curds. Or again, we may say that God is not subject to change any more than the potter’s stick is in reference to the jar,' since the stick does not effect any change in itself besides that produced in the jar. Therefore it is said in the Aphorism ‘since matter is interposed as a screen.’
“But if Illusion is the material cause, is not the world founded upon illusion? How then can we find it declared by Sruti,—as in the passage,” ‘on Him is all founded,’—that the world is founded on Brahman?” He answers as follows:
There is (still) the being founded upon Him, as in the case of a stool in a house. (88).
There is no contradiction in holding that the developments [of illusion] are also founded upon Him, Brahman, ‘as in the case of a stool in a house;’ 2.९. just as one, standing on a stool placed in the middle of a house, is said equally to stand on the stool or in the house.
“But if so, is not Brahman rendered superfluous by our assumption of primeval Matter (prakriti)?” He denies this in the next aphorism.
Both [are needed | from their mutual dependence. (89).
Brahman and primeval Matter are both causes; since the intelligent and the non-intelligent mutually depend upon each other, the one for attaining self-knowledge and the other for attaining an object for its potentiality. Which of them can ignore the other P 4
He now proceeds to enumerate his categories, in order to facilitate the employment of the terms in his Sastra.
1 God in this view is the instrumental cause, and the potter’s stick is not itself changed.
2 Taittiriya-khilopanishad, 26
° Cf. Sankhya K4rik4, 21
+ In p. 28, 1. 1, read fa कस्योपेखु क according to the Calcutta Sansk. Coll. MS The printed text is nonsense
of Séndilya. 41
There 1s no third beside ‘knowable’ and ‘knower.’1 (40).
The ‘knowable’ (chetyd) is ‘Matter,’ the ‘knower’ (chit) is Brahman ; there is no other third thing; such is the meaning. If you say that this third thing need not be taken any account of,? as it is neither proved nor disproved,—we reply that what the Aphorism means is this: the state of knowing abides in none but Brahman, that of being knowable in nothing but Matter.
‘But if there is no connexion between the Soul and matter, all effects are abolished ; and if there is any connexion, then this itself will be the third.” He answers,
And these two are joined from their being beginningless. (41).
‘Mutually’ must be supplied from Aph. 39, ६.९. ‘mutually joined.’ Both these, previously mentioned, t.e. Soul and Matter, themselves constitute the connexion between them,? and we need not assume any extraneous connexion. Why? from their both being beginningless. And so it is said in the Gita (xi. 19),
“Know that Matter and Soul are both beginningless.”’
‘Well then, let this very ‘beginningless’* form the needed connexion between पला.” We demur, for, as the alternative lies between ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious,’ the two terms do not admit of a third. |
[Here follows a १1168800. | “But if Matter is only an illu- sion,—as is declared in the Swetééwatara and other Upanishads,
‘Let him know that Matter is illusion, and MaheSwara the
illusion-lord,’ does it not follow that Matter is all false? and if so, how is it described as the Category, ‘what is to be known’?” He replies : ‘What ts to be known’ is not false, from tts being a power. (42).
1 86. ‘object’ and ‘subject’ (chetyd and chit).
2 For a somewhat similar example of this rare use of chodyam, cf. Magha, ix. 16. 3 8.९. it is the so-called swartpa-sambandha (cf. Kusumanjali, transl. p. 13, note). 4 Read p. 28, 1, 14, anddi eva with Sansk. Coll. Lib. MS.
42 The Aphorisms
‘What is to be known,’ ६.९. Matter, cannot be false,— why ? ‘from the very fact of its being a power.’ Thus the magician cannot create the required extraneous thing without an illusive power. And again, in such 08882068 ` 88 that, “but how, gentle youth, could the existent be thus born from the non-existent?” (Chhénd. Upan. vi. 2), the Sruti proves the reality of the cause from the reality of the effect, and so de- clares the reality, not the falseness of all. But we may also put the matter into the form of a regular inference; the divine Creation always depends upon a corresponding concomitant cause,' from the very fact of its being a creation made by an intelligent being,—just like the [illusive] creation of a ma- gician. Nor may you say that “this argument is irrelevant, as all we want is gained by assuming adrishta, etc.,” because it is simpler to make one assumption, as we do in assuming this ‘power,’ and also because there is no proof that adrishta is a cause of anything except experience and the means of pro- ducing 1४.“ Again, since these other causes would inevitably over- lap, if we tried to regard them as producing all effects [ each being only partial in its operation], we consider that the existence of this may4-power as the one eternal concomitant [to the Deity | is established. And as the further assumption of many other con- comitants subordinate to this one is useful for the proposed end, it involves no real violation of the well-known law of parcimony. All this will be discussed at length in the third chapter.
The topic thus started as a digression being thus dismissed, our author returns to his original subject.
The purity of the faith is to be inferred from signs, as we see in common life. (43).
Although faith is an object of consciousness, through such
1 The world resembles the m4y& power of Fswara.
2 Thus it is said in the Kusum4njali (i. 12) “‘‘ the perceptible form, etc., and their absence (in ice and air) arise from contact with special causes,’ and these special causes are the various kinds of merits in the person gratified by the cold air or 66."
of Sindilya. 43
cognitions as ‘I have faith in (such a person),’ ‘I am devoted (to him),’ etc., just as is the case with such cognitions as ‘I know,’ ‘I wish,’ etc.; still its ‘purity,’—7.e. its being charac- terized by very strong impressions,—cannot be ascertained by direct consciousness, any more than the authoritativeness of knowledge can.! Therefore it can be ascertained only by cer- tain observed signs,? ‘as we see in common life.’ Just as ‘in common life’ the greater or less degrees of affection must be inferred from the way that the person is affected at discourse concerning the loved object, etc., as by horripilation, tears, or other signs of emotion, so it is here.
But. not only are there ‘signs’ as in common life, but these signs have been abundantly defined in the authoritative tra- ditions (smriti) of the great sages; so the author declares as follows:
And we learn from the Smritis such signs in abundance, as respect, honour, joy, forlornness, doubt as to any other olyect, celebra- tion of his praise, continuing to live for his sake, consider- ing everything as his, regarding him as being in all things, resignation to his will, ete. (44).
i. ‘Respect,’ as that shown by Arjuna (Mahabh. Drona parva, 1. 2822), “The righteous winner of wealth, in whatever posture he may be, never fails to rise up before Krishna, with faith and affection.”’
ii. ‘Honour,’ as that of Ikshw4ku (Nrisimha Pur. xxv. 22), “Through his fondness for his name, and for the deer and lotus
1 The Prabhfkara school of the Mim4ms4 hold that knowledge is an object of internal perception, and its correctness (or authoritativeness, prdmdnya) is cognised by the same act of cognition as the knowledge itself. There is 1. the perception of the object, ४.९. ‘this is a jar;’ 2. the consciousness of this perception, ६.९. ‘I perceive the jar;’ 3. simultaneously with (2) the cognition of the truth of the perception. The Ny&ya holds that the three steps are successive, and the last is gained by infer- ence, not by direct consciousness. If it were gained by direct consciousness, there could be no such thing as doubt.
2 The Sansk. Coll. MS. reads च्मुत- for WTA- in p. 29, 1. 17.
44 The Aphorisms
which resembled him, the king showed honour even to the cloud which was of the same [blue] colour [as Krishna ].”
iii. ‘Joy’ as that of Vidura (Mah4bh. Udyoga P. lxxxviii.) ; “The joy which I feel because of thy coming, O lotus-eyed, why should it be told to thee? thou art the inmost soul of all embodied beings.”’
iv. ‘Forlornness,’ as that of the milkmaids (Vishnu Pur. V. xvii), “It is not possible for us to speak before our parents,— what can I say? What can our parents do for us burned with the fire of absence ?”’
v. ‘Doubt as to any other object,’ as, for instance, the feeling of hindrance in the minds of the dwellers in Sweta- dwipa, even at the sight of the divine sage Narada! (Mahabh. Santi P. 1. 12888) ; or as that of Upamanyu (Mahdbh. AnuSé- sana P. 1. 7077), “At Sankara’s command I would be even a worm or a grasshopper; but I desire not even the three worlds, if given, Indra, by thee.”’
vi. ‘Celebration of his praise,’ as that by Yama (Nrisimha P. vi. 21), “The guilty one, tormented in hell, was thus addressed. by Yama, ‘Why is not the god KeSava, the destroyer of sorrow, worshipped by thee ?’”’
Or, again, (Vishnu P. III. vii.), ‘Having seen his emissary with noose in hand, Yama thus whispers in his ear, ‘Spare those who take refuge in Madhusidana; I am lord of other men, but not of Vaishnavas.’”’
vu. ‘Continuing to live for his sake,’ as in Hanumat’s case (Ramayana, Utt. Kanda, cvii.), “As long as thy purifying story shall circulate through the world, so long will I remain on the earth, obeying thy command.”’
1 Narada goes to S’wetadwipa, a region inhabited by intense monotheists who worship only Vishnu. The god shows himself to him and then bids him at once depart to his home: “ These my votaries, filled with faith in me, ceasing from their five senses and from food, and brilliant as the moon, would fain fix all their thoughts on me; let there be no hindrance to their wish.”
of Séndilya. 45
Or as in the continuance in life of Narada and others, though they had accomplished all their ends, solely for the sake of adoring him. Hence we have that passage of Sruti (Nrisimha- tapani, vi.), “He whom all the gods worship desiring liberation, and the reciters of the Veda.”’
vi. ‘Considering everything as his,’ as in the case of the Vasu Uparichara (Mah4bh. Santi P. cccxxxvii.), “ His kingdom, and his wealth, his wife and his chariot,—he regards them always as all belonging to Bhagavat.”’
ix. ‘Regarding him as being in all things,’ as in the well- known case of Prahlada; as for instance his words (Vishnu P. I. xix.), ‘Thus an unwavering love for all beings is to be cherished by those sages who know that Hari is all things.”
x. ‘Resignation to his will,’ as of Bhishma, even when Bhagavat approached to kill him (Mahabh. Bhishma P. lviii.), “Come, lord of the gods, home of the world,—adoration to thee, bearing in thy hand bow, club, and sword,—slay me by force, O ruler of the world, from thy chariot, O thou refuge of living beings in battle.’’!
By the word ‘etc.’ we are also referred to the actions of Uddhava, Akrira, etc.2 Although this has been already men- tioned in Aphorism 6, ‘It is an affection from its being the opposite of hatred,’ still there 18. 8 distinction between the two places, as there the intention was to give a sign to denote the presence of affection, while here it is to give a sign of the purity of faith.
“But do we not see hatred, jealousy, etc., felt by those who are devotedly attached to their lord towards those who ex- perience a greater degree of his favour; why then should not these also be considered as signs?”’ He replies,
1 I have followed in the last line the reading of the Calcutta printed text, as that given in the S’andilya Comm. seems to be corrupt.
2 Uddhava was Krishna's cousin, see Wilson’s Vishnu 2, (Hall’s ed. vol. iv. p. 113); Akréra was Krishna’s uncle on the father’s side,
46 The Aphorisms
But hatred, etc., are not so. (45).
Ie. from their incompatibility, as has been said by the venerable Dwaipfyana (Mahabh. Anisana P. cxlix.),
“Neither anger, nor envy, nor greed, nor impure thoughts belong to the sanctified ones who are devoted to Purushottama.”
While in the case of Sigupdla there is the following suc- cession to be traced ; from hatred arose continual remembrance, from that came the highest faith, and from that liberation.
“These ‘signs,’ however, are chiefly mentioned in the Smriti as having been produced in reference to Vishnu’s Avataras, but this faith of yours should have reference to the Supreme since it springs from the knowledge of Brahman.”
He declares the true view.
From the implied remainder of the sentence this [ faith] ts also directed towards manifestations [as in an avatdra]. (46).
This highest faith may also have as its object an avatdéra itself,! as is seen ‘from the implied remainder of the sentence.’ [He proceeds to explain this.] It is said (Gita, vil. 23),
“‘The worshippers of the gods go to the gods, those who have faith in me go likewise to 106."
Here, in order to enforce the main point, there is an implied meaning of censure of the faith directed towards other deities. Therefore, in the passage (vu. 21),
“Whatever form any one devoted wishes to worship with
faith, to him I make that very faith unwavering ;”’ as the sense would have been complete, if the words had run ‘‘whatever (deity) any one, etc.,’’ we infer, from the addition of the word ‘form,’ that the real meaning must be that this faith has as its object the avatara itself [and thus refers to Vishnu’s own assumed forms]. The entire topic is faith.
1 T take déman in prddurbhdvdtman as meaning ‘ itself;’ but it might mean ‘ the soul manifested in an avatdra.’ Cf. 1. 13, and p. 37, 1. 10
of Sandilya. 47
From revelation we learn that there is no further birth to him who knows (His) births and actions. (47).
His ‘ births,’—7.e. Bhagavat’s assuming a body for the per- formance of those effects to which a body is indispensable, as being visible to his votaries, slaying the demons, producing the Veda, etc. His ‘actions,’ ४.८. his producing the Veda, etc. To him who knows these aright, [this knowledge] leads to immunity from all future births; as He himself declares (Git4, iv. 9),
^^ My birth and my action are divine ; whosoever knows thus in truth, he, on abandoning the body, is born no more, but goes to me, Arjuna.”
Not that immortality is the direct fruit of this knowledge of His births and actions ; but, by abolishing the foulness of that mind which is fixed on these, it produces the highest faith having for its object the supreme YFéwara as conditioned by these avatdras, and so leads to the immunity from all future births. Therefore we maintain that Revelation itself allows that the being who assumes an avatdéra may be the object of the highest faith.
And these are divine from their being produced solely by his own power. (48).
What does the ‘divine’ character mean in those words of the Gita just quoted, “my birth and my action are divine”? It cannot mean that they are produced by reason of previous merit, because there is in him no contact with merit, as ‘consequences of actions’ are not proved to belong to him. Nor can it mean their being produced in heaven, because then the character would not apply, when (as in the case of Krishna) the birth is in the world of our earth. Rather it means that here there is no making use of any gross material cause as in the case of the ordinary body; but it is all [directly] produced by his own may4 power. Hence we have those words of Bha- gavat to Narada in the ‘ Liberation’ book [of the Mahabharata, eccxhi. ],
48 The Aphorisms
“ All this is a mayé created by me, that thou seest me at all, Narada.”’ And so too in the Gité (iv. 6),
“Though myself unborn, of an eternal nature, and lord of all beings, yet making use of my subject Nature, I am born from seon to seon.”
Nor is the circumstance that his body is not composed of the gross elements any bar to its being a body,—since its being composed of the gross elements is only necessary so far as it is to be the seat of the enjoyment of the fruits of former actions [and these, as we just now said, are out of the question in regard to Krishna]. If you say that its being such a seat of enjoyment is essential to the idea of a body,—I reply that it is simpler to hold that the true idea of a body is its being the seat of voluntary effort. Effort is a particular species of the genus ‘action’; for we must not say that effort is the same as action, or we should have to apply the term to the forced movements of a dead body [under the influence of magic].! Nor may we say that effort is action produced by direct volition,—because then it would follow that we ought to apply such a phrase as ‘it makes an effort’ to a pot, since all acts [as of a pot’s boiling its contents] are produced by the direct volition of YFéwara. Now the same argument which proves Féwara to have a body establishes the efforts produced by that body, and so the dis- cussion may rest here.
Nor does it follow that, if we thus grant the existence of such a body for Krishna, we must raise the number of principles or ‘primary existences’ [to 27 instead of 26, as this body will be quite 5५४ generis; | because it will not be a ‘principle’ at all, any more than a common effect is, as a pot, etc.,—since neither of them acts as the material cause of any external object which
1 Cf. the scene of the old witch and her slain son in the sixth book of Heliodorus’ Zithiopica; or kriyd may mean such actions as the dead body’s falling to the ground, etc. I prefer this to taking mritasarira-kriyd as ‘the last offices paid to a dead body,’ which would simply be a quibble on the word kriyd.
of Séndilya. 49
helps to make up the visible world ; nor again does it act as the material cause of the senses.!
“‘ But how does He act, as He has no object to move Him ?” He replies,
Lis chief object indeed is compassion. (49),
In common life we apply the term ‘compassionate’ to those who exert themselves for the disinterested? removal of others’ sorrow. But this is not the highest application of the word, since these persons are not entirely disinterested in their action, as they may act in order to avoid the pain caused by their sense of pity or in order to attain subsequent merit. Nor, again, would its highest application be right in the case of any one who merely acts to remove others’ sorrow,’ since we do not apply it to one who has ulterior objects in view by so doing, as e.g. gaining wealth, etc. But the compassion of Bhagavat is com- passion in its highest sense, when He disinterestedly abolishes others’ woe. For His sake we use the term ‘compassionate’ in only a secondary sense, when we apply it to those who aim at other objects. Hence we say that men act from their feeling
1 §’4ndilya holds that Kyishna is really a form of the Supreme Brahman (see Comm. on Aph. 52); but his body is not a separate primary principle (tattwa) from the acknowledged 26 of the Vedanta, as it is not a tattwa at all. The 26 tattwas are divided first into two great classes, as intelligent (chit) and non-intelli- gent (aehit). The former includes Fgwara and the individual soul, the second all the rest. But the second is in turn similarly divided into general (vydpaka) and special (vydpya); the special are the five elements, the five tanm4tras and the eleven senses and organs; the general are matter (४.९, Iswara’s m&y& power), intellect and egoism (see Comm. on Aph. 87). The special spring from the general, as their material cause; and in turn themselves produce all the different individual existences (as pots, etc.) in the world. But the divine body of Krishna 18 not like the special tattwas, as nothing in the gross world springs from it; nor can it be like the general tattwas, because these are the material cause of the elements, senses, organs, etc., but this divine body is not the material cause of anything. (Cf. the Tattwa-kaumudi in its Comm. on Sankhya-karik4, aphorism 3, where it is shown that such effects, as pots, etc. cannot be called ८५८८५८८5.)
2 Perhaps nirupddhi in p. 35, 1. 3, should be corrected to nirupadhs ^ genuine,’ ‹ guileless ;’ mérupadht however means pretty much the same thing, ^ unconditioned,’ ‘ disinterested.’
9 i.e. omitting the word ‘ disinterested’ from our previous definition.
- 4
50 | The Aphorisms
of compassion, having regard at the same time to the merit which the action will produce.
“But might we not say that, as all pre-eminent manifesta- tions of power are said in the Gité to be forms of Bhagavat (according to the line, ‘know me to be also amongst men the king,’ etc., Gita, x. 27), liberation might also follow from faith directed towards a king, etcP” He replies,
Tt is not directed towards pre-eminent manifestations of power, because they have to do with the vital airs. (50).
The highest form of faith is directed only to a Being ` unassociated with the individual soul; but when faith! is directed towards such beings as kings and others, who are connected with the vital airs, etc., which are the disguisers of the individual soul, it cannot have liberation as its fruit.
And because of the prohibition of gambling and the king’s service. (51).
We read in the Dharmasastras that gambling and the king’s service are both prohibited ;* but this would not be so, if the king were [the same as] the Supreme Being [and so a proper object for faith |.
Tf you say ‘this also apphes to Vadsudeva,’—no, because he ts the real form (of Brahman). (52).
«But when the Sruti speaks of these pre-eminent manifesta- tions of power, does it not mention among them ‘I am Vasudeva among the Vrishnis’ (Gita, x. 37), and therefore [as the manifes- tation as Vasudeva here only runs parallel to that as a king, etc., in x. 27, | it would follow that the manifestation as Vasudeva is no more to be an object of faith than the others?” We can- not admit this, because the Supreme Brahman is really in the form of Krishna; as Pardsara says (Vishnu Pur. IV. xi.),
1 In p. 35, 1. 15, read ATM: for TM. | 2 I do not know the exact verse here referred to, but the sentiment is found in Bohtlingk’s Indische Spriiche (2nd ed.), 2992, 2995,
of Sdndilya. 61
“If a man hears the line of the race of Yadu, he is delivered from all sins, that race in which the Supreme Brahman became incarnate as a man, under the name of Krishna.”
This would not be so, if Krishna were only an individual soul.
And from his recognition as such. (58).
We find in Sruti a distinct recognition of the son of Vasudeva as the Supreme Brahman, as (in the Narayana Upanishad, Atharva Siras, vi.)?
“The son of Devaki is related to Brahman, the destroyer of
Madhu is related to Brahman ; “There is one form of the Supreme Brahman belonging to Narayana, pervading all beings, existing as the cause (of all), itself uncaused.”” And this same recognition is also found in Smriti, as in the words to Yudhishthira, uttered by Mar- kandeya, who had had ocular experience of a mundane destruc- tion? (Mahébh. Vana Parva, clxxxix.),
“That god who was beheld by me of old, having eyes long as a lotus-petal, is now, O tiger of men, thine own relation, Jandrdana.”
So too (Mah4bh. Sénti P. cccxlv.) Janamejaya says, after hear- ing that Bhagavat is not to be seen even by force of penances,
‘‘He who is not to be seen even by force of penances, Bhagavat worshipped by the world,—him they have seen visibly manifested, adorned with the Srivatsa mark.”
The ‘and’ in the Aphorism implies that another reason is found in the fact that the Smriti expressly mentions a reward to those who are devoted to him.
‘¢ How then is it that we find Vasudeva himself enumerated among the pre-eminent manifestations of power [as in the Gita, x. 87 |?” He replies, |
That is to be explained by his superiority among the Vrishnis. (54) In such passages as ‘I am Vishnu among the Adityas,
1 Compare Weber, Indische Stud. ii. p. 54. 2 He is called Sapta-kalpdnta-jivanah, ‘living through seven won-destructions.”
52 | The Aphorisms
(Gita, x. 21) this mention of him among the pre-eminent manifestations of power is simply to show that Parameswara has the superiority amongst them; and so too this similar mention of Vasudeva (in x. 37) is simply intended to show that he is the superior among the Vrishnis.
And 80 too with regard to other well-known [similar manifesta- tions]. (68).
In the same way we are to infer that faith will produce liberation as its fruit, when it is directed towards the boar, man-lion, dwarf, Rama, and other avatdras, which are well known to possess, like the Vasudeva avatdra, the signs of the supreme Brahman. Or the aphorism may mean that we are to understand a similar meaning of mere superiority over the other pre-eminent manifestations of power, which are well known to possess the signs of the Supreme Brahman, as e.g. ‘I am also Sankara among the Rudras,” etc. It is said in the SkAnda Purdéna (Kasi-khanda, 1. § 27),
“He who would declare that there is any distinction between Vishnu and Rudra or between Sri and Gauri,—that utterance of that erring fool is blamed by the Séstra.”
The fact that Sankara is well known to possess the signs of Brahman, is abundantly to be recognized as taught in the Smriti, etc.
Thus ends the first daily portion of the second Chapter of the Commentary on the Hundred Aphorisms of’ SAndilya, composed. by the most learned teacher Swapneswara.
The two manifest aids to faith, knowledge and devout concen- tration (yoga), have been discussed ; the author now proceeds to: discuss the inferior forms of faith, which have final bliss attached to them in an indirect way, inasmuch as they destroy the sin which would hinder its attainment.
of Sandilya. 53
Since ‘bhajana’ is summed up in ‘bhakti,’ the lower’ form exists Jor the higher as it 1s a means to its production. (56).
The Git&, after praising the highest form of faith as set forth in the seventh chapter, by the line (ix. 13),
“‘ Having known me as the imperishable, the first of beings, they worship me (bhajanti) with undiverted minds; ”’ proceeds to notice [the inferior forms] in the next couplet,
“ Always reciting my names and striving, firm in their vow,
And paying homage with faith (bhakti), they serve me, per-
petually devoted ; ”’
and after that (in ch. ix. 29) we have the summing up of the whole subject in the words,
“‘But they who worship me (dhajanti) with faith (bhakti), are in me and [ in them
Now with regard to this passage, just as the Mim&msakas explain the text “let him sacrifice with chitrd” (Taitt. Samh. 11. 4, 6),? so here we must take it as meaning, “ let him produce the desired fruit by worship (dhqjana), which is expressed by the term bhakti,” and in this way the fruit [bliss,] and the habit of mind [worship,] will be both found residing in the same subject. [If you ask why the author of the Git& used the word bhakti when he meant bkajana, we reply that] the word bhakti came ready to the author’s hand as having been already used of the habit of mind towards Bhagavat in such
' Tread गौणी for गौखा with the Sankerit Coll. Library MS.
2 This alludes to a Mimfms& discussion on the text ‘‘let him who desires cattle, sacrifice with the chttrd.” A discussion is raised (Ny&ya-m4l4-vistara, 1. 4. 3) as to the meaning of chitrd,—is it merely the name of a sacrifice, so called from the six various objects, honey, ghee, etc., offered in it; or does it mean the spotted she-goat which is the Agnishomiya victim? The Mimfms& decides that chitrd here means the name of the sacrifice ; as in this way the desired fruit (cattle) and the prescribed means (the chitrd sacrifice) will both belong to (or reside in) the same subject, the offerer. If it had meant the spotted she-goat used as a victim in the Agnishomfya sacrifice, then in the words “let him who desires cattle sacrifice with the spotted she-goat,” the fruit would have belonged to the sacrificer, but the spotted she-goat would have been a characteristic of the sacrifice, and belonged to it, and thus we should have had vatyadhtkaranya.
54 The Aphorisms
passages as “he who has faith in one (ekabhaktih) is pre- eminent’? (vii. 17); and moreover bhakti and bhajana are originally synonymous [being similar derivatives from the root bhay |.
We must not say that the highest form of bhakti is here enjoined as producing the fruit of supreme bliss,—because we have already seen in Aphorism 7 that the highest form of faith cannot be thus enjoined by rule, as it is not to be pro- duced by a mere effort of human will. Nor again can we say, that the fact of its being a cause of supreme bliss was before unknown and is now first definitely declared in the Gité,— because this fact had been already declared in the seventh chapter by the words “they who have faith in me go likewise to me.” The true view 18 rather that these ceremonial repetitions of a deity’s names, etc., were originally only brought in with a view to show that they were means for removing the hin- drances to the highest faith; but afterwards the word bigkti in the instrumental case was applied to them in a secondary sense [in ix. 14], and thus they were enjoined as themselves means to produce the highest faith. We are thus led to the closing passage (in 1x. 29), “They are in me and I am in them,” asa ‘persuasive enforcement,’ giving the purpose of this injunction (arthavdda).—Otherwise we should have had to divide the sen- tence, and to read it, “by bhakti they attain bhajana, and by this they dwell in me.”
As such acts as repeating a deity’s names, etc., are a means for producing faith in the worshipper’s soul, the word ‘ bhakti’ is used here in a secondary sense which is easily understood from the literal one, just as in the Vaidic phrase “ghee verily is life’? [where the real meaning is not that ghee is literally itself ‘ life,’ but that it is a great means for prolonging it]. Or the word bhakti may be applied to these ceremonies, as meaning that they are instruments of worship, ४.९. “he is worshipped by these things” (bhajyate ebhih); just as the word udbhid [is ap- plied to a particular kind of sacrifice, as well as to a shovel,
of Sdndilya. 55
from its etymological meaning udbhidyate pasuphalam anena ‘the desired fruit, sc. cattle, is dug up by 2.7] 1 Or the term may be used. from our reading in the Gita of the various grades of worship, “four several kinds of men worship me”’ (vii. 16),—so that the term itself implies ‘ varieties’ as the term ‘creation’ does. Or it may be a secondary sense of the term as characterized by the vague and less discriminating attribute ‘ noble-minded,’ since we read in the Gita (vii. 18) “ all these are noble-minded, but the knower I hold as myself.”
And since the other [inferior forms of faith] are associated with the recitation of the god’s names as tending to stir up affection. (57).
It is said in the Gita (xi. 36), | “Well is the world, 0 lord of the senses, delighted and filled with love at thy praises.”
Here we have it directly affirmed that the recital of the deity’s ` names is for the purpose of stirring up feelings of affection.— “Since they are associated with it,” all the other observances which are mentioned with ‘recitation’ in the Gité (ix. 14, etc.) —‘‘always reciting my names and striving firm in their vow,” etc.—will also have as their end the production of affection [1.¢. faith | in the soul.
But the inferior forms are mentioned in the interval; and they are also alluded to in the Vedic references to objects of adoration, from the very fact that they are found in the Brahma- kdnda. (58).
The inferior forms of faith which are mentioned in the Gité between the two aforesaid passages, ‘ Having known me as the imperishable, the first of beings, they worship me with un- diverted minds” (ix. 18), and ‘“‘ But they who worship me with faith are in me and I in them” (ix. 29),—are really subsidiary to the highest faith, being included as by nippers between two
1 Dr. Ballantyne, in his edition of the text, gives a reference here to Aswalfyana’s
S’rauta-sitras ; but the true reference is rather to the derivation of udbhid suggested in the Mimamsa, compare Jaiminiya-Nyfya-m4l4-vistara, 1. 4. 2.
56 The Aphorisms
distinct mentions of this highest faith. Thus we read (in ix. 14, 15, 22, 25-28) as follows,
“ Always reciting my names and striving firm in their vow, and paying homage with faith, they serve me perpetually devoted. And others serve me, sacrificing with the sacrifice of knowledge,’ and worshipping me in unity or in plurality, or as facing every way in many guises.”
“They who serve and think on me, with their minds fixed on nought besides,—to them, ever devoted to me, I bring sure bliss.”’
‘Those devoted to the gods go to the gods, those devoted to the ancestors go to the ancestors, those who sacrifice to goblins go to the goblins, and those also who sacrifice to me go tome. He who gives to me with faith a leaf, a flower, a fruit, or water,—I eat it from him pure-souled as offered in faith. Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou offerest, whatever thou givest, whatever penance thou under- goest, O son of Kunti,—give it all over to me. Thus shalt thou be delivered from all good or evil consequences, caused by works,”’
Here ‘recitation’ means repeating the deity’s names; and worldly ‘striving’ also to attain faith is likewise mentioned with it, as the subject-matter is the different subsidiary helps to faith. ‘Firmness in their vow,’ t.e. their performing through faith in me such ceremonial observances as the fasting on the eleventh lunar day,' etc. ‘Paying homage’ (namaskdra), i.e. the performance of such ceremonies as the raising the hands to the head in token of self-abasement. The ‘sacrifice of knowledge’ is twofold, the superior and the inferior, as directed respectively to unity or plurality. The ‘thinking on Him alone’ is the contemplation and continual remembrance of Him. ‘Sacrifice’
1 «¢ Every eleventh lunar day is held in extravagant veneration by the Hindus, but more particularly by the Vaishnavas. Fasting on the eleventh day is declared to be equally efficacious with a thousand aswamedhas, and eating during its continuance as
heinous a sin as parricide or the murder of a spiritual teacher.’-—Wilson’s Essays on the Religions of the Hindus, vol. 11. p. 204.
of Sandilya. 57
is worship directed to Bhagavat, and the giving of leaves, etc., and so, too, the giving over of all enjoined or forbidden actions to the Supreme Lord.
These, however, are not the only subordinate helps; for other means to produce faith are hidden! in such passages about worship as that of the Chhéndogya Upanishad (iii. 18), “let him adore the mind as Brahman,” or that of the Gitd (x. 21), “T am Vishnu among the Adityas,” etc. If you ask “why?” I answer that we are authorized to conclude so, because the whole of the Theosophical part of the Veda treats of faith or the means for its production in the soul.?
From these arises purification, as we see by the introduction of the subject. (59).
From these inferior forms of faith arises ‘purification,’ i.e. the removal of the sin which causes the foulness of the internal organ; this, however, is itself a means [not the end]. Why? because these inferior forms are mentioned in the Gita, after introducing the subject (in ix. 2) by the words “this is the best purifier.’ Purification is an indispensable means, since faith is a quality of the internal organ [ which is produced after purification has accomplished its preliminary work |.
Some infer a greater degree of fruit from this conjunction of the higher faith with these. (60).
Some teachers hold that the joint mention of the higher faith in connexion with these inferior forms, as the recitation of names, etc., in such passages as “‘he who offers to me with faith,” (ix. 26), “paying homage to me with faith” (ix. 14), etc.,—as it is certain from the context, etc., that these latter forms must hold a subordinate position,—can only be in order to show that there is a higher degree of fruit to those who, having exercised their faith, also practise these lower observances.
1 Literally ‘swallowed up by.’
3 Or as it was said in the Commentary on Aphorism 26, ‘ faith is the end of the
brahma-k4nda.’ $ Compare pp. 47, 52, supra.
58 The Aphorisms
Jaimini thinks that it ts only as a name, from the possibility. (61).
But the teacher Jaimini! (as the fact of these forms being inferior is certain) thinks that the same explanation holds here which holds in regard to the Vedic injunction “ let him who is using a spell against an enemy sacrifice with the $yena.”’ [Now it is shown in the Aphorisms of the Mim4msa that éyena does not mean there ‘a hawk,’ but is the special name of the ceremony ; 9 and so Jaimini maintains that] the word ‘faith’ is only used in this passage of the Gita in a sub- ordinate way as a special name for the actions described, and thus the passage means “let him secure the highest faith by the [so-called special] faith, ‘repeating the deity’s names,’ and by the [so-called special] faith ^ giving’”—since in this way we have the possibility of their all referring to the same sub- ject; and thus it will have no reference to any fruit of its own, which would only introduce a needless complication.
Here these subordinate means are to be performed according to time and opportunity, as in building a house, etc. (62)
Now three alternatives present themselves. The repetition of names, paying homage, and the other aforementioned ob- servances, may be either performed simultaneously, or any one singly, or all in order. But we cannot accept the first alter- native, because then we should have the whole failing, if any one observance were left unperformed; nor can we accept the second, because if there were thus an unlimited option, it would involve their all having one and the same use; and the third alternative will not suit the meaning of the text; and again, when one observance was performed, it would seem unnecessary trouble to perform the next. And therefore the primé facie con- clusion is that these different observances cause mutual confusion by each intruding into the province of the others.
1 Ts this an adaptation of Jaimini’s doctrine (in Sut. i. 4. 6) ; or does it refer to a modern writer of that name ?
2 So called from its suddenly destructive effects on the enemy 3 ६.८. they will be all alike instances of the lower faith, sc. means to the higher
of Sdndilya. 59
‘But the true conclusion is that all these observances are alike means [to produce faith], since all have authority for their being followed. But there is no necessity for the simultaneous performance of all, from the absence of any authority for it; those only need to be practised simultaneously, the simultaneous use of which is commanded in the Sruti, as perfumes, flowers, incense, lamps, oblations, etc. All the other observances may be performed according to time and opportunity, as in the making of a house, etc.; ४.९. just as men bring the various materials for a house, as the thatch, pillars, etc., sometimes all at once and sometimes in succession ; and it does not follow, however they may be brought, that the thatch, etc., cease to be means for the desired end. Therefore whatever sin each ob- servance is specially suited to destroy, let it be performed for that purpose; and thus all having respectively shown their various efficacy, the highest faith will be eventually produced in the soul; and so it is declared in the Gité (vii. 19),
“At the end of many births he who has knowledge attains
me.”’
From pleasing the Supreme Lord even one may be effectual. (68).
Among these inferior means any one may become powerful by special practice, and this even by itself may produce pleasure in the Supreme Lord and so avail to cause the highest faith ; just as we see that an earthly lord is not pleased by his other attendants with all their many careless services, but may be pleased by even one attendant with a simple act of sham- pooing performed with hearty zeal. The highest faith may be attained, through the favour of Bhagavat, by even one of these inferior means, as repetition of names, etc., resolutely carried out; as we read in the Gita (xvi. 57),
“ Devoting thyself to concentration of thought, fix thy mind on me; he whose mind is fixed on me will, by my favour, cross over all difficulties.”
So too any particular one may have a peculiar efficacy derived
60 The Aphorisms
from a certain time, etc., as it is said in such passages as the following [in the Brahma Puréna, ch. xcvii. 166],
५ What one obtains by meditation in the Krita, by sacrifices in the Treté, and by outward worship in the Dw4para, that one obtains in the Kali by merely reciting Kesava’s name.”’
Nor will the different means interfere with each other, since recitation of the deity’s names, and the other means, produce their respective influence by their own nature, in each indi- vidual case where faith is to be powerfully excited.
Is the purification [spoken of in Aphorism 59] the means [for obtaining the highest faith] in the case of all who are occupied with the recitation of names, etc., or is something else the means in the case of some? He replies:
That absence of bondage, which belongs to surrendering works, 1s the true means, (64).
The true means [for attaining the highest faith] is that absence of all bondage consisting in a cessation from all con- sequences, which arises in the case of those who have sur- rendered all their good and evil works to Bhagavat. As we read [in the Gita, ix. 28],
“Thus thou shalt be delivered from good and evil conse-
quences, caused. by works.” And there is a formula for this surrender of our works in another Purana,
“ Whatever I do, good or evil, with or without my will
That being all surrendered to thee, I do it as impelled by thee.”
Nor would it follow in this way that a man might do as he pleased, under the pretence of acting as thus impelled by Him; because the absence of doing evil is really one part of this divine impulsion. And so the Smriti, “A man could not be devoted to sin, while depending on strength derived from the Veda.”” Therefore we say that this ‘purification’ must have for its object something other than doing evil. Now good deeds
of Séndilya. 61
are to be understood as meaning the necessary and occasional observances! prescribed by one’s period of life (A’srama). The world of Brahma, etc., is the reward attained by the due observance of the duties of one’s dsrama, and the very attain- ment of this reward would delay the summum bonum, libera- tion ; and therefore this and the like are called ‘bondage’ in the Aphorism. But when all is surrendered to Brahman, it is well known that it is a means to liberation. Thus, too, there is an absence of consequences when the voluntary works engaged in through desire of fruit, or evil works engaged in through ignorance, are afterwards surrendered [to Brahman].
But here we must consider a distinction in these subordinate forms of faith. Thus, for instance, we find a description like that [in the Chhéndogya Upanishad, i. 6], “That golden male who 18 seen within the sun, with golden beard and golden hair,”’ etc.; and so too [in the Narada-pancharatra, xi. 71.],
“He is ever to be meditated on who resides within the orb of , the sun, Narayana, seated on his lotus seat; crest-bearing, wearing bracelets and makara earrings, decked with a string of pearls, golden-formed, and carrying a conch and discus.”
Is meditation to be restricted to these [special manifestations | or is it to be extended to the complete [formless] manifestations of the divine nature, as given in other srutis? The prima facie answer which suggests itself is that it is restricted by the sruti’s mentioning the definite nature of the object to be thus meditated upon ; but the following Aphorism supplies the true answer.
1 Ceremonial works are of three kinds, ‘ constant,’ ‘ occasional,’ and ‘ voluntary.’ The ‘ constant’ are those continually enjoined through a Brahman’s life, as the daily and fortnightly offerings; the ‘ occasional’ are enjoined on certain occasions, as recovery from sickness, an eclipse, etc.; the ‘voluntary’ are directed to some special end, as ‘let him who desires heaven offer the jyotishtoma.’ It is generally held that the first two are positive duties and cannot be omitted without sin; but their performance does not produce bondage by causing merit in the offerer. The ‘ voluntary’ offerings necessitate a future reward, and as they thus produce bondage, they should be avoided by the devotee. S’&andilya, however, holds that even ‘con- stant’ and ‘ occasional’ works, as well as ‘voluntary,’ produce ‘ merit,’ and so tend to cause bondage, unless they are surrendered in faith to Iswara.
62 The Aphorisms
But the [apparent] restriction of the meditation is given because of the easiness of a visible object. (65).
The reason why the Sruti mentions a particular object for one’s meditation is in order to present the mind with some visible object, as the mind might become distracted by a variety of objects. Therefore its mention is to be considered as arising only because of the greater easiness,—as there might be the risk of an option and other difficulties, if the meditation were directed only to the unseen. Therefore the rule will be different in regard to different passages of Sruti. Hence we see that without some such definite mention the fruit of medi- tation would have been hard to obtain in the case of the milkmaids and Sigupdla, ete.
Ihe root ‘yaj’ there means worship ; not so tn the other sacrifices. (66).
“In the Gita (ix. 25) it is said ‘those also who sacrifice to me (mad-ydjinah) go to me;’ does the root yqaj, used here, refer to the well-known jyotishtoma and other offerings, or does it mean ‘worship’?’’ We answer,—vyq/ is used here only in the sense of ‘worship.’ How is this known? By such injunctions as “let him worship Vishnu,” etc., necessary and voluntary worship is already expressly enjoined with reference to Vishnu; and the Gité only enjoins this ‘worship’ here as a subsidiary part of the highest faith,’ and does not itself expressly enjoin that it ‘should be performed with a reference to Vishnu.? But in the case of the other offerings [i.e. the jyotishtoma, etc.] we do not find any express declaration that they are directed to Vishnu; in fact, in that case, we should be forced to divide the sentence of the Gita, [‘‘those who sacrifice to me, go to me,”] into two
1 This refers to the Comm. on Aph. 58, where vv. 14-28 (Git, § ix.) are con- sidered to refer to the ancillary forms of worship included (as ‘ between nippers”’) between vv. 13 and 29, which describe the higher form
ॐ T read in p. 45, 1. 3, na for tena, as this is the reading of both MSS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library
of Sandilya. 63
distinct declarations, viz. one to establish that these sacrifices were directed to Vishnu at all, the other that they were related to faith.‘ Well then, [if an offering’s connexion with Vishnu is what gives it this relation], let us hold that there is this connexion with faith in such a special and voluntary offering as that prescribed in the text, ‘he offers an oblation of milk and butter to the wide-stepping Vishnu.’”! We concede this in part ;—but the example you give is an imperfect one, since voluntary oblations [which are offered with a certain definite end] have properly no reference to any farther end when that immediate end 18 obtained; and I would rather exemplify this connexion with faith by the case of those constant daily offerings which the very fact of living makes obligatory [apart from any accidental desires, such as might prompt voluntary offer- ings]; since there is nothing to hinder this view,? and, inas- much as they are constant, they are always at hand.
Hence in the Mokshadharma section of the Mahabharata, we read, in the censure of acts of worship accompanied with injury to living beings (Mahdbh. SAnti P. celxvi.),3 |
“The righteous-souled Manu prescribed avoidance of injury in all ceremonial works; it is because men are filled with [unnecessary | desires that they slaughter the cattle outside the Vedi. They alone who know Vishnu worship him rightly, with offerings of milk and flowers; thus is his worship pre- scribed in the smriti.”’
Now follow three sections (adhikaranas) arising from the topic of piyd as just discussed.
1 This is some passage, describing an offering made to Vishnu under a particular manifestation, and for some particular desired object. Although in the indicative mood, it appears to be considered as an imperative injunction, compare the Mim&ms& discussion, Taitt. Samh. vol. i. p. 34.
2 These constant offerings have no expressly declared fruit, and therefore naturally look forward to some such transcendental fruit as that declared in the line from the - ७1४4.
3 This is part of the speech of King Vichaknu, on seeing oxen slaughtered at a great sacrifice.
4 See Aitareya Brahmana, ii. 11.
64 The Aphorisms
But the “water of his feet”? means water for washing the feet, as otherwise it would not apply to all cases. (67).
a. The following passage occurs in Smriti (Nrisimha Purana, § 59),
“Those sacred waters of Ganges, Prayiga, Gaya, Pushkara, and Naimisha, and those of Karujdngala and Yamuna, only cleanse sinners after a lapse of time; but the water of Bhagavat’s feet cleanses immediately.”’
Now does this “water of Bhagavat’s feet’? mean water actually connected with his feet, or water poured on the feet of his adopted representative (as an idol or priest)? The “ water of his feet’? means only “water for washing the feet ’’ [1.e. we name it from its object, but we do not undertake to prove that it has actually been in contact with his feet]. Why? Because otherwise it would not apply to some cases which ought to be included. Thus we may at once declare that no direct con- nexion is possible between the water and Bhagavat; nor can it be by means of a personal descent of the deity, because this too cannot be [immediately] present to the performer of the cere- mony. And again, even if we maintained that the difficulty was met by the actual connexion between the water and the feet of the consecrated image which receives the worship, still this would not hold in the case where an unconsecrated image is brought in for worship; nor again would it apply in the case of the Sélagrém Ammonites, etc., since these have no feet at all. So in order to help the passage to apply to all these cases, let the expression be held to mean only “water for washing the feet,” as otherwise we should have to invent all kinds of very distant connexions which might be supposed to exist between the image, etc. [and the deity].
What 18 given by the worshipper himself may also be taken by him, since there is no difference. (68).
6. The offered eatables, the flowers left at an offering, etc., which were given in worship to Bhagavat, are to be given to
of Sdndilya. 65
the Satwatas, as enjoined by the passage, “what is sacred to Vishnu is for the Sétwatas,”.! etc. ; now as the word Satwata applies equally to both, they may be also taken by the votary himself [as well as Krishna’s other votaries], ६.९. they may be appropriated to his own use by eating [as the food], or by holding [as the flowers]. If he himself takes them, the final ceremony? is fulfilled. But all trickery in religious rites is to be avoided. Therefore, just as the purod4ga cake, which was presented to Agni, etc., is afterwards given away, in the con- cluding ceremony, in accordance with the words of the in- junction, “he cuts the offering to Agni Swishtakrit from the upper half; the four priests, with the institutor as the fifth, eat the cake,”—so here too the same thing is done because of the words of the injunction ; otherwise one could not give it even to the Satwatas, as it is property belonging to another.
If you rejoin that “he gives it to the Satwatas from the injunction,” I reply that there is nothing in the words of the injunction to exclude one’s self. Nor may you retort, “But then you might argue in the same way that, when it is said ‘let him give to the brahmans,’ he may give to himself as he too is a brahman ; ’’—because the very essence of giving is that while your own right of property in the thing is destroyed, another’s right is constituted.® But we are not to apply this rule in the case of the concluding ceremony mentioned above, because we see that the institutor is expressly named in the in- junction as a sharer; that 18, the ceremony establishes his right, just as buying does. And so, if there are no other Satwatas to benefit by the offerings, the rule is to be prevented from remaining inoperative, by himself taking them.
And the same principle is also to be understood when he
1 S&twata originally means a prince of the Satwats, and is applied to Krishna; it afterwards means a devoted follower of Krishna.
2 Called pratipatti in the ritual treatises; 8.6. the final disposal of what is left at the end of the rite, cf. Jaiminiya Nyfya M. V. iii. 4. 21.
2 I read पर् स्वलापादन० for पर स्वलापाद्ान्० in p. 46, 1. 3 infra (cf. last line), (cf. Jaiminiya Nyfya M. V. iv. 2. 12).
5
66 The Aphorisms
takes the water for washing the feet, etc., which he had himself presented. The line in the Gita (iii. 12), ‘He is verily a thief, who eats things given by the gods, not having first given them to them,” is to be explained as bearing out our view, for, as the agent is the same in the two clauses, so we must understand the object to be the same, as his supposed right of ownership is destroyed! [by the fact of the things having been previously given by him]; since the negation with the in- declinable participle [apraddya—‘not having first given’ | necessarily requires to be construed as applying to the same object as the verb ‘he eats,—as there is no reason for sup- posing that ‘ things given by the gods’ could mean in the next clause things of a similar [तपत् > [and not those very things]. Therefore we must hold that even what is presented to the gods may be used by the offerer if there is nothing to hinder it.
We must determine as to the different offences, by having regard to their occasion and character® (69).
८. We find that [in the Varéha Purana, § 124], in the passage beginning with the line, “Thirty-two offences in divine worship are enumerated,” thirty-two offences and their several expia- tions are laid down. Now the question arises: is the avoidance of all offences a part of the worship, or is the avoidance of some of them a part of the worship and of some of them an end in itself? We find it said in reference to this point [ Varaha P. 28. |,
“Whatever man worships me with a flower improper for the
rite, I will declare that man’s fall [into hell]; hear it, O earth.”
1 mada seems irrelevant. My pandit proposes व्कान्तांभे
2 ६.९. he quotes this verse of the @{४ as bearing out his own view, since he explains it as meaning that the offerer is to offer first, and then to use himself those very same things which he has offered. The two interpretations differ, inasmuch as
one explains it ‘not having first given similar things to the gods,’ the other ‘ not having first given them to the gods.’ |
3 In Aph. 69 read निमित्तगृणव्यपे्णात्. The 2 in the printed text is a misprint, as the @ is the reading of Dr. Ballantyne’s own MS. as well as that in the Sansk. Coll. Lib,
of Sandilya. | 67
Here as improper flowers are positively forbidden, their avoidance can form no part of the worship. If, however, they are offered by a mistake in the course of the celebration of the ceremony, there is an expiation which has reference to that particular ‘ occasion.” But—[Varaha P. id.] ^ When any one offers me incense, without having given me perfume and garlands,”’—as here there is an offence committed against the proper order of the worship, and as this very order is a part of the worship, we must consider its expiation also as a part too, since we thereby avoid the worship’s becoming defective ; [and we thus have regard to the ‘character’ of the offence. | But when it is said [Vardha P. 18. | without any form of worship being mentioned, ‘But whoever approaches me, not having chewed a twig,” etc., here it is clear that the avoidance of this offence is an end in itself as leading to happiness. Thus we determine the relative position of the different offences in regard to worship.—
[After this digression respecting these three incidental questions, he now returns to his main subject. |
It being thus established that worship is connected with faith, the passage (Gité, 1x. 26), “He who gives me with faith a leaf, flower, fruit, or water, I eat it from him pure- souled as offered with faith,” declares that all gifts directed to Bhagavat are subordinate parts of faith. He proceeds to explain this in the next Aphorism ;
The giving of a‘ leaf, etc., [in the Gitd is enjoined as a part of faith ; | 1 otherwise the gift would be limited. (70).
There is a well-known passage,
‘¢ Whatever is most desired in the world, whatever else is loved at home,—that is all to be given to the discus-holding god of gods, to please him.”
Now the passage in the Gita really enjoins that the gift of
1 I supply as the rest of the sentence after patrdder dinam, HAAG AAT वि- धीयते
68 The Aphorisms
everything to Bhagavat, already enjoined by this and other such passages, is a subordinate part of faith; otherwise, if the Git& passage were the primary authority for giving, the gift would have to be limited to the four things especially named. If it be suggested that these four things may be definitely en- joined here [to supplement the general but vague injunction already given elsewhere],—we reply that in that case there ought to have been four separate sentences! [and not one, as at present]. Therefore the passage from the Git& properly only re-enforces the gift already enjoined, and then itself enjoins that this gift is a subordinate part of faith, just as the Vedic passage [Taitt. Samh. ii. 5. 11], ‘he wears his cord over his left shoulder,’ which mode of wearing it is the general one [and already enjoined by the Smriti], has itself an enjoining force, inasmuch as it enjoins this mode of wearing it at that particular time as a subordinate part of the general whole, ६.५. the great sacrifice at the new moon.
1 There is a favourite principle in the एक Mim4ms6, that several different characteristic circumstances cannot be enjoined in one sentence in regard to a thing which is already enjoined by a previous rule, as this would involve the fault called Vakyabheda,—they must be broken up and mentioned separately. Thus when it is said (see p. 53, supra), “let him who desires cattle sacrifice with the chtérd,’”’ the opponent suggests that chitrd is not here the name of 8 sacrifice, but means ‘a spotted she-goat,’ and thus only gives two special characteristics of sex and colour which the animal, already enjoined by other passages but unspecified, is to possess. This is rejected on the ground that, as the sacrifice is one already enjoined, these two qualities could not be combined in one word ०११८१८४) but must have been given as separate sentences (see Nyfya 7818 V. 1. 4. 3. cf. Taitt. Samh. Comm. ii. 4. 6).
2 This also refers to several discussions of the Mimams4 (866 Taitt. Samh. Comm. vol. ii. p. 665, vol. i. p. 33). The injunction in question occurs in the 11th chapter in Taitt. Samh. ii. 5. Now the whole of the 5th section is devoted to the New-moon sacrifice; in the 7th and 8th ch. we have the Sdmidhent hymns; in the 9th the Nivtd sentences, and in the 10th some voluntary Sdmidhenis. The Mim&ms& discussion shows that the injunction about the cord is not to be considered a part of the sdmidhents nor of the nivids, but of the general topic of the book, the New-moon sacrifice. The discussion in vol. i. p. 34, showed that the sentence ^ he wears his cord” is a definite injunction (vidhé), although it is expressed in the indicative, not the imperative mood; and though in itself it is prdpta, (४.९. previously enjoined as the ordinary mode of wearing the cord (by the Smriti and Smarta-sttras) it is also an injunction, as it authoritatively declares that the act of so wearing it is here a part of the New-moon sacrifice.
of Sdndilya. 69
These various forms of faith are the chief things, since they spring Jrom previous good works, and are causes of the highest Jaith. (71).
These various forms of faith are the chief things in all ceremonial actions, because they tend to produce the highest faith, and because they are themselves produced by the other religious acts. Thus it is said (Gita, iv. 10, 11),
“‘ Many, being purified by knowledge and asceticism, have attained to faith in me;! and in what measure they turn to me, in that measure I show my favour to them.”
Again, it is said elsewhere,
“Do not fishes dwell in the [holy] water of Ganges? The flocks of birds dwell in the home of the gods [the sky]. Being destitute of faith, they receive no benefit from a place of pil- grimage or the most sacred temple.”
So, too,? in the line (Gita, vii. 16),
“Four classes of men, all having done good works, worship
me with faith, Arjuna ;
as their respective degrees of faith thus spring from previous
good works, faith in any of its degrees is superior to them [as
being their fruit and end]. Hence we conclude that, as we said before, this whole discussion of ours belongs to a Mim4ms4 of Faith, not a Mimémsé of works.®
“But may we not say that those who have faith cannot be divided into a higher and lower class; because if they could be, how could Bhagavat speak of them as all standing on the same level, when he says (0118, vii. 16),
‘Four classes of men, all having done good works, worship
me with faith, Arjuna ; He who is distressed, he who desires knowledge, he who desires happiness, and he who knows, O hero.’ ”
1 Swapneswara expressly takes madbhdavam as meaning here madbhaktim; but other commentators more rightly understand it as “have attained to identity with 116."
2 For (at in p. 48, last line, read तथा. 3 Cf. Comm. on Aphorism 26.
70 The Aphorisms The author replies in the following Aphorism,
The three are subordinate, and their association with the other 18 to give them honour. (72).
Three of these forms of faith are subordinate, and the Sruti’s mentioning them in conjunction with the principal one is only to give honour to them by associating them with it, just as we see that ministers are mentioned together with the king. And thus the faith of ‘the distressed’ means the remembering (Krishna), repeating his names, etc., for the sake of destroying sin, deliverance from calamity, etc. The faith of ‘him who desires knowledge’ is the performance of sacrifices, etc., for the sake of knowledge. [This is one kind. But again] as it is said [in the Brihad Aranyaka,| ‘‘Him the Brahmans desire to comprehend by studying the Veda, by sacrifice, charity, asceticism, and fasting,” so we read [in the Gita, xviii. 46],
“Having worshipped him by his own proper works, a man
attains perfection ;” and again [in the Vishnu Purana, III. vii. 20],
‘Him who never deviates from the duties of his caste,—who looks with equal mind on himself, or his friend, or his adver- sary,—who takes nothing from another, and smites none down, —him, fixed in mind, know to be Vishnu’s faithful worshipper.”
We see by such passages that the faith called the desire of knowledge also consists in the performance for the sake of knowledge of the duties of one’s own caste and order, the pre- scribed repetition of the Veda, etc. The faith which is called ‘the desire of happiness’ is also of two kinds,—the one before described which is carried out for the sake of the highest faith, and the other that which consists in repeating the divine names, etc., and is performed for the sake of sovereignty, heaven, etc. As it is said [in the Vishnu Purdna, ITI. viii. 6],
‘When Vishnu is pleased, a man obtains all terrestrial en- joyments,—a supreme place and one to be praised even by the
of Sandilya. 71
dwellers in heaven,!—yea, and even final liberation? which 18 best of all.”
Here final liberation is attained by means of the highest faith, and therefore this form of faith, which we call ‘a desire for happiness,’ may have as its end this highest faith, since this exactly agrees with those words of the Gita (ix. 19),
“Whosoever worship me with faith, they are in me, and I in
them.”
And as for what is said in the Bhagavata (VII. v. 22, 23),
“To hear and repeat the names of Vishnu, to remember them, to serve his feet, to honour him, to shew him reverence, to do service as his slave, to love him as a friend, and to sur- render oneself to him,—if this ninefold faith be yielded by a man to Vishnu, [that I consider the best lesson, }” these must be distributed according to circumstances among those divisions of ours. And there is no real fault in these arti- ficial characteristics, even although the subject-matter of each should not be always kept distinct.
‘But if repeating the divine names, and the like, were called [in Aph. 58] subordinate parts of faith, how can they now be considered as principal by being associated with the so-called faith of ‘distress,’ etc.P’? To meet this, we have the next Aphorism.
Both may be included and also external, as the Aveshti and the Brihaspati-offering. (73).
Remembering and reciting the divine names, etc., inasmuch as they are subordinate parts of the highest faith, are included in it; but inasmuch as Sruti mentions another independent fruit arising from them, [beside the one arising from the highest faith], they may be separated from it and regarded as outside; just as in the Mim&msé discussions the expiatory
1 The Commentary to the Vishnu P. explains this as meaning the world of Brahmé, ete. 2 Nirvana in the original,
72 The Aphorisms
ceremony called aveshti,! although included in the Réjastya sacrifice, may still be regarded as a principal rite [and not ancillary], from its being.connected with an independent fruit of its own, and so may be severed from that sacrifice. Or just as the Brihaspati offering, which is sometimes a principal rite, 18 properly ancillary to the Vajapeya sacrifice.? This distinction entirely depends on whether there is authority in the Sruti for it or ०0६.
So too it 18 said,
“If, when men are performing some rite, anything fails in the sacrifice, it will be supplied by remembering Vishnu; thus saith the Sruti.”
By this passage we see that all ceremonial rites can be occa- sionally performed as subordinate [to faith in Vishnu, and ` dependent on it for their success, however they may in their ordinary relation occupy the principal place]. Thus there is nothing inconsistent in the supposition that these actions [recit- ing the divine names, etc.] may be in themselves subordinate parts of the highest faith and yet be principal in relation to the fruit of heaven which they will produce.
A particular distinction is now examined in ‘the faith of distress.’
Remembering, reciting, hearing or telling the history, etc. [are in- cluded | tn the ‘faith of distress,’ because they have the nature of expiation. (74).
Remembering and reciting the divine names, hearing or telling Bhagavat’s history, acts of homage, etc., are properly included in the faith of the ‘distressed,’ since they are de- scribed as producing the cancelling of such and such sins to
1 This ceremony is described in Taitt. Samh. I. viii. 19, and Sayana in his Comm. quotes the Mim&msé& discussion. Cf. Jaiminiya Nyfya M. प्र, xi. 4. 3. 2 This ceremony is to be performed by one who wishes to become a family priest, as Brihaspati was to the gods; it is described in the Taitt. Brahmana, II. vii. 1. The Sansk. Coll. MS. takes this line as a new Satra and not as part of the
Commentary, and reads प्रमाद् for WaATa-, thus connecting it with what follows and not with what precedes,
of Sdndilya. 73
those who are suffering the pain of hell caused by those sins. Thus we read [in the Vishnu Purdna, IT. vi. 32, 33],
*‘ Arduous expiations for great sins, trifling ones for minor offences, have been propounded, O Maitreya, by Swa4yambhuva and others. But whatever be the expiatory acts, whether penances, deeds of charity, or the like,—to remember Krishna is superior to them all ;”
Again [ibid. VI. vii.],
“That repetition of his name with faith, Maitreya, which is the best consumer of all sins, as fire is of metals.”
So too [Mahabh. xii. § 345],
“To visit all hermitages, to bathe in all places of pilgrimage, confers not such blessings, 0 Sauti, as. the history of Narayana. Men become purified in body, when they have heard this holy history from the beginning,—whose subject is Narayana, and which abolishes all sin,” etc. |
Therefore it is quite proper that these should be included under the so-called faith of ‘ distress.’
Tf you object that the more difficult expiations will not be practised, we reply that from their including a pertod only ending in death,’ the lesser expiations [such as repetition of the divine names, etc.| must be ranked among the great expiations. (75).
An objector may here say, “ All this may be true, but it is clear, from the opposite being contrary to reason, that all these passages only refer to very small sins; otherwise all those penances which involve considerable pain would have so far lost their authoritativeness that no one would practise them.” To this however we demur; since these supposed minor ex- piations really involve more pain, because they are described as including a period only ending at death.
Thus we read (Vishnu Pur. IT. vi. 29),
‘Therefore, O sage, the man who remembers Vishnu day and
1 I would read WTWTAY for आ्राप्रयाणं.
74 The Aphorisms
night, being purified and having all his sins abolished, never goes to hell.”
Such a passage means that this habit is to continue as long as life continues, and end only with that; since the beginning and the end agree [in being undefined and therefore contemporary with life]. For no time is specified for the beginning; if it had been, we might have been led to suppose, from the contra- diction to this, that the end also could have a different meaning [from that which is its obvious one, and imply a fixed time too |. And thus, as both kinds of expiation are alike in the amount of pain which they involve, we need not suppose that the other kinds of penance will become, as our objector fears, unauthori- tative and cease to be practised. The passage (in the Vishnu Pur. IT. vi. 35),
“At morning and night, sunset and noon, remembering
Vishnu,’ which divides the worship into different fixed periods [and so might seem to contradict our view], is really only a repetition (anuvdda).
Nor is this expiation which we are advocating only suited for one who is repenting for some act of sin. As for the passage (in the Vishnu P. idid.),
“Whosoever having committed sin, feels repentance, his
best expiation 18 one remembrance of Har ;” since this is a reiteration (anuvdda) of the necessity of repent- ance as a part of every expiation, the word ‘one’ must also be a reiteration of that comparative disregard of all other ex- piations which the whole argument of the previous passage had already established. Otherwise the two parts of the sentence would have to be divided and the objects of each would be special and not the same! Therefore also the passages pre-
1 8.८. the first part clearly declares what had been already enjoined (४.५. that re- pentance is necessary in every expiation), and it is therefore an anuvdda; and the second part must also be an anuvdda, unless we are to suppose that the two parts of the sentence (although connected by yat and tat) are different, the one being an anu- vdda or simple reiteration and the other an arthavdda.
of Sandilya. 75
viously quoted [sc. Vishnu Pur. II. vi. 33, etc.] will similarly not be arthavddas but anuvddas,' as they also are severally in- volved in the same construction of the relative and its corre- sponding demonstrative [which unite the two clauses indis- solubly |.
Hence we read elsewhere [Vishnu Pur. III. vii. 34, 35],
‘“Yama’s attendants, their staves and bonds, Yama himself and his tortures, are powerless against him whose soul is always dependent on 688९४. Let him at all times and in all places repeat the names of the discus-armed one; no impurity is found in him, for He is the purifier.”
This and other similar passages declare that the remembrance of Vishnu should be continual.
[This, however, is not the whole truth, as the next Aphorism will declare. | :
Even a little act in the case of the faithful worshipper destroys great sins, because of the abandonment of everything else. (76.)
‘Even a little act,’ as once remembering or repeating Bhaga- vat’s name, etc., ^ will destroy,’ i.e. obliterate, ^ great sins,’ since in the case of the faithful worshipper there is the full idea of ‘abandonment,’ ४.९. of giving up all other modes of expiation. As it is said in the Gita (xviii. 66),
“ Abandoning all religious acts, fly to me as thy one refuge ; I will deliver thee from all sins, sorrow not.”
1 The arthavdda is properly a persuasive enforcement of a previous injunction; it gives the purpose of the injunction, and illustrates its power by positive or negative examples. Thus there is an arthavdda for the Sarvaytt sacrifice (Tandya Br. xvi. 7. 2), ^ Verily by the sarvajit the gods conquered all, it is for the attainment of all, for the conquest of all; by this a man attains all, conquers all.” The anuvdda is the reiteration or re-inculcation of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself. Thus, after the injunction the is to offer the agnthotra,’ we have an anuvdda ‘he offers it with curds’ (this is a gundnuvdda); or, again, we have an injunction ‘let him who desires prosperity offer a white goat to Vayu,’ followed by the anuvdda ‘the wind (Vayu) is the swiftest of gods’ (Taitt. Samh. iii. 4. 3), this is a stutyarthdnuvdda. Later writers (as Laugfkshi, etc.) make the anuvdda one of the three kinds of arthavdda, This later view has probably produced a var. lect. in the Sansk. Coll. MS., which reads in p. 53, 1, 1) anuvdddrthavddatwam for anuvddatwdn-ndrthavddatwam.
76 The Aphorisms
Here the meaning cannot be that the sin spoken of is the pre- vious abandonment of all ‘voluntary’ religious acts; for there is no sin in abandoning such religious acts [as they need not be performed unless by some one who desires the result which they are to produce], and so what sin would there be from which Bhagavat was to deliver his votary? ^ Well,—but suppose that it is other kinds of sin [arising from the neglect of positive duty] which are to be destroyed,—as it might well happen that the desire to escape the acquisition of merit [and the consequent necessity of future births in order to enjoy its reward] might have caused him to abandon voluntary religious acts.” Still we cannot allow that the passage refers to the sin arising from the previous abandonment of ‘necessary’ or of ‘occasional’ religious acts,—because, if there is a positive and authoritative command for their abandonment, no sin will accrue from the act, what then will be the need of deliverance? And if you say that there is no such command, we demur, as the very text quoted from the Gité contains such an injunction, and conse- quently the act commanded will not produce sin. If you reply that “the words ‘ having abandoned all religious acts’ are clearly meant as a description by anuvada of the sannyasin [who has already done so by his profession, and not from this injunction |, and therefore the passage refers to him’’—I answer, No,' for the smriti lays down certain expiations for sanny4sins, as that in the case of unchastity, etc.,? and your interpretation would give them an option [between these and faith], and your old fear would thus be actually realised [see supra, Aph. 76, | that the practice of severe acts of asceticism would be given up. Nor can you allege that in the case of sannydésins these sins must be abolished by continual repetition of the deity’s names [which was shown above to be equal to any single act of penance, however heavy, |—for we see by such lines as the following:
` 1 Sis often omitted after a purvapaksha as here, cf. Muir, Sansk. Texts, iii. p. 61 2 See some of the expiations for an avakirnin in Gautama’s Institutes, xxiii, 17 xxv., but the sanny&sin is not mentioned there
of Sdndilya. 77
“Even though filled with a great sin, if he meditates on — Vishnu for the twinkling of an eye, The ascetic becomes again the purifier even of those who purify the company in which they dwell,” that [in his case also] ‘a little act’ destroys great sins. And besides we have no right to introduce the idea of the sannydsin into the aphorism, as there is no mention in the context of that order of life (d8rama). Therefore just as in ordinary life, if any one were to promise to another, saying, “leaving all others, follow me and I will put an end to thy troubles,” we should naturally understand that this implied the abandoning of all other means to abolish those troubles,—so too here the words of Bhagavat imply a similar abandonment of all other means to abolish sin. And if we read the whole chapter in its connexion with this one verse, even if this latter does seem to a certain degree to enjoin the sanny4ésin’s mode of life, we shall see that such cannot be its real object, as the general subject and the con- text are of greater importance in determining the sense of a passage.! And in this very chapter such lines as that (él. 2), “‘By sannydsa the seers understand the abandonment of all voluntary religious acts,” distinctly speak of an abandonment of voluntary religious acts, not of the sannyasin order; and thus he alone who has resolved to abandon all other modes of expiation and desires to escape from his distress by repeating the names of Bhagavat only, can lay claim to the promises attached even to the single mention of his name. Nor can these various objections be simultane- ously alleged against our view, for they really relate to different persons, [and therefore do not lend each other any mutual support |.
Nor are the more difficult expiations here left unperformed through any fear of the trouble which they would involve; for such passages as (Gita, xviii. 8),
“Whatever religious act he leaves unperformed through
1 Cf. note on Aph. 15.
78 The Aphorisms
fear of bodily trouble, saying ‘it is a pain to me,’ that abandonment only springs from the principle of passion, and he will not gain the fruit of true abandonment,”
clearly teach that such abandonment as this is to be avoided.
And such passages as that in the Vishnu Purfna [VI. vii. 21],
“The very terrible sin of men in the Kali age which gives them the pain of hell, is at once abolished by his name being once repeated,’’ etc., distinctly refer to the privileges [ of the faithful man |.
So too such passages as that in the Gita (ix. 30, 31),
“Even if a man of very wicked life worships me with un- divided worship, he is to be esteemed virtuous, for he has resolved aright. Speedily does he become. holy, he attains eternal rest; be assured, O son of Kunti, my votary never perishes ;”’
And again that in the Nrisimha-purana (viii. 28. 29),
“The inhabitants of hell [in their agony] cried out ‘O Krishna,’ ‘O Krishna,’ ‘O Narasimha;’ thus was Vishnu men- tioned with faith by those in hell, and all the infernal pains of those great-souled ones were destroyed,” clearly declare the privileges of faith. Here ‘recitation’ merely means the bare mention of the name, and there is no binding rule that 16 must be in the vocative case.
There is no need of the adjuncts of other expiations, because it stands in their place, like the post of the threshing-floor. (77).
When it is said in the Vishnu-purana (II. vi. 34),
‘“‘But his best expiation 18 one remembrance of Hari,”’ the direct mention of the name [expiation] does not imply the need of the usual adjuncts of other expiations,—‘ because it stands in their place,’ 2.९. because it is enjoined in the place of all other expiations. Just as, when it is said (in Aéwaléyana’s Srauta-sitras, ix. 7), “the post of the threshing- floor is the sacrificial post,” the rule enjoins that the post of
of Séndilya. 79
the threshing-floor is to be used for the sacrificial post in tying up the victim, but it does not follow that the substituted post must have eight corners,’ etc., which characterise the true sacrificial post,—so here there is no need of such usual ad- juncts of other expiations as cutting the nails, hair, etc.
But we must not say on the other hand that the recitation of Krishna’s names is the only true expiation (prdyaschitta)? because it abolishes sin; for we see by the couplet [of Angiras’ Smriti |,
“‘¢Penance’ is called prayas, chitta means ‘certainty ;’ Prd- yaschitta it is therefore called in tradition as combined with penance and certainty,’’? that the word prdyaschitta primarily applies to some form of penance and is only secondarily used of other things [as, for instance, of the recitation in question |.
Since the right to appropriate the subsidiary means‘ is de- termined by the right to appropriate the principal end [faith | which they serve,—we have next to examine who has the right to practise the faith which we have been discussing.
All, down even to the despised castes, are capable of learning it at second-hand, like the great common truths. (78).
‘All are capable’ of practising faith, ‘down even to the despised castes,’ such as Chandalas, etc.,—because there is no distinction in the universal desire to lay aside the misery of mundane existence. If any one objects, “how can this right belong to others than the three twice-born castes, since they have no right to read the Veda?” our author answers ‘at second-hand.’ Following the principle laid down in the Mimémsé Sitras (i. 1. 2), ‘Duty is a thing recognised by the instigatory character (of the passage of Sruti which mentions
1 Cf, Taitt. Samhité, vol. 1. p. 487.
2 In p. 56, last line, read prdyaéchittatwam with the Sanskrit Coll. MS. _ $ We must read tapo-nischaya-samyuktam in the second line. The gloka is quoted in the S’abda-kalpa-druma.
५ Sc. the inferior forms of faith (as repeating the divine names, etc.), see Aph. 58.
80 The Aphorisms
it),’ and also that in the Veddnta Sitras (i. 1. 3), ‘(God’s ex- istence is known) from the Séstra being the source of our knowledge,’—we do not dispute that transcendental things can only be learned directly from Sruti. But knowledge based upon the Sruti may be still indirectly produced in women, Sudras, and others, by means of legends, purdnas,! etc., and in Chandalas, ete., by such mediate teaching as is in accordance with the Smriti and immemorial good custom, just as they learn the great common truths of not injuring living beings, etc. Otherwise it would follow that even a knowledge of these latter would not be found in them.
Hence even those who have not attained perfection [are capable of it] in His world. (79).
Since all men alike are capable of it, those in whom the highest faith has not attained perfection in this world, are said in the Smriti to practise the various means to attain it in Swetadwipa, the world of Bhagavat. Thus we read how they there practise the means to attain the highest faith [in the Mahabharata, S4ntiparvan, ccexxxvill. 12778-12792], in the passage commencing,
“To the north of the ocean of milk lies the splendid Sweta- dwipa; there live men bright as the moon, intent on Nérdyana, filed with the idea of absolute Unity,—these are devoted to Purushottama,”’ and ending,
“Then those men quickly ran up together, folding their hands full of joy and uttering shouts of praise; then I heard a great shout as they spoke,*—lo! an offering is presented by them to that deity.”’
Therefore all have a right to this doctrine of faith; and hence it has been said in the Vedanta Sutras (I. iii. 26), “ Bada-
1 This refers to the well-known passage of Smriti so often quoted by Hindu mediseval commentators, “the three Vedas are not to be heard by women, S’udras and merely nominal Braéhmans,—therefore the Bharata story was made by the sage (४९88४) through pity.”
° fe वदतां Bombay od. for विवदतां
of Sdndilya. ; 81 rayana [allows a right to study Vedanta doctrines] even to beings above man, since they too may need them.”
He now introduces, as a digression, the question, “how is it that Bhagavat’s world is not for those who have attained
perfection ?”’
But [the afore-mentioned one is the true interpretation], as in this way the single stage and the successive stages are accounted Jor. (80).
The “but” is added to meet the doubt which has been suggested. The N&rdyaniya section of the Sdnti Parvan of the Mahébharata (xii. § 346), after beginning with the line “Those who are exceedingly sinless in the world, delivered from merit and demerit,” goes on to describe their successive entrance, by the door of the solar orb, into the bodies of Aniruddha, Pradyumna, and Samkarshana;! and then it de- clares, «^ But those who have their minds intently fixed in con- templation, who are self-restrained, and sense-subdued, filled with the idea of absolute Unity, enter the son of Vasudeva.”
Such is the description of the successive stages; but it is said afterwards (ibid. § 350),
“But they, whose every acquired desert has been already consumed as fuel in the world, and who are delivered from all merit or demerit—their destination has been thus declared by thee, as they pass by these intermediate stages; and in this fourth stage they arrive at the highest sphere. But verily this doctrine of absolute Unity is the best of all and dear to NAré-
1 ¢¢ Those who are exceedingly sinless in the world, delivered from merit and de- merit,—to them as they go on their happy journey, O best of the twice-born, the sun who dispels darkness in all the world is declared the door; their bodies being con- sumed by the sun, being invisible by any one anywhere, having become atomic, they verily enter that deity; released from him, they then enter into the body of Ani- ruddha, and having become pure mind they enter into Pradyumna, and released from Pradyumna they enter the living Samkarshana, they the best of the twice-born, Sankhyas 4nd Bhigavatas. Then being freed from the three gunas, they quickly enter into the Supreme Spirit, the unconditioned Soul. Know thou that the son of Vasudeva is verily the Soul, the abode of शा. Then follows the couplet quoted in the text, ^ but those who have their minds, etc.”
6
82 The Aphorisms
yana, whereby they attain to the immortal Hari, without passing by the three preliminary stages.”’
Here we have the doctrine of one stage only declared as the end of those who possess perfect faith. Otherwise, [but for this distinction between perfect and imperfect faith, ] there would be a manifest contradiction between the two accounts. Therefore we conclude that the attainment of Bhagavat’s world (Sweta- dwipa) belongs to those whose faith is imperfect.
And from the remainder of the passage in the Smriti' relating to the soul’s departure. (81).
There is a passage in the Git, relating to the soul’s departure at death, beginning, ‘endowed with faith and strength of de- votion”’ (vill. 10), which says (viii. 18), “he who goes forth and abandons the body, pronouncing the syllable Om which is Brahman, and remembering me, he goes the highest way.” The remainder of the passage follows (in sl. 24) and declares the successive stages of the way by which the soul is to go,
“The fire, the light, the day, the waxing moon, the six months of the sun’s northern journey,—those who go forth by these, reach Brahman, as men who know Brahman.”’
So also in the remainder of the immediate context (as given in sl, 16),
८८.५1] worlds, Arjuna, up to the heaven of Brahman, admit of a return; but when a man reaches me, O son of Kunti, there is for him no other birth.”
Here by the mention at first of the different worlds, and then by the force of the preposition upa in mdm upetya, “when a man reaches me,” it 18 clearly implied that the attainment of the worlds near to Bhagavat 18 only for those whose faith is imperfect; but for him whose faith is perfect even such a reward as going to His world is not suited, because Ais reward _is of course imperishable, and we hear in Sruti that in his world they do not practise the means [for increasing faith, as
1 The Sansk. Coll. MS. omits the word कपूर in the Aphorism.
of Séndilya. 83
it is already perfect!]. And again, if it were established that imperfect faith could from that world certainly secure a gradual liberation, the injunction to remember Bhagavat’s name at the moment of death would be needless. Nor can we say that by dwelling in Bhagavat’s world the highest faith is superadded to the other; for we are taught clearly by that line of the Gité (viii. 22),
“This supreme Soul, O son of Prith4, is to be attained by
undeviating faith,”
that this faith is the means of liberation, independently of any other. Therefore all that we can concede is that even in the world of Bhagavat [as elsewhere] a soul has the power of attaining this highest faith. But birth in the favoured land of Bh4ratavarsha is only useful as being the indispensable con- dition for performing meritorious ceremonial works, as it is said in the Vishnu Purana (II. iii. 5),
“No where else are ceremonial acts enjoined to mortals.”’
But we have shown before that faith is not a ceremonial work [and is therefore independent of country]. If you rejoin that [by being born elsewhere] a man would still fail to obtain its indispensable conditions,—we answer that if the main end is allowed to be attainable, the necessary conditions and ad- juncts are thereby included, just like the adjunct [fire] of the sacrifice of a Nishd4da king? And again, 6६788, etc., are pro- hibited from ceremonies which arise out of Vedic hymns, but not from the appointed means of producing faith, such as re-
1 While these means are practised in S’wetadwipa, etc., ef. Comm. on Aphorism 79.
2 This refers to a Vedic passage quoted in K4tyay4na’s S'rauta-shtras, i, 1. 12, “ He whose subjects Rudra destroys, should offer a charu-oblation of Cotx barbata; let the priest cause the Nish4da king to offer this sacrifice.”’ The question is discussed in S‘abara’s Mimfms-bhashya (vi. 8. 20, 21), whether this offering should be made in a consecrated fire duly laid or in common fire. He decides that it should be ina common fire,—as fire is the adjunct of a ceremonial work, but the ceremony of duly laying it (ddhdna) is only an adjunct of fire, and though fire by an express Vedic in- junction isa mecessary adjunct of a ceremonial work, it is not so with the ddhdna ceremony, unless, as in the DargapGrnam4sa, it is expressly mentioned by the éruti, which is not the case in the present sacrifice.
84 The Aphorisms
membering and repeating Bhagavat’s name, etc. Since then it is clearly established that all classes have a right to practise faith, all idea that knowledge is an indispensable preliminary is improper
“Well then, let it be granted that even those who have committed great sins are competent to attain the highest faith —they will be similarly competent for the ancillary parts of knowledge, which is itself an ancillary part of faith,—these ancillary parts being the repetition of the text of the Veda, etc.”” He replies,
But the great sinners [are competent only] for the faith of distress. (82)
But those who have been devoted to sins which will lead to the soul’s falling into a lower state [as hell or an animal birth], are competent for the faith of distress only, just as they require expiations [cf. Aph. 74], and not for the other forms of faith ; since the abolition of those sins is more requisite for them than anything else, in accordance with such passages as this, ‘ enjoy- ing he would increase his sin,’ etc. When the sin is abolished, of course their competence for the highest faith is more firmly established than ever.
As the question naturally suggests itself from the considera- tion of the perfect soul, devoted to the Supreme, he next proceeds to dispel the demon-like doubt whether all religious duties are different from the highest faith or not.
This [highest faith | is the true identity with the Supreme, since this is recognised as the meaning of the Giittd. (88).
This highest faith is the true identity with the Supreme, and nothing else [7.e. the summum bonum of the soul;] since we hear in the Sruti! that this is distinctly recognised as the meaning of the Gité. Thus we read in the Nardyantya section
1 If Sravana is used correctly here, it would seem to imply that the term S’ruti can be applied to the Mah4bh4rata itself, and not merely to the Git& included in it.
of Sandilya. | 85
of the Santi book ‘of the Mah4bhérata [इ 350], that Janamejaya asks,
“Those bréhmans who, duly intent and practising all the injunctions, read the Vedas with the Upanishads, and those who follow the duties of the ascetics,—I know of a way better than theirs, the way of the absorbed monotheists ;! by what god or rishi has this religion been taught ?”
Vaisampaéyana answers,
_ “When the troops of the Kuru and Pandava hosts met in battle array, when Arjuna was full of despondency, this was sung by Bhagavat himself.” Therefore the highest faith [as described in the Gité] is identification with the Supreme.
“Still even the inferior forms may directly produce liberation, —what harm will it do, if you concede this?” He replies,
Only by producing the highest faith do all [lead to kberation] ; thus verily He saith. (84).
Only by producing the highest faith, do all [religious duties | become means to liberation. Thus verily saith Bhagavat adding at the same time the reason (Gita, xviii. 68),
५ Whosoever shall declare this most excellent mystery to my faithful votaries, he, having produced the highest faith in me, shall without doubt come to me.”
Now since it had been already established that the fruit of the teaching of this doctrine was the becoming identified with Brahman, why is it here added “having produced the highest faith in 6 ? Because the शप declares that this is the means to liberation. Therefore in the legend of the king Uparichara Vasu, when it is said (Mahabharata, xii. § 337), “His kingdom, his wealth, his wife and his chariot,—he always consecrated them, saying, ‘it all belongs to Bhagavat’;”’ this is given as a distinguishing sign of his faith, t.e. his intense affection for the Supreme Lord,—since it could not have been done simply for itself [but must have been a means to some
1 Ekdntin,
86 The Aphorisms
higher end]. Therefore, when the Sruti speaks of all religious duties as causes of liberation, we infer that it really means that they are helpful to produce liberation, inasmuch as they produce the highest form of faith. It is not possible that a religious duty could produce both [i.e. this faith and liberation too], because, being an action, it could not produce [such a transcen- dental end as| liberation; and therefore the injunction to per- form it must have reference to a visible effect [४.९ to one which arises in this present life, as the production of faith in the soul].
Thus ends the second daily portion of the second chapter of the Commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of S4ndilya, com- posed. by the most learned teacher Swapneswara.
of Sandilya. 87
THIRD CHAPTER.
Since the pre-eminence of faith arises from the pre-eminence of its object, and also because of the promised identity of the faithful worshipper with Him, He, the object of faith’s adora- tion, is now described.
The object of worship! is this Being without a second, since all is identical with Him. (85).
The certainty [7.e. the real existence] of the object depends on knowledge,—such is the conclusion of the SAstras; existence 18 knowledge.? But existence is not a genus, because genus does not exist in genus, etc.,3 nor even if it were would the desired connexion be established, from the cumbrousness of the process. Therefore the one existence, the supreme Brahman, who by himself pervades all things, is himself knowledge. In all visible things there is really identity with Him; even [the
1 The two Sansk. Coll. MSS. read dhajantyam for bhayantyena.
2 The commentary on the third chapter is mostly in verse; hence it is very ellip- tical and obscure. I have been obliged to supplement the text by copious notes, for which I gratefully acknowledge the assistance which I have received from Pandit Mahesa Chandra Nyfyaratna.
$ The Vedanta doctrine is that nothing exists but Brahman, and He is pure in- telligence; nothing else exists except so far as it is known as identical with Him. The Ny4ya, however, maintains that Existence is a summum genus, ‘as no genus except Existence, belongs to each and to all of the three categories of Substance, Quality, and Action’ [Ballantyne, Siddh. Mukt&v. p. 20]; it denies that there can be a genus of the three Categories, Genus, Difference, or Intimate Relation [cf. Ibid. p. 19], and holds that these Categories (with Non-existence) are not genera or classes (jdtt), but general characteristics (upddht). Our author maintains that existence is not a genus, and tries to establish it by a quibble,—‘ because of the non-existence of genus in genus’ [sc. if genus had a genus, then that genus would have its genus, and 80 on ad infinitum]. The opponent answers “I quite grant that genus cannot exist in genus by intimate relation; but suppose that it exists in it by the relation of identity.’’ Our author replies,—even so it would not help your view; you do not want this relation of identity which leads to no result, you really want the connexion to be that of intimate relation, which properly connects the genus or species with the classes or individuals in which it resides, and it is thts to which we stoutly demur.
88 The Aphorisms
apparent] diversity 18 found only in what depends on the real.! If you reply that, if this were true, we should conceive of a jar as ‘knowledge,’ just as we conceive that. ‘a jar is, —I reply that we do not thus conceive of a jar, viz. that it ts, since it does not present itself to our senses in any other than a transi- tory connexion.? [Again, the Naiy4yik objector supposes that] the causes of creation® are (i) God’s knowledge, embracing as its proper object the material cause which he has to act upon ; (ii) his desire to create; and (iii) his consequent effort of will; but if these three causes have to be assumed, together with the object on which they are to work, our supposition of one only cause is far more simple. This one Brahman whom we postulate as our cause, together with His object to work on, [viz. the material cause, Ignorance], is not a substratum of qualities,* because this is a cumbrous hypothesis; the suppo- sition, that he is a knower, etc., only arises, as in the parallel case of time,® through the disguising influence of a limitation imposed ab extra [1.e. it is our understanding, acting as a dis- guiser, which divides the one ever-flowing stream of time into
1 This is the only sense which I can give for the line as read in the printed text:
तदभदो दृश्मते दृश्चभेदस्तु GAT । The Sansk. Coll. MSS. read दृश्चति वस्तुसत्परे » which may perhaps mean, ‘‘identity with Him is seen in all visible things, as soon as they are viewed as depending entirely on the one only existing thing.”’
2 We see it only as yryvduevoy, not dv. The Pandit explained it ghatasya bhane ’pi na tatra satidripa-satyatwena ghatasya bhdnam, tad-ripena ghatasya anupasthiteh, paramtu vidyamanatwa-ripa-sattayd. The jar really only exists in Brahman and is therefore knowledge; but this relates to its transcendental state, not to its phenomenal state. |
$ The two Sansk. Coll. MSS. and the Oxford MS. read vishaya-jndna for vishaye jndna- in p. 62, 1. 2 ; and I have conjectured hetutd for hetund (though all the MSS. read the latter), as it offers a clearer sense. If we read Aetund, it must be taken in connexion with the hetutwe of line 3, and we have the same meaning, but more obscurely expressed.
4 He is not the possessor of knowledge, a desire to create, and will, as the Nyfya would maintain; he is himself pure knowledge. Cf. Zanche, de nat. Det, ^^ Hac est causa cur verius appelletur Deus vita quam vivens, sapientia quam sapiens, lux quam lucidus, atque ita de reliquis. Quamobrem? Quia seipso vivit, non per vitam; se ipso perque suam essentiam sapiens est, non per sapientiam aliquam que essentie divine sit addita ;” Cyprian, ep. 52, “‘ Unus 1116 et verus Pater, bonus, misericors, et pius; immo ipsa bonitag, misericordia, et pietas.”
5 In p. 62, 1. 5, I read (with Sansk. Coll. MS.) Adlasyevopddhi- for kdlavedyopddhi-,
+
of Séndilya. 89
definite portions, as minutes, days, months, years, etc.; and similarly our imperfection conditions God as knowing, wishing, and willing |
His Mayé-power (is known) from the totality of the non-intelligent creation. (86).
‘His,’ t.e. Brahman’s, almighty power is Maya (or Illusion), —as is declared in the Gita (vii. 14),
“Verily this my Méy4-power, consisting of the three quali- ties, is hard to be overpassed; they only who come to me (with faith) cross over this Méya;”
And again, (ix. 10),
“Through me as its superintendent nature brings forth the universe; for this reason, O son of Kunti, the world revolves in its round of change
But this Divine power is called May4,! from the marvelldus- ness of its effects, not from their unreality, since Sruti declares the existence of Brahman expressly to prove the existence of his effect, the world ;? and to assume the falseness of the latter would be improper, as it would involve the non-reality of its cause. If you reply that “the characteristic mark of falseness is its being abolished by the knowledge of reality,”’ we still demur, for if, as you ४ 60871808 hold, the world’s very falseness is itself false, its truth [or reality] is only more firmly established ;* and if, on the other hand, you hold that its [inferred] falseness is true, the truth of what is presented by our senses seems to be estab- lished [since perception is a superior test to inference]. And again, since things which are utterly unreal cannot be illumined, the very fact that the inanimate world has to be illumined by
1 Our author takes mdyd in its old sense of ‘ ausserordentliches Vermégen, Wunder- kraft,’ as it is used in the Rigveda, see the St. Petersb. Dict. sud v.
‡ As in the Chhandogya Upanishad, ९५ Verily in the beginning this was existent, one only, without a second” (vi. 1), and “ He whose will is truth’’ (iii. 14).
$ One of the cardinal tenets of the Ved&nta is that the ignorance which causes the world, is itself false as being imagined by ignorance; but if so, the falsity of a falsity 18 truth, as minus into minus gives plus
90 The Aphorisms
soul,’ proves that it is true; for the supposed manifestation of a non-existing snake in a rope is really only a case of mistake, [not a creation of ignorance]; for it is an acknowledged rule in all other things except undeveloped Nature, [¢.e. in all creation,* | that their reality or unreality depends on their being capable or not of being contradicted [or falsified] by a more authorita- tive judgment. This Mayé is the totality of the non-intelli- gent creation, and as it is capable of being known, it must be real, otherwise a universal rule would be at once contradicted ;5 therefore Brahman, the pure Intelligence, and the unintelligent Creation are both real.®
And from the identity of the special categories with [their material causes| the general. (87).
Thus, too, we see that the special categories’ arise from the general, and the general are held to be the material causes of the special because they are identical with them [as the cause
1 Cf. Ved4nta-sara, p. 16, “all the inanimate world (४.०. the non-Soul) from the ‘son’ up to the ^ void,’ has to be illumined by Intelligence (i.e. Soul).”
2 Anyathdkhydti ‘mistake’ is the Naiy&yik explanation,—the mistaken spectator erroneously transfers the idea of the snake which he had actually seen elsewhere, to the rope now before him; the Vedantin, on the other hand, holds that a snake is then and there actually produced,—only as it belongs to the class of ‘apparent’ things (prdtibhdstka) and not ‘practical’ (vydeahdrika), we get rid of it by applying to it that contradiction which the world of practical life supplies. The two views are beautifully contrasted in the Vedanta-paribhsh4, p. 10, ll. 13-16.
3 Prakriti being imperceptible and therefore not capable of being thus falsified
bddha).
+ पृ lh houses, etc., really exist, because no superior evidence ‘ 9187068 ' them and precludes their reality; but the objects seen in dreams, the snake seen in a rope, etc., are falsified and precluded by waking sight or by closer inspection. I follow the readings here of the two Sansk. Coll. MSS
अन्यत्र सदसत्त्वाभ्यां बाधा बाधव्यवश्ितेः। सा माया जडसामान्यं Wet तु नित्यमेव तत् ॥ अन्यथा SATA स्यात् तस्माच्चिञ्जाड्यनित्यता |
6 8.८. that if a thing is capable of being known, it must exist; we cannot know the non-existent
6 I take nitya as here meaning sat.
7 See my note, suprd, on Aph. 48.
of Sandilya. 91
is always identical with its effect.1 So too, in the same way, Brahman. ` 18 identical with the world, as its material cause, —it exists by his existence.|] It will not do to hold [with the follower of the Ny4ya] that the connexion between the cause and its effect may be that called ‘Intimate relation,’ and not that called ‘Identity,’—because it is a much more cumbrous assumption than ours and involves the connexion of ‘difference’; ? and by our own we easily get at the true meaning of the various Sruti passages,—seizing them one by one, as oxen by their horns.® Hence the Supreme Lord’s causality consists in his being in all his effects [as identical with them]; his efficiency arises from his knowledge extending to all objects which are to be known.‘ [Nor may our opponent assert with the S4nkhyas, that then mind (buddhi) might be the world’s material cause,—for] even if mind were to be directly illumined by the Witness [Soul], still, since mind is properly itself unknowable, we should con- tradict, by our assumption that it could be known, the very definition of mind and extend it to cases where it cannot apply.°
1 This is a favourite doctrine of Sanskrit philosophy, especially of the Sankhya, from whence it was probably borrowed by the Vedanta. The bracelets, earrings, etc., made out of gold, are only gold after all.
2 For two things to be related by Intimate relation, they must be originally differ- ent, i.e. foo things; our assumption of their real identity is more simple and therefore better suits the Law of Parcimony.
3 8.९, such passages as ‘ Uktha is Brahman,’ ‘ Préna (breath) is Brahman,’ etc. S‘ringagrdhikd-nydya is a proverb sometimes explained as ‘catching an unruly bull first by securing one horn and then the second,’ and sometimes, ‘ driving many oxen into a stall, by seizing them one by one by their horns.’ Samayah in 1, 5 seems to mean the same as samanvayah.
4 By the first he is their material cause, as the gold of the earrings; by the latter their efficient cause, as the goldsmith, since ‘ what a man knows, that he can do.’
5 The Pandit’s note, which I translate, clears up most of the difficulty of this hard passage. “ ‘But if duddhs is thus connected with all its objects, then why should not buddhs be the world’s material cause, and not Igswara?’ He replies, ‘if mind (buddhr), etc.” The meaning of the passage is as follows: The knowledge of visible objects, as jars, etc., is twofold, (a) the connection of the senses with the object [see note infra, p. 100], and (4) the result obtained. By the former the concealing veil of ignorance is destroyed; by the second, which is the manifestation of intelligence or soul, as reflected on the mind which is evolved in connection with the object, we obtain the knowledge of the jar. (Or as it has been said, in more exact conformity to the Ved4nta doctrine, ‘ the evolution (vrst¢s) of the mind as associated with the object and the manifestation of
92 The Aphorisms
When Iéwara awakes from sleep, after a mundane destruc- tion, his intellect (duddhi) is the first thing that arises; and having contemplated thereby the various relations of causes, effects, etc., he, the Lord, proceeds to create the world. Although in itself without an object, yet as the disguising associate of His Intelligence, it abides as the oil in the lamp, etc., and illumines, revealing a specific character. Next from the volition ‘I will make’ arises the principle of Egoism, as is established by various passages of Sruti and Smriti, as, for instance, “ He looked,—he thought, ‘may I be multiplied.’”’?
Since Egoism extends through all the developments of in- tellect, as wish, etc., it too is a first principle; but in it in- tellect also itself resides by reason of its being still more general. ‘I am the ruler [and I will such developments for my own enjoyment,’—this is the utterance of Egoism;] and since all things are thus created by volition and are determined by Egoism, Egoism is the cause of the subtil elements, the gross elements, and the organs of sense and action ; but among these also we must likewise allow that the respective genera, called the several ‘forms’* of sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, are likewise themselves the causes of their respective grosser developments [ether, air, etc.]. If you object,* that “if this were the case, we should be able to detect these first
intelligence,—these two pervade the jar; by the first ignorance is destroyed, from the manifestation the jar itself bursts forth into view.’) We must here take the latter sense, as we must consider buddhi to be directly illumined by the manifestation of intelligence (which is called ‘ the witness’ in the text); but even so this would contradict the true notion of buddhi, as it is not a proper object for itself to cognise [just as the eye cannot see itself],—and therefore it is not the true material cause of the world.’”’ I read in p
63, line 9 afaaqwahtrarcy for -व्धभिचारे but one of the Sansk. Coll. MSS reads the lines very differently from the printed text बुजेस्त सासिभासयाया
बोद्धव्यत्वं यतो धियः । Tear बुच्िजवे व्यभिचारोऽपि संभवेत् ॥
1 Having spoken of creation, the writer proceeds to describe the order in which it proceeds.
* Chhéndogya Upanishad, vi. 2.
$ Scil. gabdatwa, ete.
4 This is said to a Naiy4yika objector.
of Sdndilya. 93
principles everywhere”—TI answer that I quite allow it, since in fact we do perceive these underlying first principles, when we once recognise their developments, in exactly the same way a8 you recognise your genera in the different individuals.! Such is the progressive expansion of the ‘general’ first prin- ciples as developed in the ‘special’ ones; and the fact is un- doubted that all the first principles, beginning with Brahman, combine to be the material cause of every material product, as é.g. yonder pot.
Nor would it be right to object that our first principles are superfluous as causes, because it is sufficient to assume pre- existing desert? as the one necessary cause of everything in the world ;—for nothing can ever be made without its being identical with its material cause, and your pre-existing desert [being only the instrumental cause] cannot produce this identity.3 |
Moreover, these first principles, which are the causes of the world, are also indirectly means to Liberation ; + therefore, since individual souls are multitudinous and not identical,5 intellect, egoism, etc., have been created separately in the case of each individual. Intellect never wholly ceases from the first crea- tion in an zon to the final destruction ; but individual intellects are temporarily abolished during sound sleep, and this abolition is unending in Liberation.
But the creation of all things in succession from Intellect,
1 The follower of the Ny&ya recognises one genus aéwatwa (the eldos of horse) in all individual horses—so we recognise the features of intellect, egoism, etc., in all the different products which make up the world around and in us.
2 Karman. |
$ The Pandit explains sl. 136 (¢dddtmydd anthathd ° ददन) as tdddtmyam vind vastuno ‘sambhavdt (i.e. the anyathdsiddhs of 1. a 18 the well-known technical term, in ]. 8 it 18 to be resolved into two words), The ‘pre-existent desert’ is an instru- mental, not a matertal, cause; and its presence has nothing to do with the necessary relations between the material cause and its effect.
५ Intellect, egoism, etc. (since life is impossible without them), contribute to pro- duce that knowledge of and faith in God which produce Liberation.
6 ६.९, so far 88 their phenomenal (vydvahdrika) nature is concerned.
6 T understand prdnindm before atdddimydt.
94 The Aphorisms
as held by the atheistic Sankhyas, is untenable, from the ab- sence of any proof to uphold it,—this is declared in the next Aphorism.
[Creation] is not from the individual intellects because it is tm- possible. (88).
From whose intellect is the successive creation of gods, rishis,
etc., declared in the Veda to have been produced? This crea-
tion is not possible ;! therefore there must be a Supreme in- telligent Lord.
Having created high and low he also creates the Vedas like a Jather. (89).
Having created all beings high and low, according to their respective merits and demerits, He creates the Vedas through His desire for their welfare.” As a father, having begotten children, teaches them also by his words the unknown means of attaining good and avoiding evil, so does He too, this su- preme Lord.
Lf you say ‘Not so, from the mized teaching,’ we reply No, from the extreme smaliness [of the part which you object to]. (90).
If you object, “ But this Lord is not benevolent like a father, since his teachings relate to sacrifices which are mixed up with injurious acts productive of sin;”*—we answer, No, for, inasmuch as the [evil] fruit of these injurious accessory parts is so small in comparison with the bliss produced by the principal parts, the enjoiner of the former is not to be ` accounted therefrom other than benevolent.—“ But should we not rather say, that, since the injurious act (which is only an ancillary portion) has no fruit of its own apart from the general result of the whole sacrifice, the general prohibition
1 As I cannot translate the reading sambhavdd bhitasargo’yam, I adopt the reading of the Sanskrit Coll. MS. na sambhavati sargo ’yam.
2 This alludes to the slaying of animals enjoined in so many of the ceremonial sacrifices.
of Séndilya. 95
[‘thou shalt not harm living things’] has no force in refer- ence to such enjoined ancillary acts; otherwise there would be simultaneously one command to perform and another to abstain from performing, and consequently there would be an option left to the sacrificer; therefore the general prohibition only holds in those cases where there is no special injunction to suspend it, just as we see in the general injunction regard- ing the offering in the Ahavaniya fire.”! To this we reply,— we grant that injury to living beings produces an evil desert so far as it goes, and that all such injury is a cause of sin; here there is no dispute between us.
“But if this be so,” our opponent replies, “then,—as the meaning of an ‘injunction’ really is that it will produce a desired end unaccompanied by any predominant undesirable result,*~this general injunction, as it is accompanied by a ‘not,’ [‘thou shalt not harm living things’] warns us that this characteristic is absent from such actions, and thus all this injury to living beings [in sacrifices] produces sin and misery $
1 This pirvapaksha expresses the doctrine of the Nyfya and Mim&msé schools, and shows how they meet the objection against the Veda drawn from the killing of animals enjoined in the sacrifices. They hold that an ancillary part of a rite has no fruit of its own apart from the general fruit of the whole,—it only exists for that whole; consequently it does not come within the scope of the general prohibition, as this only refers to independent acts.—The allusion to the Ahavaniya fire is to be explained as follows. It is said in the Taittiriya Brahmana (i. 1. 10. 6), ‘‘ whatever he offers in the Ahavaniya fire, therewith is the fire worshipped and pleased by him,” the Ahavaniya fire is therefore that in which the offerings of butter, etc., called dhutis, are generally offered. Now in the offering connected with the ceremony called wpanayana (when a father takes his son to the teacher), it is said that three dhutis are to be offered; but these are not to be offered in the consecrated Ahavanfya fire but in un- consecrated, as the boy, having as yet no learning, has as yet no right to the Ahava- niya, 866 Jaiminiya-nyf&ya-m4l4-vistara, vi. 8. 2. Here therefore the general rule is suspended by the special rule which is only an ancillary part of the upanayana.,
2 This is the view of the modern Ny&éya, 866 Siddhanta Mukt&vali, p. 135. (Cf. Kusum4njali, transl. p. 80.) 9 3 There is an important misprint in p. 66; 1. 14; Saraegqar should be दुखाचहेतता, which is the reading of the Sansk. Coll. and the Oxford MSS. The
88४08}. Coll. MSS. read the whole line, तथा सवात्महिंसाया WAT दुःखाघहेतुता,
which I have adopted in the above translation.
96 The Aphorisms
fand consequently all such actions are to be scrupulously avoided }.”’
We grant all this to a certain extent; but the pain, which arises as an ancillary part of a sacrifice, is not ‘predominant,’ since it is inseparably connected! [as a preliminary | with that happiness of heaven, etc., which is the fruit of the sacrifice as a whole. Otherwise if we did not analyse this notion of ‘predomi- nance’ [but allowed all kinds of pain to be tpso facto ‘pre- dominant’], we should have to extend the deterring influence of pain too far, [and exclude all action of every kind, through a dread of some minor pain inseparably connected with it;] therefore this idea of ‘predominance,’ as applied to pain, 18 a special characteristic? [whose presence or absence can only be inferred in each case from the result]. Thus, for instance, in the case of death as an expiation for some heinous guilt or in that of suicide at the meeting of the rivers at Praydga, the pain of self-destruction is light compared with the benefit resulting from the act, [but not so in the case of a slight toothache or fever]. Hence Panchasikha has said that this pain is ‘to be borne with patience,’ from its being so small; but it is not so to be borne where it assumes a real importance from being predominant.®
[We also find expiatory rites provided to meet this necessary killing of animals, for] there are general rules declared by the Veda, enjoining the performance of the Paryagni rite;* while
1 Just as the hungry man will still gladly eat, in spite of the trouble of obtaining, cooking, and lifting up his food to his mouth, which are inseparable adjuncts.
2 Jdtivigesha seems here to mean much the same as our ‘ differentia,’ ३.८, it forms a class.
8 This refers to a sdtra of Panchagikha (an ancient teacher of the SAnkhya said to have been a disciple of Kapila’s pupil, Asuri), quoted in Vy&sa’s Comment. to the Yoga Stitras, ii. 13, and in V&chaspati’s Tattwa-Kaumudi (K4r. 2), “the mixture with a very small pain is easy to be obviated [by expiations], and to be borne with patience, and it is not enough to destroy one’s merits. Why 80 ? Because I have much other merit stored up, in which this little annoyance being thrown will make little diminution in heaven.”
4 “The priest takes a firebrand from the Ahavaniya fire and carries it on the right side thrice round the animal which is to be sacrificed.”"— Haug, Ait. Brahm. transl. ii. 5. This rite is to avert evil, see Taitt. Brahm. 11, 1. 3.
of Séndilya, 97
Manu provides for the five slaughter-places in the householder’s house.! Since then we have here no principle of universal applicability [but one strictly limited to the duly initiated Vedic householder and priest, | and since it will apply still less to one who is devoid of the due qualifications, to whom shall the player who presumes to slaughter animals fly for refuge P?
But since from their connexion with Sruti, these éruti- ordained rites produce desert [and consequent fruit,| then the question arises, does that desert [and fruit] belong to the per- former or the enjoyer, or does it reside in the Supreme Lord ?
Bddardyana says* that the fruit comes from Him, because we see it ४ so in ordinary life. (91).
We see in common life that the ordinary rewards and punish- ments of men’s actions come from the king’s being pleased or displeased; and the Saint Badarfyana declares that they similarly come from Him, Brahman.
The fruit does not reside in the doer, because we see that, when the father performs the ordained rite on the birth of a son, it is the son [not the father] who receives the fruit [in the shape of ceremonial purity, health, etc.]. If you maintain that the enjoyment of the fruit resides in the enjoyer, we must still discuss where it really resides,—for yours will be only a tauto- logical definition, since each term will depend on the other for its being intelligible. Therefore from the analogy of ordinary life, we conclude that it is from the Supreme Lord’s being pleased or displeased, that a good or an evil result arrives to the
1 Manu, iii. 68,69. These five ‘slaughter-places,’ १.९. the fireplace, the grindstone, the broom, the mortar, and the waterjar, are only expiated by the five daily sacrifices. 2 In the Vishnu Pur. ii. 6. 21, it is said that ‘players, fishermen, poisoners, in- formers, etc., will go to hell,’—the player is therefore by his profession at once debarred from offering sacrifice. I follow the Sansk. Coll. MSS. and read AT: &
for ACR.
3 Vedanta 34788) 111. 2. 38.
५ 8.९. if you are asked where the enjoyment resides, you answer ‘in the enjoyer;’ if you are asked who the enjoyer is, you answer ‘ he who possesses the enjoyment.’ (I read in 1. 15 savyapekshandt.)
7
98 The Aphorisms
person who is its proper subject. Nor need we assume any inter- mediate link to account for the fact of the results thus gravitating to the proper subject [१.९. we need not bring in a new influence of apirva or desert to explain it]; else we should have to bring in the same idea of apurva in ordinary life, in the case of the service or offence done to the king [and the consequent reward or punishment]. Hence it is that we find it expressly stated in the Sruti! that human actions give pleasure to ’éwara.
“But they who follow out this ambrosial doctrine as I have declared it, full of faith and devoted to me, they my votaries are exceedingly dear to 106.
And although we thus ascribe to Him displeasure and pleasure, the Supreme Lord is not thereby brought within the sphere of phenomenal life, for He himself is all that exists, He is exempt from all pain, and He is likewise eternally free.
Dissolution arises from a regression, for so it is seen to be. (92).
Dissolution [as in the great periodical mundane destructions | is held to arise from a regression of ‘the special’ elements into ‘the general,’? since we see, by actual observation, that the special forms, as e.g., jars, etc., are resolved into the general substance earth.
Here ends the first daily portion of the third chapter of the Commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of SAndilya composed by the most learned teacher SwapnesSwara.
The second daily Portion.
The individual soul’s becoming one with Brahman is called Liberation ; by accurately discussing this the nature of the one great object of Faith will also be made more clear. While investigating the question ‘how can one thing become another?’ the author of the Aphorisms declares the capability of the individual souls to become Bhagavat.
1 Bhagavad-gith, xii. 20. “ Cf. the beginning of the Comm. on Aph. 87, and my note on Aph. 48,
| of Sdndilya. 99
Its unity appears as diversity or unity, according to the influence or the destruction of the disguiser, as is the case with the sun. (98).
It is said in the Chhandogya Upanishad (iii. 14), “ All this is verily Brahman,” and in the Katha (iv. 11), “There is here no variety whatever ;”’ and so also in such passages of the Gité as these (xi. 32 and 2), ` “Ag the one sun illumines all this world, so, O son of Bharata, the soul illumines all the body ;”
८८ And know me also, O son of Bharata, to be the embodied soul in all bodies,” ; the soul’s nature is expressly declared to be unity; therefore the idea of diversity which presents itself apparently to con- sciousness, really belongs to the internal organ as the disguiser and is produced by it in the soul! And so too says the Sruti, “It is seen in one way and likewise in many ways, as the moon in water ;”’ and so again (in the Vishnu Purana, IT. xvi. 22),
८.48 the one sky is apparently seen diversified as white, blue, etc., so Soul, which is in truth but one, is seen by those of confused vision as distinct in different persons.” |
When by the highest form of faith, the internal organ, which is the soul’s disguiser, is destroyed, this essential oneness comes out without any contradiction, just as is the case with the sun, whose nature is light, as soon as its reflecting dis- guisers, as mirrors, etc., are destroyed.”
Tf you say ‘ Souls are distinct,’—not 80,—because as self-manifesting light they would have no connexion with the Supreme Soul.’ (94).
Some hold that “souls are several, entirely distinct from each other, each consisting of self-manifesting light; for otherwise
1 In p. 65, last 1. and p. 66, line 1, the Sansk. Coll. MS. has a much more intelli-
gible reading than that given in the printed text ुभूयथया — अनुद्धतः, which 1 have adopted. It is as follows,
अत एव यो AAT: स जीवोपाधिवुद्ैरात्मनि wa: | 3 The individual soul is the reflection of Soul on the mirroring internal organ (८४९50) . 3 The Sansk. Coll. MS. reads prakdsétmandm for prakdsdnam,
100 The Aphorisms
you could not say that such a soul was liberated and such a soul bound ;” but this opinion must be rejected, for even if it might be consistently held by the atheistic Sankhyas, it cer- tainly cannot by the Theistic S4nkhyas [and much less by us Vedantins]. How so? Because, consisting as they do of self- manifesting light, there could be no such a relation between the Supreme Soul and them as seer and object seen, since they would not be illumined by him, just as lamps, as self-manifesting, are not illumined by the sun, And hence we should have to admit in Brahman an absence of omnipotence and omniscience, and the consequent capability of being himself knowable [as not himself infinite]. Nor yet! can we allow that souls are illumined [by Brahman],—because it would follow from this that they were themselves non-intelligent.2 Nor can we allow that souls are illumined [and thus manifested] by the mutual evolution of their internal organs; because this manifestation is produced by the removal of the darkness [which veiled the otherwise self-revealing object],5 and not by the evolution
1 The Sansk. Coll. MS. reads in p. 68, 1. 16, भ च प्रकाशाः; if we read WA we must suppose Wf to be omitted (cf. note supra, p. 67).
2 There isa rule यद्धि परख प्रकाश्चं तख्बडम्.
3 This passage is only cleared up by a comparison with the statement in p. 72, 1. 13, 14 (Calc. text), see infra, p. 108. The author seems in both to diverge slightly from the usual Vedfnta doctrine. He holds that by the connexion of the senses with an external object, the darkness of ignorance which previously concealed that object from the internal organ is removed; then that form of the internal organ called the understanding (5uddht), influenced by the quality of ‘goodness,’ becomes evolved so as to assume the form of that object, and is illumined by the light of Brahman; and by that light the object is thus rendered manifest. Thus the eye of a certain man comes in contact with a jar, and the ignorance which had concealed that jar from him is removed; his understanding next assumes the form of the jar, and is illu- mined by the light of Brahman, and the jar is made visible to that individual. (In the Vedfntasfra the understanding itself removes the ignorance by its evolu- tion (vrittt), while here the connexion of the senses removes the ignorance or darkness, and the understanding is subsequently evolved and illumined.) In the supposed case where one individual soul makes another soul its object (as also in that where the soul makes Brahman its object), the former step alone is possible, as the object, being self-luminous, shows itself as soon as the intervening obstacles are removed. (Cf. Vedanta S. pp. 22, 23.) One of the Sansk. Coll. MSS. reads 1. 17 tamo ’ bhibhityaivdntahkaranasatiwavyittyd, which seems an attempt to bring the statement in harmony with the usual doctrine; but cf. p. 72 (Calc. text),
of Sdndilya. 101
of the internal organ under the predominance of the quality of goodness [which causes it to cognise |.
This manifestation [by the evolution of the understand- ing] is out of the question, as in this case it is wholly inap- plicable [since the soul is essentially light, and will therefore show itself]. For we see also in the external world that, even though the veil between two lamps [caused by a curtain] is removed, one lamp cannot be illumined by the other [since both are self-luminous |. :
Thus we learn that in the case of the external and internal light [६.९. the lamp and the soul,—however different in other respects they may be from each other], there is found a common though non-essential quality,' [६.९ their incapability of being illumined by anything else]; and it is the presence of this common quality whieh enables us to apply the word ‘light’ [properly applicable only to the external object to the soul in a metonymical sense based on likeness,’ as in those words of the Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, iv. 3. 9, “this soul becomes itself pure light.”’ |
Therefore the soul which is pure thought is proved to exist solely by the very fact of its illumining the world [and thus making it an object of cognition]; no external proof is needed. And again, the existence of soul is incontestably established by the fact that. 1४ is the receptacle of those attributes of the in- ternal organ which are erroneously reflected on it, and that it is also the only site of all essential knowledge; while we can only apply the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘happiness’ in a secondary and figurative sense to the functions of the understanding.
‘What proof can there possibly be of the existence of
1 An aupddhika dharma is one which does not arise from ४ thing’s nature but frem some external relation between it and something else,—it is nearly equal to our ‘ accidental.’
3 Cf. Shhitya Darpana, pp. 14,15. A metonymical meaning (/akshya) is called gauna when it is based on likeness, as when we say ‘that ass the man from the Punjab,’ not meaning that the man is actually a quadruped, but that he resembles the ass in stupidity and obstinacy.
102 The Aphorisms
separate souls? That the primary principle, the ‘understand- ing’ (buddhi), exists separately [as associated with separate individual personalities] is certain enough; how otherwise could there be the determination of bondage or freedom in the case of souls which in themselves are eternally 166 ? 71
“Well then, let souls? be capable of being modified, and let knowledge, desire, etc., be their qualities, from the fact that we are conscious of such perceptions as ‘I know,’ ‘I desire,’ ‘I am happy,’ etc.”’ The author refutes this opinion in the following aphorism.
Souls, however, are not capable of modifications, because it is the instrument which ts modified. (95).
Souls are not capable of such modifications as knowledge, etc.; why? because knowledge, etc., are accounted for by the fact that the perception of pleasure, etc., belongs to the instru- ment [.९. the mind |, and consequently the souls are unmodified. Thus in the inference [already given in p. 3] “the perception of pleasure is through an instrument,’ we assume that the connexion® between the perception and the instrument 18 that of identity ;* and again there is also the argument “ pleasure, etc., are not modifications of soul, because they are perceived [98 reflected] in soul, as paleness, etc., are perceived [as re- flected] in soul.” 5 ‘So too the mind perceives the idea of self, by being identical with its cause [egoism]; and consequently, as the mind itself is dissolved during sound sleep, we have in sound sleep no self-consciousness. Moreover, these apparent qualities of mind [६.९. joy, knowledge, etc.] are really what
1 This answers the difficulty suggested eaprd.
2 In p. 69, 1. 6, I read with the Sansk. Coll. MS. santu dimdnah for sattdtmanah.
3 The Sansk. Coll. MS. and the Oxford MS. read in p. 69, 1.12, °@CUWPaRTRz.
५ ६.९. joy, knowledge, etc., really reside in and constitute the internal organ, but are only reflected in soul. In p. 72 (Cale. ed.) they are called buddher vikdrah.
This refers to such expressions as ‘*I am pale, etc.’ where the quality
which really belongs to the body is reflected on the soul and applied to it. Cf. supra, p. 3 । 5 0
of Séndilya. 103
constitute mind, just as the so-called limitations of time! are really what constitute time itself. This short discussion will suffice for our purpose here
He next proceeds to discuss how the soul becomes Brahman
This is produced through the absolute abolition of the individual’s understanding® by undeviating faith. (96).
It is said [in the Gité (viii. 22) ],
“He is that supreme spirit, O son of Prith4, who is to be attained by undeviating faith, in whom all beings reside and by whom all this world was spread out.” And so also [in the Nrisimha-pur4na |, ^ Wherefore is not an effort made for libera- tion into the ancient spirit, who is to be attained only by faith?” Therefore Liberation is the attainment of the joy of Brahman, when the individual understanding is entirely abolished by the highest faith,—this is the true meaning. And therefore its definition is in fact declared to be the attainment of that joy of Brahman unaccompanied by the antecedent non-existence of the abolition of the individual understanding.’ (Here we consider the ‘understanding’ (duddhi) as the disguiser of the individual soul [and not really belonging to it], since we only accept the understanding as belonging to God‘ [all creation being produced by his May4].)
If you rejoin, that “by this last view of yours the attainment
1 The Ny&ya holds that although time is in itself only one, it is called by the names moment, day, month, etc., past, present and future, through different limitations or accidental conditions (wpddhi). Thus that time is called ‘past’ which is thé counter-entity of a present ‘emergent non-existence,’ as the past day; that time is called ‘future’ which is the counter-entity of a present ‘antecedent non-existence,’ as the following day; that time is called ‘present’ which is at once the counter- entity of a past ‘ antecedent non-existence’ and of a coming ‘emergent non-existence
2 Sc. duddhi.i—In Aph. 96 I read with Sansk. Coll. MS. tadbuddhilaydt for tadbuddhir buddhtldydt
3 In p. 70,1. 4, I read with the Sansk. Coll. MS. prdgabhdvdsahavritti. If we read with the printed text sahavrittt, I suppose it must mean that the soul really existed in Brahman, even before the understanding (buddht) associated with it was abolished,—although of course it was not conscious of it through the delusion pro- duced by that association
4 I follow the Sansk. Coll. MS. in reading line 7 of p. 70 here, after suchitam It is separated from its context as given in the printed text
104 The Aphorisms
of the joy of Brahman would no longer be an end for man, as it is not really a future thing to be attained, but one already possessed and settled [the soul being even now identical with Brahman | ;’—we reply that it is still an object for man to pursue, as it also admits of being determined by a special relation to himself, just as a village may be [for although the village already exists and is not to be produced by our will, we can still produce by our efforts a direct relation between us and it as proprietors and property]. Otherwise [if you absolutely denied that what is thus determined by something else can be an object for man, even though from another point of view it is not fixed,] it would follow that even happiness itself could not be an object for man. For we cognise it as the thing ‘happiness’ (sukha) determined by the general idea of happiness (sukhatwa) which inheres in it, and this general idea [like all jdtis] is eternal and therefore fixed ; and therefore our wishes and volitions would have no power to pursue it, as these [unlike the power of cognition] cannot separate the determined from the determinant.! Therefore we maintain that wish and volition, under the colour of that part of the object which is unfixed, pursue also that which is fixed, both being to them inseparably united.? If you say that the knowledge that the object is not to be attained by our volition will always act as a restraint,—we reply that there is no incon- gruity in supposing that a violent passion may lead irresistibly to action by overshadowing the idea that the desired end is
1 The Hindus hold that on the contact of the organ of sense with an object, as ९.८. 9 jar, there arises the idea of a jar and also the idea of the nature, ४.०. el8os, of jar (both being equally objects of perception) but the two ideas are distinct,—this is nirvikalpaka, Subsequently the mind combines them into one idea, ‘a jar possessing the species or nature of jar,’ and this is savikalpaka. We are however not conscious of the first step,—it is only recognised as necessary from an analysis of the subse- quent compound idea. Swapneswara maintains that ‘wish’ and ° volition’ have not this double mode of exercise which the power of cognition has; they can only act as sa-vikalpaka and seize the desired object together with its species, t.e. they cannot separate the non-eternal individual pleasure from the eternal and fixed species or general idea residing in it.
2 In p. 70, 1. 10, read with the Oxford and Sanskrit Coll. MSS. सिदे ऽ पीहाहछती,
of Séndilya. 105
hot wholly attainable by our volition,—just as in the parallel case of the hawk-sacrifice,! where anger overshadows the know- ledge in the sacrificer’s mind that it will be accompanied by a predominant undesirable result? [7.e. hell].
Moreover it is said in an Agama, “Joy is the essential character of Brahman, and that becomes present in liberation,” and this very text proves that the attaining of such a state is an object to be striven for.
“But even if this supreme faith be established,—just as the pre-existing merit and demerit which produce the necessity of living in the present life can only be abolished by experiencing these effects, so too the other forms of merit and demerit can be similarly cancelled only by experience; and hence there can be no such thing as final liberation after all.”’ To this objection he replies,
So long as life lasts in the one case; but the others will be cancelled Jrom the absence of any place for them to abide in. (97%).
When this devotion to the supreme soul is produced, the words of the Chhéndogya Upanishad come true,’ (vi. 14),
“So long it [bodily existence] remains to him, until he shall be liberated [from merit or demerit]; then he shall attain to the end.”
And so too in the Vishnu Purana (I. ii. 20),
‘What has he to do with merit, wealth or desire? Libera- tion is placed in his grasp, who has firm faith in thee, the root of all worlds.” :
By ‘life’ is meant the merit which operates to produce life in this present birth; this, so long as it lasts, hinders liberation even though the highest faith exists,—so long the devotee only attains jivan-mukti.4 But since, when the merit which produces
1 «८ Tet him who desires to kill his enemy by incantation offer the hawk-sacrifice,”’
—Shadviméa Br. iii. 8. > Cf. Kusumfnjali, v. 13. $ Compare the similar argument in S’ankara’s Commentary on this passage of the Upanishad.
५ “The third kind of liberation is effectual in lifetime (jfvan-mukti) and enables he possessor of it to perform supernatural actions; as evocation of shades of progeni«
106 The Aphorisms
life is cancelled, the understanding also entirely ceases, the ‘other’ merits and demerits will also be ‘ cancelled,’ ६.९. will not produce experience,' from the absence of any place for this to abide in.* Hence it does not follow, as you supposed, that there can be no such thing as final liberation,—since even the understanding it- self acts negatively as one of its causes, by the very fact that it can be so changed [7.e. can be cancelled, and therefore cease to hinder the desired issue]. Nor need we suppose that these other merits and demerits will in this view cease altogether to be causes ; because a cause does not altogether cease to be & cause, because its necessary concurrent is not present.’
{An objector might however say that “merit and demerit (which constitute fate or adrishta) might be thus cancelled, if they resided in the intellect of the person to whom they belong; but you hold that they reside in the intellect of the Supreme Lord, for you declared in your Commentary on the 91st Aphorism that our rewards and punishments came from Brahman’s being pleased or displeased; and therefore, as re- siding in Him, they cannot be thus cancelled.’”’ We reply, | This adrishta which resides in the mind of the Supreme Lord in the form of his pleasure or displeasure can be cancelled by the effect of time or by the occurrence of a mundane catastrophe, just as the effects of the several parts of a sacrifice, which are being accumulated towards the aggre- gated total, may be cancelled by the failure of one part, and thus fail to produce the general effect. The transference of
tors, 61९.) translation of himself into other bodies called into existence by the mere force of his will, etc.’>—Colebrooke, Essays, vol. 1. p. 399.
1 In p. 71, line 4, read with the Sanskrit Coll. MS. भोगासखदस्याभावाद्धानि-
मोगाभाव एवेति The printed text seems to me meaningless.
2 Buddhi being the site of all phenomenal consciousness.
3 s.¢. the gunpowder still retains its power of causing an explosion, though without the concurrence of a spark it will not actually exercise it.
५ The new-moon and full-moon sacrifices consist of six parts, as the offering to Agni, etc.; each of these parts produces its own partial adyishta; but the general adrishta is only produced by the united effect of all. Ifa sacrificer had completed five of these partial offerings and died before the completion of the sixth, the general effect would be lost.
of Séndilya. 107
all the result of our actions to the Supreme Being [which our theory so earnestly inculcates| directly abolishes the tendency of these ‘ hindering’ actions to produce bondage. The fire of knowledge only destroys the influence of our actions indirectly [by leading to faith; but not directly, as Sankara’s followers would inculcate |. |
Their mundane existence arises from want of faith, not from igno- rance, since this 1s not established to be a cause. (98).
“Ts the mundane existence of the individual soul considered to be caused by ignorance, or is it caused by want of faith?” The Aphorism proceeds to answer this question.—A temporary heaven,—liberation while still alive——and absolute liberation, —these are the three paths; liberation while still alive implies the possession of the highest faith; but the want thereof in- volves a mundane course from birth to birth. This mundane existence arises from the absence of the desire of faith; when faith is produced, it ceases; and thus has it been said by the great sages ;
“‘So long are there pain and this desire, so long infatuation and sorrow, while the soul does not fly for refuge to thee, the deliverer from all sin” (Vishnu Purdna, I. ix. 72).?
The creation is caused by ignorance of the truth; by know- ledge we hold that creation is abolished ; when the causes vanish which produce the snake and the rope, these effects likewise cease to exist. The succession of births, the dreadful scourgings of Yama’s attendants, the various sufferings, and the sight of the Son of the Sun (Yama),—these are the mirage of the wave of the creature’s egoism and personality ;—the effect of turning away from the lotus of Krishna’s feet.
They have three eyes, like Rudra, divided as revealed speech, a sign, and sense-perception. (99). ‘They,’ 2.4. embodied souls, have ‘three eyes,’ 2.८. three means
` 1 The Sansk. Coll. MS. reads abhakteh and kdranatwdsiddheh, but both are rather glosses than the true reading.
° For तु सा the Bombay edition of the Vishnu P. reads तद्या.
108 The Aphorisms
or ‘proofs’ for attaining certain knowledge of things. Although they do not differ as to being certain, they are three as being three different instruments. Thus ‘speech’ [i.e Revelation | produces verbal certainty, being in the form of certain words and their meanings which are congruous and understood. Revelation is here mentioned first [and not, as is usual, sense- perception, ] in order to declare its pre-eminent efficiency as a means for producing supernatural faith. So again the knowledge of ‘a sign’ [or middle term] which abides in the minor term and is invariably accompanied by a known major term, is the cause of inferential certainty; and in our school we should not dispute the definition, if [instead of the words ‘the knowledge of a sign which abides in the minor term, etc.,’] it ran ‘the sign when recognised as abiding, etc.,’ for we hold that an effect always exists in its cause.! Again, the senses when in contact with their objects are the causes of certain perceptive knowledge; and these are six, the organs of smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, and the mind [or the percep- tive power]; and these, by their connexion with their objects, having overpowered the darkness of ignorance which had enveloped the internal organ,? produce an evolution of it as influenced by the quality of goodness, so that it forthwith assumes the form of the object as illumined by the light of the Brahma-soul. Hence it is said in the Gita (xiv. 11),
“ Light arises in this body through all its avenues.”’
But when we say that joy, sorrow, etc., are also per- celved [as well as external objects], and speak of them as modifications of the understanding? which is associated with the individual soul,—it must be remembered that these
1 If we said that ‘a sign, when recognised as abiding in the minor term, etc., is the cause of an inference,’ it might be objected that in this case no inference could be drawn if the sign were past or future at the time of inferring (see Bhdshdpart- chehheda, &1. 66). He replies that in his view (as in that of the Sankhyas) an effect is always existing in its cause, and therefore the sign will still be equally present, though latent.
3 Compare with this my note, supra, p. 100. 3 Buddhi.
of Sandilya. | 109
are made manifest by the soul’s own immediate light; and we have no need to assume the process of an evolution of the quality of goodness in the understanding to account for their being perceived,—since it would be uselessly cumbrous. These in truth are to be illumined by the witness Soul directly, There are therefore only three proofs, revealed speech, in- ference, and sense-perception, like the three organs of sight in Rudra, neither more nor less,—and like them they imply an identity with the moon, the sun, and 76. The supposed proof called Comparison is only useful for comprehending the direct meaning of a word; and this is effected by the mind with the assistance of the ‘analogous’* form of inference, starting from the recognised fact that a well-known word is applied to the same object to which the unknown word is applied [as in the stock instance that ‘a bos gaveus means an animal like a cow,’ | 3 just as we determine by analogy the metaphorical meanings of the words and phrases of poetry.* ‘Comparison’ is therefore included in the three above-mentioned proofs and is not required as a separate one. We do not extend this discussion on the different proofs any further here, as it has been fully discussed by us in the ‘Touchstone of the first principles of the Nyaya,’ and in the ‘Touchstone of the first principles of the Vedanta.’®
1 S‘iva’s right eye is the sun, his left is the moon, and his third eye in the centre of his forehead is fire. I suppose that the sun properly stands for revelation as being the brightest, the moon for inference (from its connexion with paksha as ‘the lunar fortnight’ and ‘the minor term,’) and the five fires for the five senses. In the text, however, the moon is put first in the compound (according to the rule abhyarhitam cha) as being the monarch of the stars, planets, and br&hmans, see Vishnu Pur. I. xxii.
2 For the sdmdnyato drishta form of inference see Nyfya 898, i. 5,—it is where the inference is drawn from generic qualities, the specific ones being unnoticed, as ‘it is a substance because it has the nature of earth.’ The ‘sign’ is not here the cause or the effect, as in the purvavat or seshavat form.
$ This is contrary to the Ny&ya as well as the Vedinta, both of which accept Comparison (syamdna) 88 a proof. Cf. my notes to the Kusum4njali, translation, iii sections 10-12.
4 Or this might mean, ‘just as we determine the meaning of the word ‘section as applied to poetry.”
5 J know nothing of these two works; neither is mentioned in Dr. Hall’s Biblio- graphical Index,
110 | The Aphorisms
The ‘intellect’! [or ‘understanding’] associated with the individual soul is the same as the ‘mind’;? this faculty possesses the power of contraction and expansion; and in this way we account for the simultaneousness and non-simultaneousness of perceptions.$
Since the intellects thus associated with the individual souls sprang from the egoism of Féwara [or Brahm], the idea of ‘I’ 18 grasped directly [without any action of the perceptive faculty or any evolution of the intellect itself‘] as residing in the intellect, just like pain, pleasure, etc.5
Again, since the subtil elements, the gross elements, the organs of sensation and action, etc., were produced by the intellect of Féwara, all this [external world] is to be known by Yéwara’s intellect,’-—it can therefore be grasped by the soul and by its associated senses.’
1 Here follows a digression on ‘ perception.’
3 The S&ankhya considers ‘intellect,’ ‘egoism,’ and ‘mind’ as quite distinct from each other; the Ved4nta holds that the internal organ has a fourfold division from its different modifications. Thus understanding or intellect (buddhi) is that modifica- tion of the internal organ which consists in assurance; mind (manas), that which consists in resolution or irresolution ; thought (chitta), that which consists in investi- gation; and egoism (ahamkdra), that which consists in self-consciousness. See Vedanta-sara, p. 8.
ऽ According to the Sankhya two or more perceptions may be simultaneous, as the smelling, seeing and touching of a flower,—according to the Nyfya they are success- ive, as the mind, being atoméc, can only receive one sensation at a time,—the apparent simultaneousness is only caused by very rapid succession, like the apparent circle of light caused by a rapidly whirled torch. Our author maintains that the mind which he here identifies with the intellect (duddhs), is not atomic but susceptible of expansion and of contraction, and when it is thus expanded it can receive several sensations at the same time, when contracted it can only receive one.
4 Cf. supra, p. 100 and p. 109.
5 The Sankhya and Vedinta hold that pain, pleasure, ete., are qualities which reside in the intellect but are reflected upon soul, and so wrongly attributed to it; the Ny4ya of course calls them qualities of soul
The pandit quotes a iyama or principle, (ay Qy बुद्धा क्रियते तत् वद बुद्धि वेद्यं भवत्येव
This passage is very obscure. I can only suppose that it means that our in- tellects having sprung from Iswara’s egoism, must be capable of being connected with the external world which was produced by his intellect (see p. 91). The process by which it is known is that before described; the senses remove the darkness, and our intellect, being evolved so as to assume the shape of the object, is then illumined by the soul’s light. (The subtil elements are only perceptible to yogins.)
of Séndilya.’ 111
` The five gross elements, the five subtil elements, the eleven organs [of sense and action], egoism, intellect, Nature, the soul and the Supreme Lord—these form the aggregate of the twenty-six first principles.
Manifestation! and disappearance are changes [of the existing], Jrom the connexion with the result of the action expressed by the verb. (100).
The author proceeds to discuss a mundane creation and de- struction, as being collaterally related to the subject. Now creation is defined as a ‘manifestation,’ 2.6. the competency of an already existing thing to produce its effects; while ‘disap- pearance’ is its incompetency to produce them; thus too, in- crease, decrease, etc., will similarly be only changes of the already existing. How so? Because in such phrases as ‘he makes a pot,’ ‘he destroys a pot,’ etc., we have a relation speci- fied between the object and the result implied by the meaning of the root; and this relation can only take place in that which is, not in that which is not, as has been said in the Gita (ii. 16),
“Existence cannot belong to that which is not, nor non-exist-
ence to that which 1s.” So too by such phrases as ‘it exists,’ ‘it is destroyed,’ etc., we similarly understand that the subject is the site of the action implied by the root; but this power to be a site can only belong to that which is. | ।
Now ‘manifestation’ [or creation] means the being connected with the initial moment [from which the subsequent series of events dates], or, as it may be more accurately defined, it is the being a counter-entity to destruction ;—since our former defini- tion was not strictly correct, as it is impossible to point out a really initial moment [as the sequence of creations and sons is eternal]. But you have no right to say that, as every manifestation must have had its manifestation, we must
1 For ऋविस्तरो भावा read with all the MSS. आविख्िसोमावा.
112 The Aphorisms
plead guilty to the faults of an ‘ad infinitum regression’ or ‘cumbrousness’; for the union of all the pot’s antecedents (as the clay, the wheel, etc.) is really the manifestation of the pot’s manifestation; and if you hesitate to grant our definition, your objections will apply with equal force to your own hypothesis of ‘production,’ since here too you -will have to concede a similar unending succession of previous productions.!
And thus we may define the ‘antecedent non-existence’ of a pot as the succession of continued previous manifestations and disappearances, while ‘destruction’ [or ‘emergent non-exist- 606 ° ] will be its ‘disappearance’; and this destruction will be sometimes absolute, as in the case of the deceased Devadatta’s body or of the intellects of those souls which have attained
1 T give a translation of my pandit friend’s clear note on this hard passage.
¢ An opponent might thus argue: ‘‘ But if you accept the idea of ‘ manifestation ’ and reject that of ‘production,’ is your ‘ manifestation’ itself continuous or occa- sional? If it is continuous, why should it not be eternal? If it is occasional, then the manifestation of this said manifestation will be either continuous or occasional. But if it is continuous, you will again have to concede that it is eternal ; or if it is occasional, you will have again to allow a manifestation of this occasional manifesta- tion, and so on. Thus you will be involved in the fault of an ‘ad injinitum re- gression.’ Or on the other hand, if, in order to avoid this fault, you allow that the second or third manifestation was produced, not manifested, you will be involved in the fault of ‘ cumbrousness,’ because if the idea of production is to be conceded at all, it might as well be allowed at the very first step.”
‘ We however reply :
८९८ We grant that if we accepted the idea that a pot’s manifestation was itself mani- fested, and then went on to concede a further manifestation of this second manifesta- tion, we should be involved in one of the two faults you allege; but we do not concede this. We hold indeed that the pot is manifested, not produced; but we do not allow a second separate manifestation of this manifestation,—we maintain that this mani- festation of the manifestation is only another expression for the sum total of the causes which are said, in your phraseology, to produce the effect, the pot; as wherever this sum total is found, there the manifestation takes place. This explanation removes all fear of an ‘ ad infinitum regression,’ as there is no continued succession of supposed manifestations.
‘<¢Nor, again, is your own hypothesis of production a whit more free from the same charge. For we may in turn ask you whether this ‘production’ of yours is con- tinuous or occasional, If it is continuous, then why is it not eternal? if it is occa- sional, we ask whether there is a production of this production or not? and so on, thus involving either an ad infinitum regression, or the fault of ‘cumbrousness.’ And you will similarly have to assume, as we did, that the production of the first pro- duction is not something separate but is only another expression for the sum total of the causes, as in our case.”’
of Séndilya. 113
liberation. But the so-called ‘mutual non-existence’ and ‘abso- lute non-existence’ are not really distinct forms of non-exist- ence, since the former is only the possessing mutually exclusive properties, and the other is only the same as the thing’s site [४.९. the absence of the pot really means only the spot of ground where it should have been but is notj. Otherwise, we should have to accept another absence in the first absence and so on ad infinitum.
But in a ‘mundane destruction’ (pralaya) we have only the absence of any developments other than that particular one called a mundane destruction. But there is no difficulty in this hypothesis with regard to the arising of subsequent crea- tions, since the latent influences produced by past acts [which are to germinate into future merit and demerit, and determine subsequent births] remain permanent in a very subtil form and are not destroyed.
Thus closes our threefold investigation into the doctrine of Faith.
May Krishna’s brightness, set off by the Kaustubha gem, abide in your hearts, as he was seen clothed in yellow garments,
himself dark blue like a cloud, with his long eyes like a lotus petal, holding the pipe, and adorned with the dust of the cows.?
1 My pandit friend thus explains this passage: “ Mutual non-existence is not some- thing distinct, but only the possession of mutually exclusive properties. Thus ‘a pot is not cloth,’ ^ cloth is not a pot ;’ we have here an example of mutual non-existence. Now the pot has those qualities constituting pot-hood (ghaftatwa) which are contrary to those which exist in cloth, and similarly cloth has those qualities constituting cloth-hood (patatwa) which are contrary to those which exist in a pot.—So too ‘absolute non-existence’ [as in the phrase ‘a pot is not there’] is not something distinct, but is really the same as the ground where the pot is not, ४.९. the absence of the pot is recognised in the ground [this is the Mim&ms4 doctrine, see Siddh4nta- muktavali, p. 9]. This has been accepted in order to avoid the necessity of allowing an infinite succession of absences. For as we must allow that there is no pot in the absence of a pot, we must perforce concede that there is the pot’s absence in this afore- said absence; and if this second absence be something existing by itself, a third absence of the pot will similarly have to be conceded as existing in it, and so on ad infinitum. Hence we maintain that the absence of a pot is not something existing by itself, but simply the spot of ground where we expected to find it and it was not there.”
2 In 1. 3 the MSS. have parimanditam. =~ *
8
114 The Aphorisms of Sandilya.”
There was in the bracelet of Bengal (Gauda), sprung from a renowned world-jewel,! a leader of the wise, named ViSarada, who held the post of monarch over all the rulers of the earth ; from him sprang Jaleswara, chief of the learned, and general of kings; by Swapnesa his offspring, was this investigation into the doctrine of Faith composed.
Here ends the second daily portion of the third chapter of the Commentary on the Hundred Aphorisms of Sandilya, com- posed by the most learned Swapneéwara, and with it ends the chapter and the book.
1 Cf. the lines, In earth’s dark circlet once the precious gem Of living light, O fall’n Jerusalem.
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